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Play is a very interesting thing. Somewhat strangely, though, play is not stud-
ied as often as are the consequences of play.
 The reason for this becomes clear when we try to study play: it is a very 
hard thing to study. Play resists our scrutiny in characteristically slippery 
ways. One of these is the degree to which play is dependent on and deter-
mined by paradox. In The Nature of Computer Games (2003), I spent a great 
deal of time focusing on the paradoxical nature of play. In that book, I classi-
fied paradoxes according to commonly accepted categories, examined com-
mon features of those categories, and concluded that paradoxes—and most 
particularly play-related paradoxes—are a form of self-reference.
 Prototypical examples of self-referential paradoxes are these:
•	 The Liar’s Paradox: This statement is false.
•	 Russell’s Paradox: The set of all sets that are not members of  
 themselves.
 In the Liar’s Paradox, the “statement” refers to itself directly; in Russell’s 
Paradox, the “set” refers to itself by including itself in its own membership. 
The result, in both cases, is that we have trouble understanding what these 
paradoxes mean. When we try to derive a meaning from the Liar’s Paradox, 
for instance, we find our meaning-making process oscillating between think-
ing the statement is true (which it must be in order to be false) and thinking 
the statement is false (because, after all, that is what the statement says it is).
 This oscillation of meaning doesn’t stop. And because we find ourselves 
(potentially forever) in the midst of this oscillation, befuddled, our aware-
ness and attention turn from the meaning we cannot derive to the meaning-
making process that cannot derive it. That is, we turn our awareness and 
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attention from the content of meaning to the form of meaning (and/or the 
lack thereof).
 In this brief analysis, then, are a couple of important realizations concern-
ing the nature and study of play that I wish to pursue further here. First and 
foremost, play involves a special form of self-reference. And because play 
exhibits a particular self-referential form—similar to paradox—the study of 
play offers opportunities for formalist methods of study. Second, a self-ref-
erential form is also, obviously and importantly, referential. Therefore, the 
study of play should involve not only the study of self-referential forms but 
also the study of references and referencing in general: that is, semiosis.
 Currently and curiously, the study of play does not often focus on either 
its formal properties or its semiotic properties as much as it focuses on other 
things. The most prominent and frequent of these other things is culture.
 In the 1970s, which was quite some time ago it seems, I was an under-
graduate English major at Yale University. Walking across campus on some 
dark and snowy eve, a fellow student pointed out to me a bearish figure 
receding in the distance, coated and capped, who was, I was told, William K. 
Wimsatt, “the formalist.”
 After a long career in academia, Wimsatt died in 1975; his primary teach-
ing duties at Yale had been curtailed—if not completed entirely–sometime 
before that. Thus, I am uncertain whether this figure in memory was Wimsatt 
indeed or simply one relatively naive student’s wild speculation to another. 
In any case, that particular image has stuck in my mind as emblematic of the 
decline of formalists and formalism, both of which were, by the mid-1970s, 
being shunted into obscurity.
 During the mid-twentieth century and beyond, formalist models of lit-
erature were superseded by structuralist models of history and, subsequently 
buoyed by post-structuralism, cultural studies. In this supersession, cultural 
studies relegated the study of language and literature—and aesthetics in 
general—to a subset of its own broader, more inclusive, and often impen-
etrably complex view of social relationships as instrumental and unavoidable 
in determining human thoughts, interpretations, and meanings.
 Ostensibly, semiotics is the study of semiosis, or the human meaning-
making process. However, in common practice, semiotics as an academic 
discipline has tended to adopt a particular set of assumptions regarding how 
and under what influences a human-like meaning-making process operates. 
These assumptions are, by and large, equivalent to those of cultural studies. 
Thus, conventional semiotic analysis situates the human meaning-making 
process in a particular cultural context.
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 This is contrary to the assumptions I am going to bring to bear here, and 
it is contrary to the original assumptions of formalism as held and promoted 
by William K. Wimsatt, Cleanth Brooks, Viktor Shklovsky, and other similar 
formalists.
 Wimsatt and Beardsley (1954) coined the terms intentional fallacy and 
affective fallacy to emphasize exactly this issue. The tenets of their “New 
Criticism” claimed that it is the literary work itself—its interior mechanics—
that determine its value as literature, or its “literariness.” If you were, rather, 
to determine that literariness on the basis of author intent—including author 
history, culture, or psychology—then you would be guilty of an “intentional 
fallacy.” Likewise, if you were, rather, to determine that literariness on the 
basis of audience (reader) response—emotive or otherwise—you would suf-
fer from an “affective fallacy.”
 Above all other things, it is this claim that sets formalism apart from its 
opposition: the formal properties of an artwork are its defining properties.
 When we apply an unadulterated formalism to the study of play, we pro-
duce a similar claim: the formal properties of play are the defining proper-
ties of that play. This is the primary claim I will make here, and this claim (if 
true) allows us to position semiotics, in contrast to its position within cultural 
studies, as a science. At its core, semiotics as a science investigates repre-
sentationalism, intentionality, and human meaning-making as fundamental 
components of human activity and expression and, equally importantly, as 
more general features of the natural world. For, although human meaning-
making processes often behave and feel as though they were subjective, 
semiotics as a science would attempt to uncover their objective properties, 
regardless of cultural context. These objective properties may appear most 
evident in the mechanics of a common, singular, and universal meaning-
making form.
 The most oft-cited studies of play and the historical basis for most con-
temporary play and game studies are not formalist studies. The two most 
prominent of these are Huizinga’s Homo Ludens (1938) and Caillois’ Man, 
Play, and Games (1961). Each of these early works has something important 
to say regarding the crucial issue of whether human culture is determinant 
of or determinable by human play.
 Huizinga’s thesis, for instance, is clear:
The aim . . . is to integrate the concept of play into that of culture. Conse-
quently, play is . . . understood . . . not as a biological phenomenon but as a 
cultural phenomenon.1
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Yet Huizinga’s analysis subsequently reveals play as dependent on something 
other than cultural contingency.
If this innate tendency of the mind . . . is in fact rooted in play, then we are 
confronted with a very serious issue. We can only touch on it here. The play 
attitude must have been present before human culture or human speech 
existed.2
 Caillois’ book, more focused and restrictive in theme than that of 
Huizinga, prefers to examine and categorize toys and games (“the residues of 
culture,” p. 58) rather than either play or culture in broader contexts. To this 
end, Caillois’ analysis is largely directed toward attempting to uncover—the 
same attempt I will make here—universal properties of play as form: “These 
diverse qualities [of play activities] are purely formal. They do not prejudge 
the content of games” (p. 10).
 Thus, both Huizinga and Caillois (much more readily, in fact, than most 
contemporary analyses of computer games) acknowledge a cross-cultural 
and interdisciplinary play element: an element that is formal, biological, and, 
ultimately, universal.
 The consensual successor to the early Huizinga and Caillois landmark 
studies is Sutton-Smith’s well-received The Ambiguity of Play (2001). This 
book is the crowning achievement of one of the most prolific, influential, 
and insightful scholars of play in the latter half of the twentieth century; yet 
The Ambiguity of Play is also quite characteristic of the current “cultural 
turn.”3
 In The Ambiguity of Play, as the title implies, Sutton-Smith describes 
seven distinct play “rhetorics,” each indicative of a particular set of cultural 
values and beliefs. It is only in the final chapters of his book that Sutton-
Smith, almost reluctantly, offers his own definition of a culturally indepen-
dent play that he describes as “adaptive variability.”
Evolution is characterized by quirky shifts and latent potential. What could 
be more fundamental in talking about all forms of play than to describe them 
in terms of the centrality of this notion of quirky shifts? . . . The notion that 
play itself is some kind of adaptive variability, and therefore presumably some 
kind of reinforcement of realistic adaptive variability, is very attractive.4
I define play as a facsimilization of the struggle for survival.5
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 Despite claims such as these (which I find very attractive as well), Sutton-
Smith, in the current fashion, qualifies his biologically derived definition with 
reference to some larger cultural context in which it must reside: “Despite 
my extensive criticism of the rhetoric of progression, I have now invented yet 
another form of it” (p. 231).
 I will not attempt hereafter, as Sutton-Smith has, to allay the concerns of 
cultural studies; I will attempt to more directly assert the assumptions and 
consequences of a biologically derived human play that is most recogniz-
able in its common formal properties. Huizinga, Caillois, Sutton-Smith, and 
others have referenced these properties, but always without embracing—or 
confronting—them fully. These unrealized assumptions within the cultural 
studies of play might be least controversially labeled biological naturalism, 
which supposes material and objective properties of human cognition as 
essential to an understanding and analysis of that cognition and, by exten-
sion, cognitive play.
 Using the assumptions of biological naturalism, I hope to revisit and, 
hopefully, revitalize formalist aesthetics theories that have been pushed aside 
in the intervening decades of scholarship since their origin.
 The realm of computer games seems an especially good place to attempt 
this pro-formalist task. For computer games, of all types of games and play, 
are most securely situated in the formal properties of a digital game code, 
which is much more measurable and more determinable than that code’s 
pre-digital analog: game rules.
 From the perspective of semiotics as a science, computer games are most 
essentially semiotic machines that generate and transform meanings through 
the coded manipulation of signs and symbols. The more accurately we are 
able to replicate these evocative qualities of computer games, the more likely 
we are to gain insight into some of the more problematic areas of human 
representationalism. To this end, the procedural structures of computer 
game design and play may be considered homologous to the human cogni-
tive structures that enable them. Therein, the study of computer game forms 
and rules—and particularly the study of the interactive and transformative 
properties of paradoxical play with those rules—has the potential to emulate 
the representational qualities of the human mind in form and, perhaps, in 
function.
 Admittedly, however, neither computer games nor computer game rules 
entirely encompass the phenomenon of play; and, in fact, the study of play is 
well justified in and of itself, with or without special reference to computer 
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games. I have had some occasion to reflect on this larger matter: why the 
study of play is, in itself, important.
 In one instance, David Crookall, the energetic editor of the long-running 
scholarly journal Simulation & Gaming, compiled a reflective issue, to which 
I contributed. Similarly articulate and energetic editors have called upon me 
to contribute my thoughts on the value of studying play and games during the 
initial publication of the relatively new Sage journal Games and Culture. The 
same question was asked in each instance: why do we now have an increasing 
number of game studies, scholars, journals, and interests?
 There is no doubt that much of the current (twenty-first-century) aca-
demic interest in computer games and game studies is driven by the recent 
commercial success of the video game industry. There was, in fact, a brief, 
but otherwise similar, surge in academic interest in computer games and 
gaming during the early 1980s; when Atari was in its heyday, Chris Crawford’s 
Balance of Power received coverage in the New York Times Magazine (Aaron 
1985), and I published my first analyses of computer games (Myers 1984).
 That early video game market went bust, however, and game scholars 
went back to what they had been previously doing: designing, playing, and 
writing about games in a relatively more obscure and less convivial environ-
ment. Now, more than twenty years later, as the game industry re-asserts 
prices and profit margins, we once again find games and the scholarly study 
of games popular and, increasingly, popularized. Once again, games are 
interesting and appealing things—as is game play.
 So, the more important question is not really “Why game studies now?” 
but, rather, “Why game studies at all?” Out of several reasons I have given in 
the past, let me re-emphasize two.
 First, the study of games involves the study of play.
 In 1999, after reviewing thirty years of articles in Simulation & Gaming, 
I said this:
What I’ve found in my review of [Simulation & Gaming] is encouraging: the 
continued and resolute focus on the game-playing process. Perhaps this is 
more by luck than design. Many contributors seem to be either dedicated 
game designers or game players—or both. It’s natural and expected, then, 
that much of their analysis is based on either game design or play. But, if this 
is luck, then it’s also serendipidity, for (once again) it is exactly the process of 
play—aside from its effects—that is at the center of the whirlpool of theory 
in other fields.6
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After all, what other aspects of human behavior (other than play) are so com-
mon, so universal, so pervasive, so profound, and so critical to an under-
standing of human nature, well-being, and self-consciousness—yet studied 
so seldom?
 Often, play studies are deemed synonymous with child development 
studies; and too often, theories of play remain narrowly focused within 
developmental models that, for all their insights, fail to consider seriously 
the implications of widespread and common adult play. Yet play is surely not 
so characteristic of the human child as it is of the human species.
 Past and current game studies clearly demonstrate that game play is a 
cross-generational phenomenon. Indeed, definitions of games, based on very 
curious and sometimes paradoxical distinctions between rules-bound and 
rules-free systems (see Klabbers 1996), portend revision and transformation 
of conventional understanding of rules-based systems of all sorts: govern-
ments, economies, cultures. Sutton-Smith, in particular, has been influential 
in extending the study of play beyond the boundaries of child education and 
development by emphasizing aspects of games and play—rough and “dark” 
play, for instance—that have been discounted by developmental theorists.
 Second, the study of games involves the study of representations.
 The study of representations and the study of play are closely connected. 
The study of representations within games emphasizes formal properties of 
games; the study of play emphasizes the functional properties of those same 
aesthetic forms. One of the more intriguing potentials of game studies is to illu-
minate this connection and, in the process, perhaps resolve some of the more 
vexing problems in representationalism and philosophy of mind. Prominent 
among these is what Harnard (1990) terms the “symbol grounding” problem: 
an information processing dilemma based on the paradoxical implications of 
an endlessly recursive semiotic process operating without a clear and common 
reference—or “ground”—to some objective correlative or “other.”
 In fact, it has long been my contention that problems and anomalies 
associated with human semiosis—such as the symbol grounding problem—
do not result from flaws of thought or logic but, rather, are necessary and 
inevitable characteristics of representationalism. Game studies may well 
help specify such problems more clearly—as well as come to some deeper 
and more complete understanding of the incorrigible nature of their, at best, 
partial solutions.
 Games, like literature, use conventional signs and symbols in unconven-
tional ways. Early formalists focused the study of literature on the nature 
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of “literariness,” or on those fundamental properties of literary form both 
derivative of and in reference to the habits and conventions of a natural lan-
guage. In this same sense, what are the fundamental properties of games? 
What properties of game designs and forms distinguish games from other, 
more conventional acts and objects of human creation and culture?
 Surely, these characteristics involve the form and function of representa-
tions within games. All games—all play—are, after all, virtual. And in our 
current age of the virtual, games and play occupy central positions.
 Yet, while most concede some fundamental role to representationalism 
in understanding and analyzing games, there has been, to date, little overlap 
between the study of representational form and the study of game form—
much less overlap than in other academic fields involving other aesthetic 
domains.
 Linguists, semioticians, and some in philosophy of mind have most often 
carried this particular interdisciplinary torch forward. But the intellectual 
net is, in fact, widespread. Early exemplars of a game-related cognitive aes-
thetics include Jakobson’s analysis of metaphor and metonymy (Jakobson & 
Halle 1956), Levi-Strauss’s (1979) study of binary structures in myth and 
culture, Lakoff and Johnson’s (1999, 2003) insight into analogies and the ori-
gins of language, Marr’s (1982) examination of visual perceptions and cues, 
and Johnson-Laird’s (1983) treatise on mental models. Other studies, the-
matically similar but slightly closer to the study of games and related enter-
tainment forms, include Bordwell’s (1989) essays on film, Csikszentmihalyi’s 
(1991) psychological analysis of flow experiences, Grodal’s (2003) investiga-
tion of the relationship between games and sensations, and Aarseth’s (1997) 
identification of aporia and epiphany as common and fundamental charac-
teristics of game forms.
 Each of these reveals how representational forms function as aesthetic 
objects during the creation, manipulation, and interpretation of signs and 
symbols. And each of these studies can be usefully applied within a cognitive 
aesthetics (coordinated with a biological naturalism) that would correlate 
phenomenological experiences—“fun,” for instance—with more objective, 
representational, and, ultimately, cognitive forms. Game studies are posed to 
emphasize, articulate, and explain such a correlation, much to the benefit of 
cognitive sciences and cognitive aesthetics.
 Some further things are perhaps best said here in the beginning.
 While I will pursue a formalist analysis, I will not attempt to be either 
overly technical or, for that matter, strictly precise in describing forms of play 
and games. This is not entirely an admission of defeat; it is an admission of 
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inaccuracy. The precise nature of a technical explanation of play consistently 
eludes us all, and so I have come to believe that this elusive characteristic of 
play is its characteristic form.
 In analogy, for instance, there is a paradox known as Berry’s Paradox: 
“The least integer not nameable in fewer than nineteen syllables.” In pre-
vious analysis, I have, as Berry’s Paradox attempts to describe its integer, 
attempted to describe play as, essentially, indescribable. Since I am able to 
do that only indirectly and only with analogous references to other, similarly 
indescribable forms, I will attempt to make those references as palatable and 
accessible here as possible.
 Further, if I wish my analysis to be clear, and if I were to look for guid-
ance in the clarity of my academic colleagues, I would find those colleagues 
in philosophy to be, pretty much by far, the clearest and most able writers. 
An important element of this clarity, I’ve noticed, is that articles and publi-
cations in philosophy tend to have fewer references than articles and pub-
lications in the social sciences, where game studies largely reside. Principia 
Mathematica is a well-known and prototypical example of this ability of the 
philosopher to find validity in an extended examination of his own argument 
rather than in the piecemeal—and often rhetorical—introduction of the 
abridged arguments of others.
 While I am not so brave as to disregard entirely the value of the citation-
filled treatise, I confess that I have thought about it. As a result, I hope to 
present my argument here aided as appropriate but unburdened, if possible, 
by the sometimes overzealous ritual of citation.
 In the game studies community, controversies arise, from time to time, 
concerning the nature and relevance of the examples used to discuss the 
fundamentals of computer game play. Because the computer game industry, 
like other digital media industries, undergoes rapid evolution and change, 
examples of computer games used as a basis for theory development may 
sometimes be considered too “old” and therein not fully descriptive of more 
current behavior in computer game play. I rather think, in general, that the 
opposite is true.
 As I argued in The Nature of Computer Games, computer game play 
and design very quickly converged in the 1970s and 1980s into a relatively 
limited number of still easily recognizable genres and patterns of play. These 
formal patterns are determined by the relatively intractable nature of human 
cognition and, thus, are actually often more evident in the simpler and less 
embellished forms of early computer games than in their later, slicker, and 
more commercially institutionalized forms.
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 A related issue here involves the concern that to understand computer 
game play, it is necessary to fully experience that play. I sympathize strongly 
with this concern—which poses a serious obstacle for the analysis of a phe-
nomenon that requires, quite literally, hundreds and hundreds of hours of 
computer game play in order to most intimately learn and understand the 
systemic nature and individual consequences of computer game play.
 Nevertheless, the nature and necessity of computer game play can only 
be gauged when that play takes place over an extended period of time, in a 
repetitive and recursive process. That is, the process of play only becomes 
most evident when and where there are multiple applications of that pro-
cess.
 These multiple applications might take place within a large group of play-
ers, or, equally validly, these multiple applications might take place within 
some single and extended period of play. Therefore, in most cases, here and 
elsewhere, I have tended to use expert computer game play as an indication 
of what is most likely to occur when computer games are played regularly 
and extensively. Expert play is better used for this purpose than beginner 
play in that expert play is more complete in its exploration and realization of 
computer game form.
 Finally, a last word on biological naturalism and media determinism: if I 
wish to position play as originating in the natural history of the human spe-
cies, then, obviously, the environment in which that species has evolved is 
important to acknowledge. This synergy between human environment and 
human behavior is readily apparent in natural affordances—of which com-
puter games make much and significant use.
 Computer games—as well as the digital medium they represent—can 
be considered an environmental influence on human behavior and, one 
might suspect, therein capable of radically transforming those (like us) who 
increasingly live, breathe, think, and evolve within a digital landscape. This 
was indeed the assumption of the once-popular media determinist Marshall 
McLuhan, who quite literally believed that digital media extended the human 
senses and, in that process, transformed human cognition. That will not be 
my position, however.
 The most basic argument asserting the primacy of biological code over 
digital code in determining human behavior is simply this: Given two sys-
tems of code, one in human cognition and one in digital media, which could 
be expected to interact with and, over time, adapt to the other? Which would 
most likely display the greatest amount of variation and adaptive change over 
time?
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 Obviously, it seems to me, the system that is more flexible and capable of 
change will adapt more quickly and more radically to its environment than 
will the system that is less flexible and less capable of change. Thus, the code 
associated with digital media forms is more likely to adapt to the code associ-
ated with human interpretive processes—rather than vice versa.7
 Giving at least face validity to these assumptions, the same simple argu-
ment can also be applied to social and cultural “codes.” These, too, seem 
more obviously amenable to sudden change and variation than do biologi-
cal codes governing human cognitive behavior. Thus, according to the same 
logic as above, social and cultural rules and systems are more likely to reflect 
adaptations to human cognitive properties than vice versa.
 So, in sum, despite their potential to wreak havoc elsewhere, it is highly 
unlikely that digital media have had any impact whatsoever on the funda-
mental properties of human cognition.
Consciousness is a biological process like digestion, photosynthesis, or the 
secretion of bile. Of course, our conscious lives are shaped by our culture, 
but culture is itself an expression of our underlying biological capacities.8
It is improbable that our species evolved complex adaptations to even agri-
culture, let alone to postindustrial society . . . The available evidence strongly 
supports this view of a single, universal, panhuman design, stemming from 
our long-enduring existence as hunter-gatherers.9
 In fact, almost without exception, new media technologies have already 
evolved in accordance with the requirements and characteristics of human 
sensibilities—rather than vice versa. The evolution of computer games dem-
onstrates this as well as any other new media form: from black and white 
to color, from flat to three-dimensional visual displays, from mono to sur-
round sound, and from isolated and single-player games to more socially 
oriented and complex massively multiplayer online role-playing games 
(MMORPGs—or, for short, MMOs).
 And yet, because computer game forms adapt to and model human sensi-
bilities, it does not necessarily follow that computer game play either extends 
or transforms those sensibilities. Indeed,
it is important to recognize that behavior generated by mechanisms that are 
adaptations to an ancient way of life are not necessarily adaptive in the mod-
ern world.10
12  play redux
 In other words, self-reflective computer game code does not entail self-
enlightening computer game play. One of the enduring themes I wish to 
promote here is that computer games evolve toward the subjective and the 
psychophysical and, in that evolution, remain steadfastly apart from the 
objective, the physical, and the real. The consequences of this include self-
pleasure and self-understanding, in many cases of computer game play, but 
also self-delusion, in many others.
 Here is what you will find in the rest of the book:
 Chapters 1–5 (What computer games are) develop a computer game aes-
thetic, which I position as an anti-aesthetic. The first chapter is a description 
of the fundamentals of play as a semiotic process. Here I establish a model 
of play as a rules-breaking mechanism and outline critical distinctions, based 
on this model, among play, games, and simulations.
 In Chapter 2, I dwell on the concept of anti-ness in form, in philosophy, 
and, most relevantly, in play.
 Chapter 3 establishes some revealing connections between a formal anal-
ysis of computer games and play and previous formal analyses of literature 
and “literariness.”
 Chapter 4 examines the form of computer games in more detail, high-
lighting differences between computer game code and computer game inter-
face, both of which have significant influence during computer game play. 
This chapter also defines and gives examples of two most important formal 
properties of computer game play, which together constitute interactivity: 
recursion and contextualization.
 In Chapter 5, I summarize the meaning and implications of a computer 
game anti-aesthetic as regards computer game play and existing theories of 
computer game play, particularly theories based on the assumptions of cul-
tural studies.
 Chapters 6–8 (What computer games aren’t) introduce a more focused 
analysis of specific computer games in terms of their narrative potentials and 
the inconsequential nature of those potentials. Chapter 6 debunks the notion 
of narrative as an important influence on computer game play in general. 
Chapter 7 looks at the misguided use of narrative-based analysis to under-
stand genres in computer game play, and chapter 8 looks at the presence 
(infrequent) and absence (often) of narrative influences in Sid Meier’s famed 
Civilization computer game series.
 Chapters 9–11 (The self and the social) deal with one of the more cur-
rently engaging topics in game studies: social play. This analysis is most 
generic in chapter 9 and then increasingly specific and detailed in chapters 
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10 and 11, regarding the mechanics and consequences of play in the MMO 
City of Heroes/City of Villains (CoH/V) (Cryptic Studios, 2004). Chapter 11 
describes a case study of CoH/V play in which social play and game code are 
in significant conflict.
 Chapter 12 (The genie in the bottle), in finale, is quite short. This chapter 
repeats and re-emphasizes the basic characteristics of computer game play 
that I have found enlightening elsewhere, as well as making some speculative 
comments concerning the future of social media and the consequences of 
social policies directed at regulating and controlling individual and idiosyn-
cratic (e.g., “bad”) play in social media contexts.
 These chapters are a compilation—not in any particularly ordered 
sequence, but nevertheless in significant bulk—of a series of similarly themed 
articles I have presented and published in various game-related conventions 
and contexts since The Nature of Computer Games appeared in 2003. I am 
grateful to those in charge of such things for allowing the words and ideas of 
the following original articles to reappear as necessary and appropriate here:
“Forms of rules of games of forms.” In J. Sorge & J. Venus, eds., 
Erzählformen im computerspiel: Zur medienmorphologie digitaler 
spiele. Bielefield: Transcript. 2009.
Play and punishment: The sad and curious case of Twixt. In The 
[Player] Conference proceedings. Copenhagen: IT University of 
Copenhagen, 2008.
The videogame aesthetic: Play as form. In Mark Wolf & Bernard 
Perron, eds., Videogame reader II, 45–63. New York: Routledge, 
2008. Copy right © 2008 from “VIDEO GAME THEORY 
READER/2/2 by David Myers. Reproduced by permission of Taylor 
and Francis Group, LLC, a division of Informa plc.
Self and selfishness in online social play. In Akira Baba, ed., Situated 
play, Digital Games Research Association Conference proceedings, 
226–34. Tokyo: University of Tokyo, 2007.
Plays of destruction. In B. Perron, ed., Intermédialités, 9. 2007.
Video games: Issues in research and learning. Simulation & Gaming 36 
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You wanna play rough?
Okay. Say hello to my little friend.
 —Tony Montana, Scarface (1983) 
There are many encouraging things about the rise of game studies over the 
past couple of decades, but there are many discouraging things as well. One 
of the most discouraging is the degree to which the youngish field of game 
studies has gained credibility by reproducing existing research methodolo-
gies and assumptions. Since game studies involves the study of play and since 
play incorrigibly approaches all objects and topics in an abject state of dis-
belief and doubt—that is, in a state of play—it might be hoped that young 
game studies scholars, of all their academic colleagues, might display a simi-
lar attitude of skepticism, doubt, and disbelief that would lead them, at least 
in their very own and brand-new field of study, to question the values and 
beliefs of their academic mentors.
 But, no. Computer game studies have quickly become, like all other 
forms of academic scholarship, very much like all other forms of academic 
scholarship: serious. And imbedded in this seriousness of method (not so bad 
in and of itself) is a set of seriously debilitating values.
 While theories of play and games are generally regarded as serious and 
therein good, play itself is most often regarded otherwise. Play is notorious 
in that it is most frequently non-serious and therein bad—ignorant, destruc-
tive, and/or illegal.
 In computer game play, ignorant play is often denigrated as “noob” play; 
destructive play would include “griefing” and the like; and illegal play in 
game contexts involves, among other things, exploitation of game rules and 
codes (including commercial rules) during pirating and hacking activities. 
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But bad play is obviously a much larger category than just that associated 
with computer game play. The theoretical term for this bad play is often dys-
functional play, and most existing play theory has a hard time explaining why 
dysfunctional play exists at all. Here, by “most existing theory,” I primarily 
mean developmental theories of play.
Contemporary theories of play . . . are concerned with the ways that play ben-
efits children’s psychological development. They have continued to impact 
on early childhood programs, particularly in under-fives settings, where we 
now see play located at the heart of the curriculum and used as a vehicle for 
nurturing children’s development across its various domains.1
 Implicit in all development theories of play2 is the assumption that the 
natural history and evolution of play documents some necessary and benefi-
cial component of play vital to species survival. That is, play is deemed valu-
able, and that value is then awarded according to the functional benefits play 
provides.
 However, if play is beneficial, then what exactly is beneficial about play 
that is risky, dangerous, and destructive? These and many other common and 
negative outcomes of play are either ignored by developmental theories or 
discounted by those theories as deviant abnormalities—or, in other words, as 
“bad” play.3
 Yet the subjective pleasures of bad play4 seem as direct, immediate, and 
engaging as those of good play. It is, then, difficult to explain why evolution 
has assigned the same visceral response to risky, harmful, and antisocial play 
as to safe, beneficial, and pro-social play.
 There are some speculative answers. For instance, perhaps the pleasures 
of bad play are a vestigial response and, in humans, bad play indeed no lon-
ger serves the same species functions as it did and does within lower animals. 
Or perhaps the function of bad play is more positive at the group level of 
analysis than at the individual level; in this case, bad play would, in effect, 
sacrifice the welfare of the individual for the welfare of the group. Or, per-
haps, on balance, bad play is more advantageous than its more obvious risks 
and harms would superficially indicate.
 There is, at present, no firm evidence supporting these speculations. And, 
regardless, the perception of risky and harmful play remains clearly nega-
tive within developmental theories of play—and elsewhere. Even when the 
pleasures of bad play are acknowledged in less than serious, non-theoretical 
contexts—in popular works of art and fiction, for instance—these pleasures 
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are commonly attributed to animal, primitive, or otherwise irrational and, 
thus, undesirable origins. Yet these pleasures, guilty or not, remain.
 And so, why bad play? In the remainder of this chapter, I am going to 
try to answer that question regarding two potentially inclusive categories of 
generic bad play: play that is threatening, risky, or otherwise harmful to the 
self or others; and play that is against the rules. Of these two, the former can 
be considered a functional definition of bad play; the latter can be consid-
ered, in contrast, a formal definition of bad play.
harmful play 
Much play that is physically threatening or risky to players is also pleasurable 
and is, for that reason, actively sought by those players who put themselves 
most at risk. This category of risky but enjoyable play includes so-called 
extreme sports, as well as less competitive but equally dangerous behav-
iors: bungee jumping, skydiving, riding roller coasters, and the like. Indeed, 
the pleasures of these activities seem, to a great degree, determined by the 
amount of risk involved.
 Putting someone other than yourself at risk during play includes bully-
ing and other aggressive forms of childhood play—sometimes labeled “dark 
play.”5 In fact, aggressiveness toward others has long been cited as an indica-
tion of bad, inappropriate, and antisocial play6 among children and adults. 
However, just as putting yourself at risk may be considered appropriate or 
inappropriate, pleasurable or not, depending on the context, putting others 
at risk may also be interpreted and valued differently in different contexts.
 Many violent sports—boxing, for instance—assume some risk to the 
participants. More informal yet still willfully aggressive play, either during 
play fighting7 or during those circumstances in which play fighting and real 
fighting are blurred—for instance, within the movie Fight Club (1999) (or, 
perhaps, within hockey games)—provide pleasures and gratifications largely 
indistinguishable from those provided by non-aggressive and non-risky play.
 This is true of many quite risky non-competitive games as well—as 
evident in the history of and popular fascination with Russian roulette. 
Originally appearing only in fiction (in a story written by Georges Surdez 
in 1937 for Collier’s magazine), Russian roulette has become as widely 
known as it is infrequently practiced or “played.” Indeed, the classification 
of Russian roulette as a form of play (rather than suicide) seems critical to 
its popular conceptualization as intriguing behavior. The movie Deer Hunter 
(1978) effectively dramatizes the peculiar appeal of playful acts of personal 
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destruction—in this case, Russian roulette—which are representational and 
yet, simultaneously and paradoxically, have physically harmful and, therein, 
clearly non-representational consequences.
 Significantly, many other types of pleasurable human behavior—most 
pointedly, sexual behavior—can also involve acts of aggression, dominance, 
submission, and, on occasion, pain, up to and including bondage and torture.8 
Labeled abnormal and psychopathic—and, as such, conventionally discour-
aged—such extreme risk-taking (and risk-enjoying) behaviors nevertheless fre-
quently appear within human virtual contexts, such as pornography. And these 
conceptual representations of bad play have demonstrable critical, popular, 
and commercial appeal, as with the writings of the Marquis de Sade, the stories 
of Anais Nin, Peter Schaffer’s Equus, and even, to some degree, Mel Gibson 
films. In light of such acknowledged guilty pleasures—schadenfreude—it is 
unclear whether harmful or risky play can be rightfully characterized as “bad” 
without necessary reference to some preexisting normative context.9
 Fortunately, perhaps, digital media and computer games provide a rel-
atively safe and less-threatening context for play than a more rough-and-
tumble natural environment. Bad play with computer games poses little to 
no physical risk to players—although risky and harmful computer game play 
can still involve severe emotional and psychological consequences.10
 Nevertheless, within interactive digital media contexts, bad play is infre-
quently physically harmful and more frequently typical of a larger and more 
inclusive category of bad play: play that breaks the rules.
play against the rules 
Most often, bad play with computer games is characterized by play against 
the rules. These rules may include rules prohibiting risky or harmful play, so 
that these two categories of bad play—functional and formal, risky/harmful 
and rules-breaking—are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, if rules prohibiting 
harmful play are both conventional and widespread (most are), then the rules-
breaking category of bad play subsumes the risky/harmful category of bad 
play. This is particularly the case when discussing play within virtual environ-
ments and—most pertinent to our discussion here—computer game play.
forms of rules
All computer games have some objective, explicit, and formal representa-
tions of their rules embedded in their software or code. For this reason, com-
Bad Play  19
puter games provide a relatively straightforward context for distinguishing 
what is and what is not rules-appropriate play. This is true despite ongoing 
social negotiations regarding rules, which always seem part of playful social 
contexts, and despite the potential of emergent play resulting from either 
loosely constructed or poorly understood rules. Thus, to avoid any confusion 
over what the rules actually are, we can define rules-breaking play—and any 
so-called bad play associated with it—as play not explicitly allowed by the 
rules as represented by the game code.
 Breaking some portion of a game’s rules—for example, rules governing 
the mechanics of the game’s interface—may make playing that game impos-
sible. Also, players may—and, frequently do, particularly during initial com-
puter game play—disconnect the game’s power supply (i.e., pull the plug) or 
in some other way physically disturb, interrupt, or step beyond the game’s 
coded rules context.11
 While these can be considered examples of transgressive and, therein, 
rules-breaking play, the most interesting category of this type of play involves 
players who break the rules while engaging (rather than destroying) the game 
code. Given such a circumstance, rules-breaking play can be understood as 
playing with (rather than within or according to) the coded rules of the game. 
This play is then in conflict not only with the rules but also with the “spirit” 
of the game as interpreted by other players and, significantly, by the game 
designer(s). Such transgressions in computer game play are commonly called 
exploits.
 This particular class of rules-breaking play—exploiting—involves break-
ing game rules while still maintaining some level of integrity within the rules 
system (or game context) of which the broken rules are a part. Thus, bad 
play of this sort is one of the more paradoxical and, therein, one of the more 
formally interesting manifestations of computer game play.
 Despite the programmed and tangible nature of rules embedded in game 
code, computer game players seem to play as often in disregard of these rules 
as they do in accordance with them. To some extent, this behavior results 
when computer game designs (either intentionally or not) hide rules from 
players—as is frequently the case when computer games involve themes of 
exploration, mystery, or subterfuge. However, a great deal of rules-breaking 
play can also be observed among players who have full access to and full 
knowledge of game rules yet still willfully choose to ignore these rules in 
order to access a freer (and usually more effective) style of play.
 Examples of exploitive play are extremely common within complex online 
role-playing games, for instance, which typically display a characteristically 
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incomplete and continually revised rules set. Here, for instance, Maleki, a 
World of Warcraft (WoW) in-game support manager, explains the nature and 
consequences of a particular WoW exploit:
To be a little more specific, the guild in question was using repeated line of 
sight exploits which prevented the mobs from attacking back. Also, using a 
pulling exploit which allowed them to only agro boss mobs. Both are con-
sidered exploits, and the guild in question was previously warned the night 
before. We want to reiterate that exploitation of high end content will not be 
tolerated.12
 Exploits which use unintended rules conflicts or consequences to aid 
play are common in offline, single-player games as well—even including 
exploits provided by the game designers themselves in the form of so-called 
cheat codes. In fact, realizing the widespread tendency of players to explore, 
manipulate, and transform game rules to their advantage, many game design-
ers have attempted to incorporate rules-breaking play within rules-appropri-
ate play through special forms of rules: self-reflexive and self-transformative 
rules.
 These “special” rules allow, in effect, game rules to be broken as an accept-
able, appropriate, and sometimes necessary component of game play: they are 
rules to break rules. While the most obvious example of such a formal rules-
breaking design is the cheat code, there are other, more subtle variations.
 Within the several popular versions of Sid Meier’s Civilization series of 
computer games, for instance, there is the self-transforming feature of World 
Wonders. When World Wonders—the Pyramids, Michelangelo’s Chapel, 
and such—are introduced into the game, they transform the game rules, 
including those rules that allow subsequent World Wonders to be built. And, 
in fact, within most other, non-computer-based games—sports, poker, even 
solitaire—there are also frequent rules modifications, variations, and trans-
gressions that serve to extend and enliven play within, ostensibly, those same 
boundaries established by the original game context.13
 However, rules transformations in non-computer games are very often 
the result of social negotiations undertaken in normative contexts outside the 
game’s rules system entirely.14 The interactive nature of digital media makes 
it possible to include something like this negotiation process within the com-
puter game design itself. That is, computer game designs provide a formal 
mechanism for recursively transformative—rules-breaking—processes.
 During all initial computer game play, for instance, players make impor-
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tant game decisions prior to full knowledge of the game rules. Players must 
decide where to build founding cities in Civilization prior to full knowledge 
of the game’s world map; similarly, players must decide what sort of charac-
ters to build within online role-playing games prior to full knowledge of the 
relative abilities and disabilities of character classes in MMOs.
 In the former instance, the game rules of Civilization might be consid-
ered purposefully hiding information from players in order to introduce 
random elements of play. In the second instance, however, the game rules 
(i.e., MMO rules manuals) are simply incapable of describing character abili-
ties that are only determined most definitely within a constantly shifting and 
largely player-determined context of play. This latter circumstance is not 
merely the result of social play. It is equally true of all popular action/arcade 
games in which contexts are determined entirely through individual play. In 
both contexts—social and solo—the experience of play is considered by play-
ers to be a better teacher (and evaluator) of game rules than any text-based 
explication or secondhand account.
 In situations like these—where game rules must, in effect, bootstrap 
themselves during game play—players constantly make and remake in-game 
decisions based on what they (mostly mistakenly) believe are the game rules. 
These decisions then affect subsequent rules-determined game outcomes 
and forms. During this play and replay process, computer games are started 
and restarted, loaded and reloaded; game representations (e.g., Civilization 
starting positions, MMO avatars) are valued and revalued, rolled and re-
rolled, built and rebuilt, constructed and destroyed—all without ever having 
full knowledge of the game rules, and all in order to conform, eventually and 
recursively, to those game rules as they are imbedded in the game code. Such 
repetitive and recursive play results in—and, simultaneously, is made neces-
sary by—the characteristic incompleteness (either in perception or fact) of 
computer game rules.
 Thus, whether the game rules and game design structures explicitly (in 
their code) allow such things to happen or not, the form of computer game 
play consistently displays recursive contextualization—through which rules 
are transformed during continuous, repeated, and, most important, recur-
sive reference to those rules.
rules as semiotic forms
In order to discuss the implications of recursive contextualization during 
computer game play, let us consider computer game rules as algorithms. 
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These algorithms then also serve as signs (or references) pointing to some 
other object, process, or goal.
 For example, game rules governing the movement of cars within Grand 
Theft Auto (GTA) point (or refer) to the movement of cars in three-dimen-
sional city-spaces. It is then useful to think of these isolated car-moving algo-
rithms in GTA as similar to the algorithms of more realistic simulations, such 
as Microsoft’s Flight Simulator (MFS), which are quite explicit in establishing 
a real-world relationship between game form and game reference. However, 
the relationship of the game of GTA to real theft, crime, violence, and cars—
or the relationship of the game of SimCity to real cities, or the relationship of 
the game of Civilization to real civilizations—is quite different from the rela-
tionship of the simulation of MFS to real airplanes. GTA’s “algorithms,” as is 
the case with most computer games, are dedicated to providing an engaging 
and enjoyable game-playing experience. MFS’s algorithms, as is the case with 
most simulations, are dedicated to modeling a particular mechanic of phys-
ics: fixed-wing flight.
 Is the experience of play, then, shaped by the same rules—that is, by 
the same algorithmic forms and functions—as are the mechanics of flight? 
No. This becomes clear when we realize rules-breaking (bad) play within 
computer simulations is different from rules-breaking play within computer 
games.
 We most often characterize rules-breaking play within simulations, such 
as MFS, as unlearned, unpracticed, or unskilled play. That is, players who 
are ignorant of the rules of the simulation break those rules and play “badly.” 
Over time, these players learn the rules of the simulation and how to play 
well by conforming to those rules. Thus, we might consider the initial “bad” 
play within simulations to be ultimately functional: that is, bad play serves as 
a necessary prelude to subsequently better and, eventually, “good” play.
 In games, however, this same form of bad play never seems to get “bet-
ter.” Game players who have increasingly complete knowledge of game rules 
still use that knowledge to sustain and improve the “bad” play of rules break-
ing. So, although we might label the outcome of ignorant bad play to be rules 
learning (and thus functional) and the outcome of knowledgeable bad play 
to be rules breaking (and thus dysfunctional), there are no clear formal dif-
ferences between the two.
 Both rules-breaking processes—in simulations and in games—tend to 
conceptually transform rules and the play experience that those rules evoke. 
And both sorts of bad play—whether ignorant or knowing—serve to accom-
plish the same function: to discover and explore exactly what the rules are. 
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Thus, both during game play and during simulation use, the rules-breaking 
function of bad play closely parallels the function of so-called Garfinkeling:15 
breaking game rules is necessary to establish the presence and, relatedly, the 
contextual (or experiential) function of those game rules.
 Significantly, then, in advanced computer game play—as opposed to 
advanced simulation use—rules-breaking play does not decrease. The pro-
cess of rules discovery, exploration, and exploitation does not end. During 
“play” with simulations, the more practiced and expert player displays both 
more skill and, in demonstration of that skill, more rules-abiding behavior; 
the more practiced and expert player of computer games, on the other hand, 
also displays more skill, but, in demonstration of that skill, is increasingly 
likely to be rules intolerant. Thus, the use of simulations, in opposition to 
the play of games, does not display the same continuously recurring forms 
of recursive contextualization, either in original design or during prolonged 
play.
 Indeed, a great percentage of all play with computer games can be classi-
fied as recursive contextualization, regardless of the knowledge or expertise 
(or lack thereof) of the game players. The only portion of computer game 
play that does not consistently display patterns of recursive contextualiza-
tion—resulting in successive conceptual transformations of game rules—is 
that portion of play involving the manipulation of the computer game’s physi-
cal interface: learning how to move the joystick or what keys to push on the 
keyboard.
 For, within computer games, the algorithms governing the game inter-
face point to something other than the subjective play experience: they point 
to the means to access that experience. Their function in this regard is then 
similar to the algorithms of a simulation. Once players have full knowledge 
of and sufficient practice with algorithms of the interface, these algorithms 
become increasingly habitualized and, therein, incapable of easy, useful, or 
enjoyable transformation. Indeed, subsequent transformations in game rules 
must take place within precisely such a learned and fixed context—or inter-
face—which then provides a necessary, stable, and conceptually unassailable 
“ground”16 for further assignation of relatively unstable values and mean-
ings.
 Learning the game interface is, therefore, more comparable to simula-
tion use than to game play. For, once interface rules have been learned, play 
with those rules ends. Once the computer game interface has been mastered, 
computer play thereafter occurs not with (or against) but through (or within) 
the game interface; play is then increasingly focused on the manipulation of 
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other, more subjective components of the play experience: the game code 
rather than the game hardware.
 The subjective components of the game play experience are relational 
and combinatorial, and so it is rare that players exhaust all these possibili-
ties during a single episode of play—or expect to. For this reason, game 
rules requiring a simple and linear, singular and focused manipulation of 
the game code—such as those manipulations guided by embedded narrative 
structures—quickly become intrusive and, eventually, during repeated play, 
superfluous to the game-playing experience.
 Computer games played by longtime and expert players inevitably take 
on less of a “rigid-rule” and more of a “free-form”17 structure, in which play 
is determined by, if any one thing in particular, the player’s own localized and 
individualized sensation and experience. And it is at this stage that a concep-
tual transformation of rules— recursive contextualization—is most likely to 
transgress the original game context and engage the so-called metagame.
 Within action/arcade games, for instance, this stage of play might include 
the creation of graphic contexts (e.g., wad files in DOOM) that then extend 
play within the context of the game’s original interface; within MMOs, it 
might include more active participation and leadership in those social activi-
ties conducted outside the limited scope of the game’s fantasy world; within 
strategy games, such as Civilization, it might include more abstract play with 
the game rules themselves; and so on. Or, alternatively, at this stage, the orig-
inal game is simply placed aside, and a new game is taken up in its place.
 During this culminate stage of expert and endgame play, it is interesting 
to note parallels with how game designers play their own games. During the 
design process, for instance, game designers have the unprecedented ability 
to play outside the rules of the game—and thus engage in rules-breaking 
(“bad”) play. In this and many other respects,18 play by game designers ignores 
the boundaries and restrictions placed on conventional game players.
 Playing with rules in the manner of game designers is common within 
all free-form games and within all self-sustaining biological systems (e.g., 
ecosystems)—and certainly within the broader context of evolutionary biol-
ogy. Yet attempting to implement free-form game play within coded game 
rules inevitably causes self-referential paradoxes: rules that break them-
selves. And if those paradoxes are not trapped and handled properly, the 
game defaults.
 Suber (1990) and others19 have noted the potentially self-destructive 
paradoxes that result when rules-based political, social, and biological sys-
tems attempt to transform those rules systems of which they are themselves 
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part. Suber, in fact, has constructed a general case illustrating this prob-
lem of self-reflexive and self-transformative rules within the game Nomic. 
Nomic, a “game of self-amendment,” is most fundamentally characterized 
by its rule 213.
213. If the rules are changed so that further play is impossible, or if the legal-
ity of a move cannot be determined with finality, or if by the Judge’s best rea-
soning, not overruled, a move appears equally legal and illegal, then the first 
player unable to complete a turn is the winner. This rule takes precedence 
over every other rule determining the winner.20
 Thus, Nomic is a simulation of a rules-making process, wherein winning 
conditions are determined by, in effect, breaking the rules of that process. 
In parallel, play itself may be understood—in the same Garfinkeling sense 
mentioned earlier—as a simulation of a simulated rules-making process. For 
just as Nomic simulates breaking the rules of a game, play simulates breaking 
the rules of simulating.
 Here, however, it is vital that play remain a simulation (or an algorithmic 
representation) of a rules-breaking process, rather than that process itself, 
since if play were the latter, it would remain bound by the mechanics (i.e., 
the rules) of that process. However, as a representation of that process, play 
(or, more generally, playing) is free to transform rules of any sort—including 
rules related to the rules-breaking process—without having any permanent 
(and potentially disastrous) impact on the biological and cognitive restraints 
and forms that evoke and sustain play itself.
 Similarly, Nomic must retain its position as a game of self-amendment, 
rather than the self-amendment process itself. Otherwise, Nomic might 
unravel itself. For while the self-amendment process that Nomic’s rules refer 
to remains paradoxical and, ultimately, untransformable, the simulation of 
that process within the game manages to amend rules in such a way that 
those amendments have no lasting effect on the broader and more inclusive 
process of self-amendment. Thus, Nomic, as a game, is unable to transform 
the play of self-amendment to which its rules refer. Or, more precisely, if 
it were to do so, then, according to rule 213, the game would immediately 
end.
 This, then, is the crucial point at which the rules (algorithms) of simula-
tions, games, and play diverge. While game rules may be unbound by the 
game context and thus capable of self-reflection, self-transformation, and, 
indeed, even self-destruction through their simultaneous and paradoxical 
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application, the rules of play are irrevocably bound to and limited by their 
biological context. Thus, play cannot fail to produce paradox, and, somewhat 
paradoxically, play cannot fail to survive the paradoxes it produces.
 For these reasons, it is useful to think of the algorithms and rules of 
games as occupying an intermediate position between the algorithms and 
rules of simulations and the algorithms and rules of play. The former are 
bound by context; the latter are not. The algorithms and rules of games are 
then “sort of” (and always temporarily) bound by context.
 Since the algorithms and rules of games, simulations, and play are rep-
resentations, we can position each as separate categories of semiotic form 
based on what they represent and how they represent it (e.g., either strictly 
or loosely). As figure 1.1 indicates, the algorithms and rules of simulations 
point to an objective process (i.e., “reality”), the algorithms and rules of 
games point to a subjective experience (i.e., “fun”), and the algorithms and 
rules of play point to the pointing (or representational) process itself. It is in 
this sense that play may be considered a simulation of simulating.
 A game such as Nomic is, then, perhaps the closest possible “good” (non-
rules-breaking) implementation of a play process that is, most fundamen-
tally, “bad” (rules-breaking). Or, in other words, if you play with a simulation, 
it becomes a game; if you play with a game, it becomes just play; and if you 
play with play—well, you can’t play with play: play pwnz.
 Thus, rules-breaking of the sort that most characterizes bad play has a 
definite formal structure with an indefinite functional outcome. This for-
mal structure provides for the evaluation, manipulation, and transformation 
of existing rules structures—forcibly so. And the outcome of this process is 
most typically paradox.
 The representational and interactive qualities of computer games allow 
the construction of rules—like those in Nomic—that allow game players to 
engage in play analogous to that of game design. In a recursive contextualiza-
tion process, computer game rules are then manipulated and transformed 
indefinitely so long as those game rules remain incomplete. However, should 
a rules system be finalized in some rigid (i.e., fully coded) form, then game 
play must thereafter either descend into the “good” and rules-abiding play of 
simulation use or ascend into the increasingly “bad” play of rules breaking. 
In the latter instance, play ultimately either breaks or abandons game rules.
 Whether this formal, rules-breaking process of bad play is functional or 
dysfunctional, then, entirely depends on the quality (level of completeness) 
of the game rules and, simultaneously, on the social and cultural (or theoreti-
cal) context within which those rules are valued and given meaning.
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Simulation  Reality Model
 Rules determined by designer
Game  Experience Interaction
 Rules determined by player(s)
Play  Representation Pretense
 Rules determined by play
Semiotic Form Formal Functional Reference Outcome
Figure 1.1. Relationships among play, games, and simulations
Figure 1.2. Representations of bad play
conclusions
This chapter introduces a formal approach to the study of computer games 
and, in particular, to the study of a common component of computer game 
play often discounted by cultural analysis: bad play. While functional analy-
ses of game play tend to distinguish between good and bad play based on 
their culturally relative consequences and associated values, a more formal 
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analysis can demonstrate similarities between the two and, in fact, as has 
been suggested here, prioritizes the “bad” play as the more fundamental 
of the two. This sheds a new perspective on the nature and origin of the 
so-called good play that is most often supported and promoted by develop-
mental theories: it may not be so “good” after all. Likewise, this perspective 
allows us to see “good” and “bad” players in a much different—and more 
equal—light.
 Formal analysis also demonstrates how focusing on references and refer-
encing—that is, on semiosis—can help us understand how human meaning-
making processes function during the self-reflections and self-transforma-
tions of play. As those meaning-making processes are turned increasingly 
inward through recursive contextualization, the consequences of game play 
become not the meanings and values of the rules of the games but the para-
doxes and devaluations of the forms of games.
 Acknowledging a formal distinction between play and game implies that 
at least one function of game play must be to maintain that distinction—that 
is, to restrict and, where necessary, punish free and uninhibited play. Thus, 
we are motivated by this analysis to look for game structures that restrict and 
limit play—structures that are easily and widely found in all those (primarily 
developmental and educational) contexts that prioritize the algorithms and 
rules of simulations.
 Can such restrictions be imposed successfully and fruitfully? Can the 
energies and pleasures of play as a whole be harnessed to accentuate the 
positive and de-emphasize the negative? Can bad play be tamed? As the fol-
lowing chapter will show, I think and hope not.
 The success of any “serious”21 or “persuasive” game (these were called 
“edutainment” in an older, pre-digital age) would necessarily depend on, 
in some important way, distorting and curtailing the natural progression of 
human play as a rules-breaking process. This may be tantamount to trying to 
teach human beings either a new way to see while using the same old retina 
or a new way to speak while using the same old larynx. It’s possible, perhaps, 
but tedious and awkward compared to the original. Trying to teach human 
beings a new way to play using the same old cognition requires less promot-
ing the new than suppressing the old. And human play may well be (again, 
hope seems in order) irrepressible.
 If so, then an irrepressible play appears to have a dual function within 
all game-like rules structures: it delimits and explicates those structures, 
and, simultaneously, it creates paradoxical contexts within which those rules 
structures are either transformed or broken (or both).
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 These two related functions are, in brief, profound. They are as necessary 
for the existence of games as they are predictive of the fragile and imperma-
nent nature of games. And, importantly, theories of play that have no primary 
explanatory role for common and widespread “bad” play should be ques-
tioned solely on that basis. Of available theories of play, agonistic theories22 
best offer an interpretation of play consonant with the position presented 
here, yet those theories also commonly seek refuge in normative contexts in 
order to distinguish the good from the bad.
 An important theoretical advantage offered by a formalist approach is 
that, without recourse to normative contexts, it is possible to justify the exis-
tence of bad play as a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the peculiar 




Did He smile His work to see?
Did He who made the lamb make thee?
 —William Blake, Songs of Experience (1794)
play with form
Games are designed to be played, just as books are designed to be read. Both 
playing a game and reading a book involve transforming a predetermined 
set of rules into a more immediate phenomenological experience. And, of 
course, reading includes a larger set of behaviors than just reading books, just 
as playing includes a larger set of behaviors than just playing games. 
 However, there are important differences between the two. Reading, for 
instance, is a learned behavior and, therein, an unnatural behavior—partic-
ularly in comparison to play. Literacy is a difficult goal to achieve and, for 
that reason, remains unachieved by large segments of the human population. 
Play, on the other hand, is widespread, more analogous to some difficult-to-
eradicate weed than to the cultivated rose of reading. Play can be motivated 
and directed by game rules but also appears without evocation by game 
design; for this reason, the “rules” of play seem, at least in some significant 
part, preformed and hardwired within human beings.
 And, curiously, reading a book—and other forms of related aesthetic 
experiences, such as viewing a film—demand some measure of solitude and 
passivity; play, on the other hand, demands some measure of precisely the 
opposite. While play can certainly be quiet and contemplative, we prototypi-
cally describe human play using physically determinable categories similar 
to those used to describe animal play:1 locomotor play (e.g., leaping, soar-
ing, brachiating—or, in general, play with body), object play (including play 
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with conceptual objects within computer games), and social play (play with 
others).
 Each of these categories is an active form of playing with something, and 
it will be my contention here that this characteristic form of playing with is 
fundamental to human play and, further, that this form is similar regardless 
of who or what is being played with.
 If human play conforms to the three categories of play just mentioned, 
then objects and forms of play can also be one of three sorts: objects and 
forms involving the manipulation of the interface between our bodies and 
our environment (during locomotor play), objects and forms involving the 
transformation of physical sensations into conceptual objects (the same pro-
cess as that of semiosis), and objects and forms involving the construction, 
maintenance, and sustenance of relationships with others (during social 
play).
a formalist aside 
When I refer to “objects” of play, I mean to refer to real-world objects, such 
as dogs and trees, footballs and joysticks, but also, more important, to the 
values of these objects as those values are determined by representational 
form. Necessarily intertwined with real-world objects and their in-game rep-
resentations is then another vital component: the relationship between the 
two. While objects and their representations may vary widely, the relation-
ship between objects and their representations has a particular and constant 
set of forms, which I wish to emphasize here.
 For instance, most are familiar with the game of tic-tac-toe (TTT). Nor-
mally, TTT can be recognized by its well-known crosshatch playing field and 
its conventional playing pieces: Xs and Os. Yet neither of these two game 
objects—field or pieces—is critical to the formalist. The most fundamental 
property of any game, according to the formalist, involves the relationships 
among game objects that determine the values of those objects within the 
game.
 In part, these relationships are described by the rules of the game, which 
prioritize and therein value game objects during play; but the rules of the 
game may be expressed in different languages and in different ways. So, 
again, the surface appearance of the rules—whether these rules are writ-
ten in, for instance, French or English—is immaterial. It is the relationships 
these rules refer to, not the rules themselves, that constitute the form of the 
game.
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 Imagine, for instance, another game (let’s call it T3) consisting of nine 
tiles, labeled a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, and c3. In the game of T3, two play-
ers alternate picking tiles, each attempting to select tiles that will create an 
a-b-c sequence, a 1-2-3 sequence, or both. Further imagine a set of rules for 
T3 that would eliminate from selection any sequences in T3 (e.g., “a1-c2-b3” 
or “a3-b1-c1”) that would not conform to the winning conditions of TTT. At 
this point, the game of T3, without a crosshatch playing field and without any 
Xs or Os, is formally identical to TTT. We might, at this point, say that the 
rules of TTT are more easily understood or, perhaps, more “elegant” than the 
rules of T3, but both sets of rules point or refer to the same essential form. 
For the formalist, the elements of TTT and T3 that are dissimilar are inconse-
quential, and the elements of TTT and T3 that are similar are fundamental.
 One technique of the formalist, then, is to identify and distinguish forms 
and relationships referenced by game rules and, in that process, to try to 
find the most efficient or “elegant” way of describing those forms and rela-
tionships. However, while game play is guided by game rules, it is not, in 
all cases, determined by game rules. Game rules can themselves become 
objects of play, and formal relationships among objects of play within games 
can be extended to include formal relationships between games and players 
and, indeed, between games and play itself. As a consequence, the impor-
tance of isolated objects and their values within games is diminished, and 
the importance of relationships among objects and their values as these are 
realized during play is increased.
 This realization would require the computer game formalist to be some-
thing of a phenomenologist as well—to seek the fundamental form of object-
value relationships (if such a form exists) that coincides most closely with the 
immediate and subjective experience of play.
anti-form
A characteristic form of human play, regardless of the objects being played 
with, embodies a reference to what is not—or to something other than what 
is. It is useful to think of this as a “not” or “anti-”form. That is, when we ride a 
stick horse, it is not a horse, it is something else—something like a horse, but 
not a horse: it is an anti-horse, which requires but does not fulfill its refer-
ence to a horse. Likewise, during play we might pretend that a box is a house, 
that stacked wooden cylinders are a king, or a that finger is a gun.
 This anti-form can then be applied, self-referentially, to play itself. 
Bateson2 identified this particular form and its peculiar consequences as the 
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single most fundamental characteristic of play in animals and in humans: play 
as meta-communication. That is, all forms of play transmit a self-referential 
message: “this is play” or, alternatively, “this is not real.”
 When we play with objects, for instance, those objects are not what they 
are; when we play with others, those others are, for the moment, not others. 
And when we play with self, that self is something other than what it is: an 
anti-self.
 The so-called magic circle3 of play attempts to distinguish between what 
lies on either side of this anti-form: the real and the make-believe, the nec-
essary and the frivolous. However, the contents of play—those objects and 
forms that are played with—are, again, less characteristic of the play experi-
ence than are the formal properties of the boundary condition itself. This 
boundary condition results from negation, or not-ness, or from what I will 
call here an anti-form.
 As a formalist (and a biological naturalist), I begin with play as an embod-
ied mechanism—an anti-form—that acts upon (plays with) objects and their 
values (i.e., their contextual representations) within an organism’s natural 
environment. During this process, these objects and values are transformed, 
with a variety of consequences, but, assumedly, according to a single and 
common formal mechanism.
 This common mechanic of anti-form is most evident as a self-referential 
function operating on representations of objects: re-presenting representa-
tions. In fact, the evolution of a human-like cognition may be closely associ-
ated with—and depend on—such self-reference. The self-references of an 
anti-form are then simultaneously similar to themselves and different from 
themselves, with their most important consequences being predictability 
and variability.
 This ability to provide useful variation through repetition is neatly encap-
sulated by Sutton-Smith in his notion of “adaptive variability” as a primary 
function of human play.
In looking for what is common to child and adult forms of play, to animal 
and human forms, to dreams, daydreams, play, games, sports, and festivals, 
it is not hard to reach the conclusion that what they have in common, even 
cross culturally, is their amazing diversity and variability. The possibility then 
arises, that it is this variability that is central to the function of play through-
out all species.4
The analysis I present here is sympathetic to this definition, sharing with it 
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the belief that play is understood best within a naturally evolved biological 
system.
 However, Sutton-Smith positions his definition as inclusive of alternative 
points of view, particularly those culturally oriented (e.g., developmental) 
theories in which human play is subsumed within theories of learning and, 
even more restrictively, within theories of education. Theories emphasiz-
ing the role of play in a particular cultural context tend to distinguish some 
portion of human play from animal play in order to position human play as 
an intellectual achievement rather than as a vestigial mechanic. I will focus 
more narrowly on those forms of play that are assumed to have neither alle-
giance nor debt to cultural values and social norms.
 Here, I consider play a self-reflexive, formal process that operates most 
significantly on its own form. If so, then cultural content is largely irrelevant 
to the operation and consequences of that anti-form.
 Similarly, an aesthetic of play is a self-reflexive aesthetic that operates 
most significantly on its own form: the human aesthetic process. Since this 
peculiar aesthetic of play is self-reflexive, self-transformative, and, ultimately, 
self-destructive, I will label this aesthetic of play an anti-aesthetic.
anti-aesthetics 
An aesthetics of the anti-aesthetics does not imply a negation of aesthetics. 
Rather, it is intended to refer to negation itself and an accompanying aesthet-
ics of negation; or, alternatively, to an aesthetics of opposition; or, alterna-
tively, to an aesthetics of the anti. Bolter and Grusin (2000) have popularized 
the notion of re-mediation as fundamental to the function of digital media, 
and here the emphasis is similar. I wish to consider the origin, nature, and 
pleasures of digital game re-presentations and the resulting anti-ness of digi-
tal game forms.
 Of all those characteristics distinguishing the aesthetic experience of 
digital media—and, particularly, the experience of computer game play—
the repetitiveness of that experience is most obvious. In other, older and 
(more conventionally) less-interactive media, aesthetic pleasures appear 
more quickly and more directly. For instance, the enjoyment of the visual, 
aural, and kinesthetic arts5 is as much in the moment of sensation as in either 
delayed reflection or persistent repetition. Admittedly, of course, to some 
extent, this is also true of computer games—particularly as regards certain 
genres (e.g., first-person shooters, perhaps)—which employ visual signs 
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appealing directly to the senses and thus invoking a mechanical and, often, 
involuntary response.
 However, regardless of the quality of images employed, the digital inter-
face of computer games allows no direct and immediate access to its pat-
terns and designs. Digital game images are always images in motion, and that 
motion is always in reference to something else: the game code. The necessi-
ties of the digital game interface delay and, subsequently, contextualize aes-
thetic experience within the rules of the game or, eventually and inevitably, 
within interactive and self-reflexive play.
 Thus, in contrast to other, non-digital aesthetic forms, through continu-
ous repetition and recursion, computer games access and return to a single 
and particular moment of formal engagement, which is, during that return, 
habitualized, contextualized, and re-engaged as a novelty of false experience: 
anti-experience. This peculiar aesthetic experience is, then, both like and 
unlike the experience of more traditional aesthetic forms.
 Poetic language, for instance, may well repeat its own formal proper-
ties—rhyme, verse, stanza—but these properties are not most fundamentally 
characterized by the discontinuities of subsequent semiotic transformations. 
Though much of art and art forms—particularly literary forms—possess some 
portion of the recursive and self-reflexive characteristics of digital media, the 
latter posses those characteristics most obviously, most strongly, and most 
pointedly during computer game play.
 I will therefore argue here that the root of an extended, repetitive, and 
formal engagement with the rules and mechanics of aesthetic form, as dis-
played during computer game play, is the result of a deeply rooted anti prin-
ciple accentuated by the malleable and discontinuous nature of digital media. 
And, further, I would claim that this principle originates within a natural and 
largely intractable human semiosis. To this end, before we move onward, let 
me briefly introduce a few antecedents to this anti-ness.
anti-philosophy 
Doubt occupies a central position in many of the more perplexing problems 
of human epistemology. Descartes’ famous aphorism “Cogito, ergo sum” is 
less persuasive than it is tautological until replaced by the more reasonable 
“Dubito, ergo sum.” For, among all cognitive functions, doubt is the single 
function incapable of being doubted and, thus, the single function that car-
ries the artifice of human thought, like a turtle, on its back.
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If you would be a real seeker after truth, it is necessary that at least once in 
your life you doubt, as far as possible, all things.6
 Hegelian dialectics emphasizes the critical role of antithesis as a cata-
lyst for subsequent synthesis and historical progression. Later philosophi-
cal inquiry disassociates antithetical forms from a Hegelian, suprarational 
context and examines the implications of those forms within the tangled 
hierarchies of more socially relevant domains. Within phenomenological and 
existentialist philosophy, for instance, doubt, denial, and resulting conflicts 
between self and other are associated with personal freedom and indepen-
dence of will.
 A core anti principle might then be found at the base of human despair 
(Kierkegaard) and as the cause of human enlightenment (Nietzsche). And a 
similar principle might be located in the radical skepticism of postmodern 
aesthetics, marked by the nihilist leanings of dadaism, punk rock, and all 
those other deconstructions of the popular.
 Indeed, the seeming lack of any embedded order or coherence in the 
vast data constructs of digital media (e.g., the World Wide Web) is accom-
panied by our persistent human desire to drill, Google-like, down to some 
single datum of individual self-interest. This desire well represents the incli-
nation of the anti to identify and prioritize the singular, the distinctive, and 
the selfish.
 Spencer-Brown (1972) positioned the fundamental function of all logic 
(and, in fact, of all cognition) as exactly this: a generic and primitive mark of 
distinction that must precede any subsequent separation of self and other.
 Merrill (1995) helps clarify the pervasiveness of this distinction:
At this more primitive level, all acts of distinction and indication are identi-
cal; qualitative differences are smoothed out, and focus is reduced to the 
mere act of creating boundaries separating this from that. All distinctions, 
indications, and values are thus treated alike.7
 However, while such a broadly conceived anti principle is clearly associ-
ated with the negation or the opposition of some other, this principle is not 
as often or as willingly associated with a bland and blanket nihilism.
Among other things I wished to translate and adapt to my own ends the 
Heideggerian word Destruktion or Abbau. Each signified in this context an 
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operation bearing on the structure or traditional architecture of the fun-
damental concepts of ontology or of Western metaphysics. But in French 
“destruction” too obviously implied an annihilation or a negative reduction 
much closer perhaps to Nietzschean “demolition” than to the Heideggerian 
interpretation or to the type of reading that I proposed.8
 Thus, the anti principle I would conjure here is willful, primitive, self-
serving, and universal in form. It may function destructively or construc-
tively (or, in linguistic terms, with compositionality) in social domains. More 
readily distinguished by its generic form than its localized function, the anti 
is always indicative of human agency. And, therein, the dark and the nega-
tive and the antithesis are not simple intermediaries existing prior to some 
yet-to-evolve, more rational context; rather, the anti principle both drives 
and defines human rationality and all subsequent representational processes 
(most specifically semiosis) through which we access, measure, interpret, 
and value human experience.
 Further, as a recursive function, this anti principle is self-similar and must 
exist both outside and in opposition to the boundaries of its own determina-
tion. That is, the anti function may operate without any formal argument 
other than itself.9
 These two basic characteristics—self-similarity and formal indepen-
dence—make the anti principle paradoxical and, for good or ill, incapable of 
conventional normative evaluation—or linguistic expression. Indeed, when 
looked at from within some normative context (i.e., from within the confines 
of some preexisting structure yet to be ravaged), the anti appears little more 
than simply dysfunctional—random, chaotic, incorrigible, and incompre-
hensible. Yet so does play appear—most particularly bad play, which we can 
now label anti-play.
anti-play 
The anti principle is well conceptualized as a form of human play. There is, in 
fact, some relevance and support for this association. Huizinga (1955) assigns 
a great deal of importance to opposition, conflict, and the concept of the agon 
in the continuously contested nature of play and games. This theme of ago-
nistic play is then extended by Turner (1990) and, later, Spariosu (1997), who 
find diaspora and the “ludic-liminal” exile of self necessarily set apart from the 
logocentric rules and regulations of more rational and rationalized games.
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I sometimes talk about the liminal phase being dominantly in the “subjunc-
tive mood” of culture, the mood of maybe, might-be, as-if, hypothesis, fan-
tasy, conjecture, desire, depending on which of the trinity, cognition, affect, 
and conation (thought, feeling, or intention) is situationally dominant . . . 
Liminality can perhaps be described as a fructile chaos. A fertile nothing-
ness, a storehouse of possibilities, not by any means a random assemblage 
but a striving after new forms and structure, a gestation process, a fetation of 
modes appropriate to anticipating postliminal existence.10
Liminality is more than a passive, negative condition or the intermediary-
mediating phase between two positive conditions . . . Liminality contains 
both positive and active qualities.11
 The liminal is a particularly resonant anti-concept within play theory and 
the so-called magic circle. Conventional accounts of a magic circle (see Salen 
& Zimmerman 2003) emphasize the distinction between play and non-play. 
However, perhaps better in keeping with the original context of the term (see 
Copier 2005), the boundary condition itself—that is, the circling or separat-
ing function (cf. Nieuwdorp 2005)—is more fundamental and telling than 
any content encircled.
 It is precisely play as a purely formal activity—serving only to distinguish 
itself from some other—that Caillois (1961) described as “pure waste.” Very 
early play theory (Groos in The Play of Man in 1901) likewise found little 
reason to account advantageously for the random, chaotic, and destructive 
functions of play as a form of anti-work. And current play theory devoted to 
explaining the educational benefits of play (Gee 2003; Papert 1993) likewise 
does little to explain, justify, or even acknowledge the purely formal and/or 
actively negative consequences of an anti-play (e.g., anti-educational play) of 
animals and humans.
 Most theories of play, in fact, neatly divide between, on one hand, the 
rational and the developmental theories concerned with the normative func-
tions and benefits of so-called good play and, on the other hand, accounts of a 
more irrational and agonistic bad (or anti-) play involving Bacchanalian, Dio-
nysian, and other seemingly irrational behaviors. It is only this latter group 
of theories that is likely to consider play as a formal mechanism (Caillois’ 
paideia) that functions, if at all, to question, doubt, and/or deconstruct the 
rules of conventional society.
 Perhaps because it remains so difficult to reconcile the wanton nature 
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of play with its supposed educational and adaptive benefits, recent summa-
ries of play theory (Salen & Zimmerman 2003; Raessens & Goldstein 2005) 
tend more often to compromise than to distinguish these separate concep-
tualizations. My goal here is to attribute all functions of play—positive and 
negative—to a single set of formal properties. Or, in short, an anti-aesthetic, 




Rationalism is a hideous monster
when it claims for itself omnipotence.
 —Mahatma Gandhi, Young India (1926) 
[old] media aesthetics
The use of formalist techniques in the humanities is rare these days, almost 
passé. Formalism has been largely absorbed and, indeed, almost eliminated 
by variants of structuralism, which have proven more appealing to those who 
would situate the study of everything—and most particularly the study of 
aesthetics—within the study of society.
 A rigid formalism assumes that there are certain formal characteristics of 
objects—most particularly aesthetic objects—that determine their identity 
and their consequence, or their essence. Much of geometry and topology, for 
instance, are formalist fields of study. The “essence” of a square is determined 
by a formal relationship among its sides and angles; and, likewise, the topo-
logical definition of a torus is determined by a set of formal relationships that 
call our attention to what characteristics are common among all tori and what 
characteristics are superficial and thus inconsequential to the torus form.
 One of the clearest and most influential statements of formalism in the 
arts—specifically, in literary analysis—came from a rather eclectic group of 
artists, writers, and critics living and working in eastern Europe during the 
early twentieth century. This group—later known in aggregate as Russian for-
malists—was reacting in part against the nineteenth-century practice of eval-
uating works of literature as products of a particular writer working in a par-
ticular venue. In order to understand the works of Shakespeare, for instance, 
according to this tradition, it was necessary to understand Shakespeare the 
man, as he lived and loved (or not) within sixteenth-century England.
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 In opposition to biographical analysis, the Russian formalists believed 
that the work of art itself was the only object necessary to understand and 
evaluate that work. In order to demonstrate this, these critics went to great 
lengths to isolate the formal essence of literature: its “literariness.” It was 
then assumed that this essence of literary form—and this form alone, apart 
from either author intent or reader affect—defined and determined litera-
ture and set it apart from more mundane, practical, and everyday prose.
 Slightly after the Russian formalist movement—well described in Erlich’s 
Russian Formalism1—came a similar wave of publications from the so-called 
New Critics, a cadre of (primarily) poetry critics working in U.S. academia 
during the 1920s.
 Wellek2 assigns Viktor Shklovsky (On the Theory of Prose, 1925), Boris 
Eikhenbaum (Melody of the Russian Lyrical Verse, 1921), Yuri Tynyanov 
(Archaists and Innovators, 1925), and Boris Tomashevsky (Russian Versifi-
cation: Metrics, 1923) leadership in the Russian formalist movement. In par-
ticular, Shklovsky’s early essays make the explicit claim that “the literary work 
is nothing but form” and that all art is, in fact, “outside emotion.” While 
Shklovsky’s views may have been extreme among his fellows, the desire to 
isolate and analyze literature as a formal derivative of natural language was 
characteristic of the formalist approach on both continents.
 Prominent within the American formalist movement were John Crow 
Ransom (The New Criticism, 1941), Cleanth Brooks (The Well Wrought Urn, 
1947), and the aforementioned William K. Wimsatt, the originator (along with 
Monroe Beardsley) of the “affective” and “intentional” fallacies (The Verbal 
Icon, 1954). Like their Russian predecessors, American formalists eschewed 
literary analysis based on either intent of author (the intentional fallacy) or 
individual and private effects on readers (the affective fallacy). And, despite 
great differences in cultural backgrounds and political ideologies between 
the Russians and the Americans, these two early twentieth-century groups 
have come to be linked in their common goal of studying scientifically, mea-
suring empirically, and defining objectively the formal properties of “literari-
ness” (literaturnost).
formalist techniques
America’s New Critics introduced the methodology now most closely asso-
ciated with formalism and still the single most sustaining contribution of 
formalism to contemporary literary analysis: the “close reading” of texts. 
Close reading consciously avoids all interpretations referring to and depend-
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ing on elements extrinsic to the text. During a close reading, formalist crit-
ics attempt to isolate objective components of texts—for example, rhythm, 
meter, and imagery in poetry—that are most characteristic of and fundamen-
tal to literary form.
 As practiced by the New Critics, this close analytical technique is very 
similar to earlier, linguistics-inspired analyses conducted by the Russian for-
malists. Each is an attempt to introduce scientific methods to the study of lit-
erature and, by extension, the study of culture. And, while each was successful 
in identifying and cataloging meaningful components of human language,3 
each also suffered in its inability to move from an analysis of specific compo-
nents of texts to an explication of more general principles of literature.
 In its most isolated and restricted use, engaged solely in the effort to 
locate literariness, formalist methodology raises uneasy questions concern-
ing the relative importance of literary form and literary content—or, later, 
concerning the relative importance of structure and materials. Further, close 
reading begs the question of how much knowledge of social context and 
use of language is required prior to objective formal analysis. And, indeed, 
the implicit requirement that the formalist critics possess some relatively 
advanced expertise prior to the application of formalist methods undermines 
the objectivity of those methods. It is for this reason that New Criticism, in 
particular, is often regarded—and criticized—as an elitist approach.
 Alternative methods that acknowledge and include the influence of social 
context during literary analysis are of two basic sorts. The first sort—critical 
methods—applies non-formalist methodologies to an analysis of social and 
literary contexts. These methods subsume the professed objectivity of for-
malism within broader social conflict paradigms and, subsequently, within 
increasingly less formal and more structural models of art and society.
 The second sort retains the objective premise of formalist techniques 
and applies those techniques both to individual components of texts and to 
the social contexts that produce them. These social contexts are then taken 
as indicative of contextual systems. Erlich, for instance, makes much of the 
methodological evolution of formal analysis to systems analysis, which then 
served as a precursor to the development of contemporary semiotics.
During the “heroic” period of Russian formalism, the science of signs was 
virtually non-existent . . . But by 1930, . . . this new discipline was well under 
way. The theory of language was being fitted into the larger framework of a 
philosophy of symbolic forms which considered language as the central, but 
not the only possible system of symbols.4
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formalist assumptions
Poetry is language in its aesthetic function.
 —Roman Jakobson, Noveishaya Russkaya Poeziya (1921) 
Russian formalism originated in ideological opposition to existing theories of 
literature (e.g., symbolism and impressionism), and the methods employed 
by formalists purposefully ignored preexisting theoretical contexts. However, 
formalism involves a linked set of assumptions about the nature of language 
and literature, which were neither often nor completely acknowledged by 
early formalists.
 At the core of both Russian and American formalism is the notion that 
literature serves a particular aesthetic function apart from that of everyday, 
conventional language. In Art as Technique, Shklovsky describes the purpose 
of art as re-establishing the “process of perception.” In this process, art “defa-
miliarizes” those objects to which it refers, creating a sense of strangeness 
called ostranenie. Ostranenie then re-engages the process of perception as 
that process exists prior to its mediation by language. During this re-engage-
ment, literature functions in a manner somewhat akin to phenomenological 
“bracketing”; that is, literature defamiliarizes conventional language through 
a self-referential process.
 This process entails a number of assumptions about the nature of lan-
guage and mind. However, before preceding further, it is necessary to deal 
with the potentially misleading term perception—a term that Shklovsky pur-
posefully disassociated from Aleksander Potebnia’s earlier claim that art was 
“thinking in images.”5 Shklovsky and other formalists clearly repudiated this 
particular distinction between practical and poetic language; therefore, the 
“process of perception” referred to by formalists is perhaps better thought 
of, in a more general sense, as a process of semiosis—or, even more generally, 
as a process of cognition.
 Given this interpretation, formalism can be recognized as an early form 
of cognitive science, with its goal being to find formal properties of sign and 
symbol systems indicative of formal properties of the mind.6 And the most 
basic theoretical assumptions of formalism remain consonant with those of 
cognitive science—with one important omission. Those most basic assump-
tions are these:
The function of literature is to evoke a subjective but universal •	
human feeling (ostranenie), based on the common and consistent 
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phenomenological properties of language—a common and consistent 
aesthetic. This feeling can be referenced objectively, though indi-
rectly, within the sign and symbol system that evokes it. 
While formally and functionally distinct, poetic language and litera-•	
ture are part of the same sign and symbol system as conventional 
language. Literature uses the sign and symbol system of conventional 
language in unconventional ways—for example, in the form of trope 
or verse. Therefore, the literary function of language is not unique 
but derivative of the common function of language. Differences 
among characteristic types of language (poetic vs. non-poetic) are 
then differences based on sequence, syntax, or other objectively 
measured forms.
The primary function of conventional language is to familiarize; the •	
function of literary language (e.g., poetry), on the other hand, is to 
defamiliarize. Thus, the latter is dependent on and cannot occur 
without reference to the former—again emphasizing the derivative 
nature of literary form.
 These three assumptions—that literature has universal form and effect, 
that literature is derivative of common forms of natural language, and that 
literature functions as a referential (or self-referential) form—justify the use 
of formalist theory and methods within the study of sign and symbol systems. 
However, it remains a bit of a stretch to position early formalism as a precur-
sor to cognitive science without the further assumption that the subjective 
experience of literature originates within and is determined by biological 
properties of the human brain. This important assumption—of a cognitive 
aesthetic—was not a well-articulated part of the early formalist agenda. 
Currently, explanations of natural-historical origins and causes of human aes-
thetic experiences continue to remain outside formalist theoretical domains; 
and it is exactly this omission that has helped lead to the formalist demise.
 Perhaps formalism succumbed to successive waves of structuralism (and, 
subsequently, post-structuralism) simply because cognitive science was too 
young then—and is too young now—to catalog properly the mechanics 
of the senses that guide and influence human aesthetics. For, if formalist 
models had been grounded, from the beginning, in a more sophisticated 
knowledge of human behavior and its biological precedents (e.g., in a sort 
of biogenetic structuralism),7 then formalism might have been made more 
resistant to competing structural models.8 Regardless of those possibilities, 
however, significantly missing from early formalist theory is a detailed expla-
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nation of just how—and for what reasons—familiarization takes place. Thus, 
even when stated in its most positivist guise, formalism remains reactionary 
and more clearly delineated by its methodology and critique of preexisting 
bodies of literary theory than by its own unique theoretical stance.
[new] media aesthetics
The argument I am offering here is, in parallel to that of early formalism, a 
rather simple one: digital games and interactive play occupy the same posi-
tion relative to natural human semiosis that, for the Russian formalists, litera-
ture and poetic language occupy relative to conventional human language. 
Thus, the cognitive requirements for computer game play are parallel, in 
part, with requirements for reading. The initial process of learning computer 
game controls is analogous to the process of learning an alphabet, grammar, 
and syntax. In both cases, aesthetic pleasures are delayed during a period in 
which player/reader frustration is more likely than player/reader enjoyment.
 This analogy is not strict, however. Once literacy has been mastered, 
there is no recurring requirement of the reader to further understand and 
access natural and conventional language. In computer game play, however, 
there are always new controls—and new rules—to learn. For this reason, the 
experience of computer game play is more properly compared to the experi-
ence of reading poetic language.
 The demands of poetic language are more involved than those of con-
ventional language. The experience of reading poetic language is, like the 
experience of playing a computer game, uncertain; a successful and pleasur-
able experience must include some measure of interactivity involving both 
the knowledge of and the ability to re-evaluate preexisting linguistic forms 
(e.g., the ability to recognize the capitalization, spelling, and punctuation 
“mistakes” of poet e. e. cummings).
 Poetic language is therein a counterpoint to existing and conven-
tional language—or, in the terms I used earlier, a sort of anti-language. 
Correspondingly, the function of poetic language is a direct result of its anti-
form: it is an undermining and questioning of existing linguistic models and 
a resulting confusion (or, on occasion, enlightenment) regarding those refer-
ents to which conventional language refers.
 As Russian formalist Shklovsky famously observed, poetic language 
serves “to recover the sense of life, in order to feel objects, to make the stone 
stony.”9 Formalist claims that poetic language returns us to a pre-linguistic 
state are based on the function of conventional language as artifice: a virtual 
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representation of real-world objects and sensations. In this function, conven-
tional language distorts our real-world sensations; poetic language, in rebut-
tal, self-referentially calls our attention to the nature and origin of those dis-
tortions. Thus, poetic language is—and is not—part of the language system 
that contains it.
 It is then useful to think of the function of literary form—and digital 
game form—as founded on an anti (or agonistic play) principle that repeats, 
recants, and therein reveals the otherwise hidden properties and mecha-
nisms of the larger contexts to which they belong. If poetic language is a sort 
of anti-language, then digital games are a sort of anti-experience.
 The ubiquitous controller of the computer game both is and is not a part 
of the human nervous system—the human experience—that contains it. By 
confining the experience of computer game play within the mechanics of the 
computer game controller and habituated response, computer game rules 
and relationships undermine and deny conventional experience in much the 
same manner that poetic language undermines and denies conventional lan-
guage.
 The great difference, however, is that poetic language merely points to—
and is therein distinguished from—the human physical form. Regardless of 
the skill of the poet, poetic language is never so stony as the stone; rather, it 
remakes the stone stony. There is no similar and incontrovertible distinction 
made between the human physical form and the computer game, particularly 
under those circumstances where both systems—the human nervous system 
and the computer game platform/engine/interface—perform their functions 
subliminally. The computer game makes (rather than remakes) the computer 
game experience and therein confirms what poetic language would deny: the 
reality of the artifice.
 During computer game play, the human body and the human experi-
 results in . . . results in . . .
(re)assertion of experience (physics) assertion of self (psycho-physics)
Natural language  Natural semiosis
conventional representation (habituation) conventional experience
Poetic language  Digital semiosis









Figure 3.1. Formal parallels between language and semiosis
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ence are accessible only as these are represented and valued by computer 
game mechanics. Poetic language points us to an objective correlative: a 
pre-linguistic state of direct and immediate experience. Computer games, in 
contrast, point us to the psychophysical: what we believe to be true.
 In parallel with the statement of Jakobson quoted earlier, we might then 
say that digital media play—and, most particularly, computer game play—is 
semiosis in its anti-aesthetic function.
the formalist precipice
Digital media provide rich opportunities for formal analysis, due to their 
reliance on an explicit and embedded code. In fact, most available formal 
analyses of media engage the relationship between media codes and human 
codes (e.g., language). There are several flavors of “media as code” theory, 
distinguished by the degree to which formal properties of digital code are 
assigned influence and priority over formal properties of human perception, 
cognition, and experience.
 One of the more recent examples of a purely formalist approach, unfet-
tered by contextual concerns, is Andersen’s semiotic analysis of program-
ming languages, in which he considers aspects of digital signs “unique to the 
computer medium.10 This analysis de-emphasizes all affective and interpre-
tive components of digital media, in favor of classifying digital code solely on 
the basis of its relationship to other sign and symbol systems. For instance, 
Andersen assigns a single set of objective properties to an “interactive” digital 
sign: an interactive sign accepts input, has mutable features, and can affect 
features of other signs. When using such a definition, no assumptions need 
be made concerning the function of interactive signs within human interpre-
tive systems.
 Others more strongly emphasize the importance of human interpre-
tive systems and functions in interpreting digital code—and, correspond-
ingly, give as much attention to aesthetic experiences as formal properties. 
Manovich, for instance, distinguishes between “transparent” and “non-trans-
parent” digital code—terms that reference the ability of digital code to trans-
form human thought.
In cultural communication, a code is rarely simply a neutral transport mecha-
nism; usually it affects the messages transmitted with its help. For instance, 
it may make some messages easy to conceive and render others unthinkable. 
A code may also provide its own model of the world, its own logical system, 
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or ideology; subsequent cultural messages or whole languages created using 
this code will be limited by this model, system, or ideology. Most modern 
cultural theories rely on these notions, which together I will refer to the 
“non-transparency of the code” idea.11
 Formalist models would agree, in some sense, that digital media code is 
“non-transparent.” However, formalist models diverge from those of cultural 
studies in the former’s claim that digital media codes and forms—including, 
in significant part, the rules of computer game play—are governed by bio-
logical codes that are non-transmutable. That is, codes of technology and, 
ultimately, codes of culture come to resemble the interior mechanics—the 
biological “code”—governing construction of human experience.
 If code is arbitrarily non-transparent—a position that some versions of 
cultural studies (and media determinism) take to the extreme—then for-
malism cannot remain “pure.” Formalism remains valid only as the initial 
step in establishing a relationship between aesthetics and cognition, or, more 
strongly put, between codes of media and codes of brains. And, in fact, there 
is an even stronger cognitive-based position: the non-transparency of media 
code is itself an indication of its (non-arbitrary) origin. That is, the “ideol-
ogy” of media code is non-transparent—and intractable—precisely because 
it parallels equally non-transparent, intractable (and yet mysterious) codes of 
biology.
It is now widely maintained that the concept of “literariness” has been criti-
cally examined and found deficient. Prominent postmodern literary theorists 
have argued that there are no special characteristics that distinguish literature 
from other texts. Similarly, cognitive psychology has often subsumed literary 
understanding within a general theory of discourse processing. However, a 
review of empirical studies of literary readers reveals traces of literariness 
that appear irreducible to either of these explanatory frameworks.12
 The most important contribution of Russian formalism was its discovery 
of universal patterns within literary forms; yet, simultaneously, the great fail-
ure of formalism was its inability to reveal the origins of those patterns and 
forms. For this reason, Russian formalism quickly fell to the more explicit 
claims of Marxism, which was quicker and more certain in attributing aes-
thetic patterns and structures—indeed, the patterns and structures of all 
things—to a dialectical materialism shaping art and community. The influ-
ence of classical Marxism has since diminished but has been replaced by 
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structural variants that have continued to suppress the occasional formalist 
revival, wherein each structural and post-structural model, like its prede-
cessors, has been more successful than formalism in assigning characteristic 
aesthetic forms to non-aesthetic causes.
 Yet the insights of Russian formalism remain persuasive: poetic language 
is contained within language, and the study of poetic language is essentially 
the study of language—its formal possibilities as well as its everyday prac-
tices. Similarly, the claim here is that human aesthetics is contained within 
the mechanics of a human sensorium and that the study of digital media aes-
thetics is essentially the study of the human neurological system, including 
those cognitive functions that process, interpret, and transform sensory data: 
semiosis.13
 As early formalist theory evolved, there were attempts to develop the-
oretical positions encompassing both the universals of form and the vari-
ety of social structures that influence the effects of form.14 Many of these 
attempts—structuralism, post-structuralism, hermeneutics, discourse analy-
sis, social semiotics, and many other contemporary literary theories—apply 
early formalist methods toward an understanding of values and meanings 
within social and cultural contexts. However, early formalist theory seems, 
in retrospect, to extend more appropriately into cognitive science than into 
social science. In fact, if universal properties of human cognition operate in 
parallel with and reinforce formal characteristics of games and play, then 
there is much to be gained from pursuing a phenomenological hermeneu-
tics in which the “interpretive community” guiding the values and meanings 
of digital media is precisely the biological origin and natural history of the 
human brain.
 There is something quite humanistic in the claim that all humans possess, 
within their most basic perceptions and recognitions, the awe, the wonder, 
and the enlightenment associated with our most engaging forms of art. The 
function of art and literature is then to unravel these mysteries of the mind 
and the body: mysteries that are already, in the most basic sense, possessed. 
In contrast with this formalist point of view, contemporary cultural and criti-
cal studies often promote a seemingly more superficial and vague humanism, 
which must assume that the aesthetic properties of the human experience 
are found in the milieu of that experience rather than in the properties and 




Play tends to remove the very nature of the mysterious.
 —Roger Caillois, Man, Play, and Games (1961) 
Poetics is the study of a particular sort of text. Aesthetics, on the other hand, 
is the study of a particular sort of human experience: pleasure—or, in the 
case of computer game play, the study of fun. Thus, unlike poetics, aesthetics 
requires some reference to the human senses (or sensorium) and that which 
enlivens or awakens or gives pleasure to the human sensorium.
 Let’s assume, as most do, that aesthetic pleasure results from a particular 
sort of art/text. If so, then when we focus a formalist discussion on the emo-
tional effect—the pleasure—of that art/text, are we not committing what for-
malists called an “affective fallacy”? Are we not confusing the study of a work 
of art (e.g., poetics) with the study of the emotional/affective consequences 
of a work of art (e.g., aesthetics)?
 After all, early formalists clearly attributed the functional consequence of 
ostranenie to poetic language. This seems to be an effect of poetic language. 
How can we not consider this sort of attribution an affective fallacy that turns 
our attention away from the form of art/text and toward the effects/conse-
quences of art/text?
 Two reasons. First, the formalist position assumes that the effect of 
poetic language is common and predictable—that is, that the function of 
poetic language has an objective nature independent of any idiosyncratic 
emotional response. And second and related, ostranenie does not affect the 
individual so much as it affects the raw senses of the species; this assigns 
a universal—even, in some ways, irresistible—quality to the poetic, subse-
quently provoking a particular, sense-based aesthetic response: a state of 
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heightened awareness in which, according to Shklovsky, we “recover the 
sensation of life.”
 Thus, the study of art/text (e.g., poetics) becomes most critically the dis-
covery and unraveling of forms of art/text that are most closely tied to the 
study of objective and universal pleasures of art/text (e.g., aesthetics).
 Here, of course, I wish to explore what might be considered analogous to 
the pleasures of art/text: the pleasures of digital media and computer game 
play. One of the more obvious places to look for the root of these pleasures 
in new media is in the formal properties of new media interactivity—and the 
associated concept of immersion. Yet, while interactivity is probably the most 
oft-cited, most distinctive, and most influential component of new media, 
that term, like play, regularly eludes a precise definition.
 Andersen,1 for instance, prefers to locate interactivity in objective char-
acteristics of computer-based signs—without much concern with either the 
interpretive values resulting from the interactive process or the pleasures 
that process might elicit. Similarly, Aarseth2 defines new media interactiv-
ity as “ergodicity,” which is understood as determined by the quantity of 
“reader” effort expended; again, this understanding is possible without any 
immediate concern with the consequential values (or pleasures) of reader 
effort expended.3
 Neither of these two definitions of interactivity—nor many others avail-
able4—commonly couch interactivity within a functional biological context 
like that implied by Shklovsky and early formalists, wherein media interac-
tivity is a formal characteristic transplanted from and reflecting fundamental 
properties of the human sensorium. When given such a biological origin, 
interactivity can be usefully understood as a human cognitive function prior 
to—and a necessary step toward—human semiosis. This then helps remove 
any theoretical disconnect between poetics and aesthetics, by connecting a 
particular form of art /text (poetics) with a particular and parallel form of 
pleasure (aesthetics).
 I have previously weighed in on this matter of how best to conceptualize 
interactivity in The Nature of Computer Games, where I promote a defini-
tion of interactivity borrowed from Rafaeli and Sudweeks: interactivity “is 
the extent to which messages in a sequence relate to each other, and espe-
cially the extent to which later messages recount the relatedness of earlier 
messages.”5 Using this definition of interactivity, I have demonstrated how 
new media interactivity transforms signs and symbols in characteristic ways, 
focusing on and emphasizing their “relatedness.”6 This characteristic pattern 
of media interactivity entails a particular formal relationship among signs: a 
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temporal sequence of significations during which successive signs are used 
to construct a context within which subsequent signs are interpreted, valued, 
and given meaning. I call this relational process recursive contextualization.
Let me break it down a bit further here. Recursive contextualization entails 
two important sub-processes: repetition and contextualization. Recursion, or 
self-reference, does not necessarily occur during repetition; nor is recursion 
necessarily a part of contextualization. Therefore, we can separate these two 
component processes—repetition and contextualization—and we can exam-
ine them individually during computer game play. Each is intimately associ-
ated with a specific element of computer game design and form that reflects 
the design and form of the human sensorium: interface and code.
the computer game interface
Prototypically, computer games engage the human senses much more directly 
and immediately than do the genres of literature and art that Shklovsky and 
Wimsatt and other early formalists first analyzed. In fact, in most computer 
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Figure 4.1. One-way, two-way, and interactive communication. Adapted from 
Rafaeli & Sudweeks (1997) [http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol2/issue4/intctvty.gif].
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games—for example, first-person shooters—mastery of game mechanics and 
interface is a vital and necessary prelude to play. This is not a temporary 
impediment that is no longer important once overcome. Constant attention 
to and manipulation of game mechanics is required throughout computer 
game play, even when these requirements recede from the conscious aware-
ness of players. In fact, game play is more enjoyable precisely when the 
attention to and manipulation of game mechanics recedes from conscious 
awareness and the player is fully engaged (or immersed) in the game. There-
fore, it seems that one function of repetition in game play is to, over time, 
fully engage and thereby familiarize the senses, leading to a phenomenologi-
cal state of “unawareness” or, in early formalist terms, habituation.
 All computer games depend on a set of core sensory mechanics—similar 
in many ways to those of language and perception. These mechanics are 
habitualized, unconscious (i.e., capable of operating beneath surface aware-
ness), and, like the fundamental characteristics of both language and per-
ception, required prior to any subsequent aesthetic pleasure. Unlike the 
mechanics of language and perception, however, these mechanics are not 
solely embedded in the human body; they are, at least in part, embedded in 
the computer game interface.
 One of the more striking characteristics of computer games is the extent 
to which these depend on and require some mastery of locomotor play prior 
to engagement with the game as a whole, particularly prior to engagement 
with game rules governing conceptual play. Of course, many generations of 
games have required similarly physical competencies: mumblety-peg, hop-
scotch, and virtually all sports. However, few genres of games have main-
tained such obvious reliance on a ubiquitous mechanical “controller.”
 The evolution of the dedicated computer game controller—much like 
that of the equally common game interface of keyboard and mouse—has 
been relatively straightforward, deviating little from the simple toggles and 
control sticks of the 1970s to the more sophisticated, but otherwise quite 
similar, handheld devices of today. Computer game controllers have only 
occasionally employed mechanics beyond the conventional and consensual, 
or mechanics that strictly and realistically modeled their in-game referents. 
There are indeed computer game interfaces modeled as guns, steering 
wheels, skateboards, and guitars—for example, for the popular console game 
Guitar Hero (RedOctane, 2005). But these are, by and large, exceptions to 
the generic controllers used by the majority of games designed for Micro-
soft’s Xbox, Sony’s PlayStation, and, until very recently, Nintendo’s dedicated 
game systems.7
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 And, significantly, despite ongoing innovations, all computer game con-
trollers—including the Wii and other exceptions to current norms—have 
at least two common properties: (1) they employ arbitrary and simplified 
abstractions of their real-world referents, and (2) they require some level of 
habituation of response.
 Player actions and choices within computer games are delayed, misap-
plied, and otherwise distorted—to the detriment of successful play—without 
a thorough and intuitive mastery of the game interface and controller. And, 
of course, learning to manipulate the computer game controller is a neces-
sary (but only preliminary) stage of computer game play.
 Habituation of response most often (though not always easily) comes 
through repetitive play, which computer games have in great abundance. 
This repetitive play integrates increasingly complex controller movements 
with more strategic and conceptual play. During this process, game instruc-
tions are learned so well as to require little conscious attention, and game 
rules come to dominate player awareness and decision making. Therein, 
computer game locomotor play is sublimated in service of conceptual play—
a difficult and gradual task, which often only willing minds and nimble fin-
gers are able to accomplish.
 Significantly, while basic controller configurations are shared across 
games, the sequential patterns and manipulations required for advanced lev-
els of computer game play are conspicuously unique. That is, while controller 
buttons have similar configurations patterned after the human hand,8 new and 
different games always seem to require that these buttons be pushed in new 
and different ways. Even within games, there are many and different control-
ler sequences to be mastered for many and different game processes. For this 
reason, each new computer game tends to evoke at least some portion of the 
habituation process anew, accompanied by similar requirements of recurring 
trials and errors, multiple saves and reloads. This phenomenon seems at first 
glance a barrier to computer game play (and subject to negative market pres-
sures) and is all the more curious when innovative controller designs have 
little impact on the subjective experience of computer game play.9
 Let us consider the interface of digital games analogous to the interface 
of the human body through which we gather, represent, and value our sur-
roundings: the sensorium. Given an intractable sensorium, our senses are 
regulated by mechanics beyond our immediate control or awareness. While 
the computer game interface cannot entirely reconstitute the body in this 
exact way, it can do something parallel: it can reconfigure our interpretation 
of experience in order to prioritize—and de-prioritize—various aspects of 
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that experience. By incorporating virtual valuations into the human expe-
riential repertoire, computer games function simultaneously as experience 
simulators and as the experience being simulated. That is, the game interface 
mediates and, on occasion, substitutes for the embedded bodily mechanics 
of a human sensorium.
 During computer game play, the domain of real-world experiences 
becomes a (relatively narrower) domain of virtual-world “immersions.” These 
immersive virtual experiences become, once habituated, doppelgängers—
parasitic on and indistinguishable from their non-virtual counterparts. The 
computer game interface evoking these “false” experiences has no ability to 
tag these experiences as true or false or in between. And, unlike the non-
virtual experiences they emulate, these virtual experiences are not subject to 
any exterior (i.e., real-world) test of validity. Rather, their values are depen-
dent on game code.
 The entrenchment of these virtual experiences within computer game 
play is a function of repetition alone, which, in general and over time, tends 
to isolate habitualized behavior from its immediate surroundings. This pro-
cess is similar, for instance, to how drivers constantly driving along the same 
route can eventually navigate that course without any conscious attention or 
concern for signs on the road. This habitualized activity (e.g., of driving) is 
then set apart from other, more willful behavior—at least until some anoma-
lous sensation (an unexpected bump in the road) jolts us into a more active 
process of value determination. Until that moment, repetition of behavior is 
most likely to result in a decontextualization process, wherein habitualized 
behavior is isolated from other sensory concerns. This is precisely the func-
tion early formalists attributed to natural language use: we are so habitual-
ized by natural language that we need poetic language (the occasional bump 
in the road) to restore a context in which we are alive, aware, and aestheti-
cally stimulated.
 Repetitive play in computer games, however, is part of a different formal 
context than repetitive use of a natural language.
the computer game code
If computer game play were static, if it were not interactive in the “related-
ness” sense of the earlier definition, then repetitive play would likely serve 
only habituation and decontextualization. However, computer game play 
is dynamic—particularly in its manipulation of semiotic form. This formal 
manipulation is guided and governed by the computer game code, which, 
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regardless of its implementation, adheres to a recognizable pattern of con-
struction and deconstruction. This code is then layered on top of the habitu-
ations of locomotor play, with a much different result than that of poetic 
language.
 Computer game designs—and here I might even daresay all game 
designs—can be construed as the manipulation of arrays within a multidi-
mensional matrix (or “space”). Commonly, these arrays are composed of 
seven values—plus or minus about two—despite the number of dimensions 
that may become subsequently involved. Among examples of this form, one 
of the clearest and most relevant to computer games is found in role-playing 
games, prototypically represented by Gary Gygax’s Dungeons & Dragons 
(D&D) (originally published in 1974).
 In D&D, for instance, character generation is based on selecting seven 
values (occasionally interrelated, occasionally not), with each value govern-
ing some portion of character behavior within the game’s broader context. 
During play, these seven values function like a composite array (or vector)—
valued in comparison with the arrays/vectors of other, similarly generated 
characters.10
 This fundamental form of character generation is found in other games 
as well. All games modeling real-world objects—airplanes, pugilists, stock-
brokers—represent these objects as aggregates of some limited (though 
sometimes quite large) number of “basic characteristics.” In D&D, these 
characteristics are strength, intelligence, wisdom, dexterity, constitution, 
charisma, and comeliness, but in other games, these characteristics can be 
more abstract and/or more generic. (In many cases, for instance, the basic 
characteristics of a game object are representative values for that object’s in-
game virtual mass, volume, and/or velocity.)
 We can now call contextualization this process of combining fundamental 
or “basic” characteristics into a game object with a single reference and value, 
for example, a player-character in D&D. This contextualization process is 
not limited to character generation alone but describes the creation of other 
game objects as well. For instance, in D&D, characters can be combined into 
teams, teams into adventures, and adventures into campaigns, so that each 
larger element of game play is formed through an aggregation of lower-level 
elements; and at each successive level, game rules govern how these nested 
combinations are valued in comparison with other, similar combinations.
 Contextualization is actually only one of two important processes required 
by this particular game architecture. The other is opposition, which decon-
structs, rather than constructs, game objects. After characters have been 
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created in D&D, for instance, their basic characteristics do not disappear 
but are called on from time to time, individually, by game rules. As I have 
explained in The Nature of Computer Games, whereas contextualization 
reveals similarities among game elements, opposition reveals differences 
among elements so that these elements can be valued, if needed, without 
reference to their immediate context.
In Street Fighter II (SFII), elements of content—Street Fighters, or offi-
cially, “World Warriors’’—are valued in opposition to one another. These 
character-elements are composed of sub-elements (left kick, right kick, left 
punch, right punch, etc.), which are also valued in opposition to each other 
. . . These sub- and sub-sub-elements are the basic characteristics of each 
fighter-character; that is, all other characteristics of the Street Fighters (their 
names, clothes, coloring, etc.) are irrelevant to the mechanics of winning and 
losing the game and to the inner workings of the SFII game engine.11
 Many other games replicate Street Fighter II’s architecture of opposi-
tion. Different characters and go-karts in Super Mario Kart are distinguished 
by basic characteristics of speed, acceleration, and handling ability. Planes 
in Microsoft’s Flight Simulator have embedded basic characteristics repre-
senting the flight capabilities of real-world planes. The simple game objects 





Figure 4.2. Common game functions of contextualization and opposition
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width, and speed of descent. Characters in Will Wright’s popular Sims series 
of games are composed of (up to) eight basic characteristics or “needs.” 
Equally, squares on a Monopoly board are defined by a common set of basic 
characteristics: each square’s position relative to the starting point of GO, its 
costs, its genre or class (real estate, railroad, chance, etc.), its in-game conse-
quences, and so forth.
 Importantly, contextualization and opposition have common properties 
across all games.12 For instance, as regards contextualization, the same num-
ber of elements constitute game objects at the same contextual level; each of 
these elements has a finite range of values; each element value determines 
some, but not all, game consequences; and so forth. As regards opposition, 
game objects are given value only through opposition; opposition is a process 
activated, unlike contextualization, by player initiative and choice; opposi-
tional values are only valid among objects at the same contextual level; and 
so forth.
 These common features of game form seem to indicate that opposition 
and contextualization are operating at a relatively deep level of human cogni-
tion. In parallel, Lakoff and Johnson13 have claimed that common features 
of natural language originate in those sensory processes associated with the 
positioning of material objects in relation to the human body in three-dimen-
sional space. This deep structure is, for Lakoff and Johnson, apparent in 
the assignation (through metaphor) of “basic characteristics” of real-world 
objects to conceptual objects: a conceptual object’s ability to “hold” other 
objects; whether or not that conceptual object is “pushable,” “pullable,” or 
“containable”; and so forth. Thus, not only do the referents of conceptual 
objects inhabit the natural world, but those basic characteristics—for exam-
ple, pushable, pullable, containable—that assign those objects values within 
a natural language inhabit (or are embodied within) the natural world as 
well. This would seem to be even more the case as regards the basic charac-
teristics and values of computer game objects.
 Sometimes we refer to these sorts of “basic characteristics” in the natural 
world as “affordances,”14 to emphasize their codependence on the human 
body and on the natural environment in which that human body has evolved. 
Computer games have numerous affordances of this sort: opportunities for 
action within the game environment, which are predisposed to be acted 
upon and to be valued—or to be “embodied”—in particular and predeter-
mined ways. The simplest examples of these affordances are, of course, a 
reliance on bodily movements within the computer games: left, right, up, 
down, backward, forward.
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 The key here is that the computer game does not determine these oppor-
tunities and affordances so much as does the natural history of the game 
player—or, indeed, the natural history of the game player species. The game 
merely reproduces and replicates these opportunities—these affordances—
in a repetitive and patterned way.
 Our aesthetic response to the computer game, therefore, is bound by 
those embodied mechanisms that identify and respond to these affordances. 
Game designs are likewise more popular and appealing based on their ability 
to appease our natural inclinations to identify and respond to these affor-
dances.
 However, computer game players activate these embedded mechanisms 
in a virtual and, importantly, symbolic environment wherein those activations 
have different values and justifications than they do in the natural world. 
And, significantly, players are often most ingenious and most successful dur-
ing play when they apply opportunities for contextualization and opposition 
in ways other than those intended—or allowed—by either the game design 
or by natural law. That is, because contextualization and opposition are such 
fundamental (and unavoidable) properties of cognition, players are only 
loosely bound in the use of these functions by game code.15
 Within the game matrix, criteria of winning conditions establish a most 
desired game object, yet these conditions do not specify which combination 
of elements best (or only) meets those criteria. Finding and/or constructing 
a most desired game object—through successive applications of the embed-
ded cognitive mechanisms of opposition and contextualization—is then the 
primary activity of game play, regardless of whether this activity takes place 
according to game rules or not.
 During play, various combinations of elements are tried and tested, poten-
tially involving, over time, all possible combinations within the game matrix. 
And once all possible combinations have been found (or “played”), the game 
becomes considerably less appealing. This is the fate, for instance, of games 
such as tic-tac-toe (naughts and crosses), which suffers from a relative lack of 
complexity in the number and combinations of its game elements.
 The complexity of the oppositions and contextualizations required to win 
a game may vary significantly from game to game, but in each case, our ear-
lier analogy remains apt: game elements analogous to arrays are manipulated 
within a multidimensional space composed of some limited number of basic 
characteristics established by the game design. The number of dimensions in 
this space—as well as the size of the arrays—is fixed both explicitly by game 
rules and implicitly by human cognition. Games that have an overly large and 
60  play redux
complex number of game elements are played more “poorly” by human play-
ers than those that do not. These more complex games are not unplayable 
by human players per se but are better played, for instance, by computer 
programs unburdened by common limitations of human cognition.
 Consider checkers, for instance, as an example of a moderately complex 
game (more so than tic-tac-toe, at least)—determined by the number of 
player moves possible within any fixed game position or space. Also consider 
the still more complex—in this same sense—game of chess. The physical 
play space is superficially the same for checkers and chess (i.e., a sixty-four-
square board), but the number of moves available to chess players within this 
“space” is much larger, and, correspondingly, the multidimensional matrix 
required to contain and adjudicate all these moves is much larger as well.
 Computer programs are quite adept at playing checkers by considering 
all possible oppositional values of all possible moves: a strategy of “brute 
strength” that has proven competitively superior to human play. Chess-play-
ing programs are becoming similarly adept, using primarily brute-strength 
techniques that (potentially) calculate every possible value of every possible 
array within the entirety of the game space. Thus, inside any sufficiently 
complex game—such as chess—human play is frequently insightful but less 
than optimum in generating the most desired game objects. Computer-based 
brute-strength strategies, on the other hand, seem less insightful than myste-
rious.
[Deep Blue II] taught us nothing about human thought processes, other than 
that world-class chess-playing can be done in ways completely alien to the 
way in which human grandmasters do it.16
Yet these “alien” strategies prove, almost without exception, superior to 
human play in generating the most desired game objects—that is, in winning 
the game.
 When human play is conceived in this manner—as an imperfect genera-
tive function testing all possible arrays within a fixed matrix—play can be 
understood to parallel other, similarly imperfect mechanisms that generate 
random variation and drive evolutionary change.17 Therein, play, as a bio-
logical mechanic, may be better understood (and more fully realized) as a 
means of preserving (and transforming) the human species than as a means 
of pleasuring individual players.
 Taken as a whole, multiple players and playings generate increasingly 
broader understandings and increasingly successful adaptations (measured 
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both by knowledge gained and effects produced) within complex games—
without being unnecessarily constrained, as artificial intelligence systems 
are, by the game code. This exploration, manipulation, and eventual mastery 
of the game system occurs despite (or perhaps because of) individual play 
being prone to frequent errors—for example, “blunders” in chess.
 These errors and mistakes occur much more often in complex games 
than in non-complex games and can be seen as originating in the indiscrimi-
nate use of opposition and contextualization functions. That is, human play 
commonly fails to maintain the boundaries and rules of the game design. 
Realizing this, game designers make frequent use of the generative function 
of play during computer game “beta tests,” which have become a vital part of 
the game design process, particularly for complex computer games, such as 
massively multi-player online role-playing games.
 During MMO beta testing, individual players hammer away at the game 
and demonstrate how it might be “broken” in a variety of ways. During sub-
sequent play beyond the beta testing period, individual players continue to 
explore the game space in ways often unforeseen by the game designers. This 
blustery and blundering sort of play may result in serendipitous “emergent” 
consequences,18 but it more often simply results in some shortcut method of 
creating the game’s most desired objects—including, of course, “cheating.”
 Thus, the game system can be seen as something of an ongoing struggle 
between the game code as law, which functions to restrict play, and play 
itself, which, largely through trial and error, tends to simplify and, if possible, 
unravel the game design in favor of some more human-compatible struc-
ture. Both sides in this struggle—game designers and game players—are 
bound by the same functions of contextualization and opposition. The game 
designer restricts the order and syntax of these functions,19 while the game 
player is more prone to apply these functions indiscriminately, with little 
regard to their proper or intended use.
 Individual play, in fact, seems characteristically unwilling—or perhaps 
simply unable—to exert precise control over contextualization and opposi-
tion. During play, these functions are applied to game elements at different 
contextual levels and out of logical sequence—again, in often seemingly ran-
dom ways. Assigning game object values in such a willy-nilly fashion com-
monly results in paradoxes anathematic to the logical analysis of complex 
systems and is particularly destructive to those brute-strength algorithms so 
proficient at playing rigid-rule games, such as checkers and chess. Therein, in 
fact, lies a great deal of the ingenuity and uniqueness of human game play: its 
bull-in-a-china-shop approach and resulting blatant breaches of game rules.
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 Further, game play—and, again, this is particularly the case with computer 
game play—is characteristically repetitive. That is, game player choices—
and the game contexts created by these choices—frequently become game 
elements (and sub-elements) within successive iterations of play, forming 
supra-contexts of play.
 One of the more sophisticated and widely known implementations of 
this increasingly recursive pattern of play—and its supra-contextual conse-
quences—is found in the Civilization series of games by Sid Meier and, later, 
Bruce Shelley. I have elsewhere explained the transformative elements of 
the “World Wonder” game elements in Civilization.20 These elements trans-
form the values of game elements—including themselves—and, during that 
transformation, likewise transform the game context that determines game 
values. This results in a self-referential form—a paradox—that is resolved 
only through repetitive play.
 While Civilization is one of the more sophisticated and successful imple-
mentations of this particular form within a single-player game, most com-
puter game designs display something similar in the construction of succes-
sive “levels” of player achievement, each resetting upon its completion to a 







Figure 4.3. Transformative functions of play that create supra-contexts
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 Supra-contexts perhaps become most obvious during repeated play of 
cooperative (i.e., non-zero-sum) games, wherein self-reference becomes an 
important oppositional value governing subsequent play. This category of 
games includes the well-known prisoner’s dilemma game, which, because of 
its relative simplicity and relevance to social contracts, has been analyzed in 
great detail. Here is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s description of 
the game:
Tanya and Cinque have been arrested for robbing the Hibernia Savings Bank 
and placed in separate isolation cells. Both care much more about their per-
sonal freedom than about the welfare of their accomplice. A clever prosecu-
tor makes the following offer to each. “You may choose to confess or re-
main silent. If you confess and your accomplice remains silent I will drop all 
charges against you and use your testimony to ensure that your accomplice 
does serious time. Likewise, if your accomplice confesses while you remain 
silent, they will go free while you do the time. If you both confess I get two 
convictions, but I’ll see to it that you both get early parole. If you both remain 
silent, I’ll have to settle for token sentences on firearms possession charges. 
If you wish to confess, you must leave a note with the jailer before my return 
tomorrow morning.”21
 The winning condition of the prisoner’s dilemma game, as in all games, 
describes a most desired game object: the (least) amount of time spent 
in jail. As in other games, this most desired game object is composed of 
aggregate game elements—in this case, two: player 1’s choice and player 
2’s choice. During repeated play, the outcomes of previous games become 
game sub-elements, affecting each player’s choices in subsequent games. 
Linking a cascading series of game outcomes in this fashion creates, over 
time, a self-referencing form, which, something like mutually referencing 
cells in an Excel spreadsheet, would seem, on the surface, unstable, irresolv-
able, or both.
 During the play process, however, players can, largely through trial and 
error (and something close to what is known, in artificial intelligence circles, 
as “backpropagation of error”),22 discover things previously unknown about 
the game mechanics and structure. With that knowledge, players can pro-
duce a close approximation of the game’s winning conditions for all involved. 
In the case of the prisoner’s dilemma game, this approximation is a tit-for-
tat strategy in which both players mimic the previous game choice of their 
opponent. This appears to be an objective or “natural” outcome of the game 
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form that does not depend on anything other than an unwavering desire on 
the part of both players to win the game—and, of course, the ability of both 
players to vary their strategies over time: repetitive and recursive play.
 It is important to note, however, that the paradoxical peculiarities of this 
recursive form entail that the game context can always be further altered. 
And this consequence, too, has been demonstrated during play of the pris-
oner’s dilemma game. For instance, a group of researchers has successfully 
defeated the otherwise optimum tit-for-tat strategy in a tournament setting 
by manipulating the competitive game context in which tit-for-tat otherwise 
would emerge victorious.23
 These researchers flooded the tournament with multiple tit-for-tat oppo-
nents, each of which competed rigorously against the tit-for-tat strategy and 
then colluded during competition with each other, in order to manipulate 
the tournament outcome in their favor. In fact, this same strategy of collu-
sion within a presumptively competitive environment is found within online 
player-versus-player (PvP) play in MMOs as well. Computer game PvP play-
ers commonly trade wins back and forth and/or create dummy characters 
that absorb multiple losses, in order to manipulate and artificially increase 
their own win totals and related PvP rankings. Such is the curious and some-
times cruel function of a socially determined supra-contextualization of 
game rules: these tend to manipulate play contexts in characteristically non-
egalitarian ways.24
 Based on this realization, social constructivists have argued that games 
are, in fact, poorly understood using formalist analysis. This argument 
maintains that because games are subject to transformation through recur-
sive contextualization—which can become, in social play contexts, socially 
determined—then it would follow that the games themselves are socially 
determined and subject to no formal rules other than, if any such exist, those 
rules governing the organization and sustenance of social order. However, 
social manipulations of game context—as in the prisoner’s dilemma tourna-
ment previously described—do not transform the fundamental game forms 
that assure contextual transformation. These forms—opposition, contextu-
alization, and, during repeated play, recursive self-reference—allow social 
manipulations to take place but are not themselves determined by social 
manipulations. Indeed, it seems more likely that the origin of these forms of 




The Computer Game Anti-aesthetic 
We all need mirrors to remind ourselves who we are.
 —Leonard Shelby, Memento (2003) 
Recursive contextualization establishes the basis for a computer game aes-
thetic, or, perhaps better, an anti-aesthetic. This anti-aesthetic is an aesthetic 
of the psychophysical and, as such, borrows assumptions and claims from 
evolutionary psychology. For instance, the aesthetic of the anti would claim 
that the pleasures of sensation and semiosis are biologically determined and, 
for that reason, inextricably linked. These mechanics of sensation and semio-
sis, no doubt, have evolved to further the survival of the human organism, yet 
these mechanics, for all their usefulness, show gaps and flaws.
 Piattelli-Palmarini (1994), for instance, has documented the degree to 
which human perception and judgment is consistently inaccurate in evaluat-
ing real-world events. Our perception—again, including perception, cogni-
tion, and semiosis as linked activities—invites a particular interpretation of 
the world due to its evolutionary design within a particular natural history. 
Real-world objects and events outside the physical and conceptual domain 
of our species remain alien to our senses and, correspondingly, alien to our 
minds. These invisible and mysterious domains may be as mundane as those 
portions of the electromagnetic spectrum beyond our natural vision or as 
exotic as quantum-level physics. We access such domains, if at all, through 
anti-intuitional means—for example, through some mechanical device sub-
stituting for natural perception (e.g., a radio telescope)—or, alternatively, 
through the formal abstractions of mathematics or some other, similarly non-
linguistic representational system. Thus, we might understand the form of 
alien domains through their analogous representation within our own per-
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sonal domains, but the experience of these other domains remains apart 
from us, despite any ability we might discover to measure, manipulate, or 
otherwise control their presence and effects.
 The psychophysical differs from the physical to the extent that it is a 
limited—and, because of its limitations, a distorted—subset of the physi-
cal. And those formal processes—sensation and semiosis—that construct the 
psychophysical laws governing our interpretive experiences are those same 
processes that guide interactive computer game play. Thus, computer game 
design and form is locked inside a particular and specific form of human 
representationalism, just as poetic language is locked inside a particular and 
specific form of natural language.
 A computer game anti-aesthetic posits a formal and cognitive aesthetic, 
which, strictly speaking, reveals, rather than constructs, emotional response. 
This aesthetic is located in the interpretation and manipulation of symbolic 
form rather than in the assignation of any particular content, value, or mean-
ing to that form. It is useful, then, to distinguish this position from others 
similar, which may recognize the same fundamental components of com-
puter game play—that is, repetition, opposition, and contextualization—yet 
assign quite different (non-anti) functions to them.
 Grodal (2000, 2003), for instance, has drawn a detailed comparison of the 
aesthetics of film and computer games, similar to that offered here.
Video games provide an aesthetic of repetition, similar to that of everyday 
life . . . The video game experience is very much similar to . . . an everyday 
experience of learning and controlling by repetitive rehearsal . . . The end 
result of the learning process is what the Russian Formalists called automa-
tion, and what psychologists might call desensitization by habituation.1 (ital-
ics in original)
 Grodal’s position, worth considering further, then goes something like this: 
the play of digital games is arousing. This arousal is cognitively labeled as spe-
cific emotional content according to the feedback players get from the game. 
And players are, to some important degree, in control of the feedback they get 
from the game. Therefore, Grodal claims that digital games as aesthetic expe-
riences reproduce embedded, prelinguistic arousal patterns (including some 
narratives—or “meta-narratives”—importantly among these) and that, during 
play, players undergo “curiosity, surprise, suspense, and explorative coping” in 
response to these patterns. Repetitive play enables mastery of the game, but, 
more significantly, repetitive play allows players to learn and achieve emo-
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tional control. Thus, Grodal values the repetition of play primarily as a learn-
ing process accomplishing a specific function: emotional self-control.
 This position is distinct from an anti-aesthetic insofar as it emphasizes the 
functional mastery of an emotional state. According to the model presented 
here, computer games and play evoke a distancing function (an anti-repre-
sentational function), which “controls” emotions only insofar as it separates 
emotions (and all other things) from their common referents within conven-
tional human experience.
 The distinction of the anti-aesthetic is that, through self-reference and 
recursion, a formal process re-creates the form of real-world experience 
within the domain of self. If and when emotions (i.e., “content”) become 
involved in this process, these emotions may be just as “real” as those 
accorded real-world experiences, yet the referents of those emotions will 
necessarily be something other than the real-world referents intended (by 
evolution and the natural history of the species).
 For this reason, the computer game experience is both experience in the 
raw and, simultaneously, an active reinforcement of false experience.2 Grodal 
seems to acknowledge the first portion of this claim but finds little reason to 
acknowledge or to assign any special relevance to the latter. In this, Grodal’s 
position is similar to that of much of current game study, which locates and 
analyzes the message or meaning or theme of computer games in the same 
manner and according to the same aesthetic that those concepts are located 
and analyzed in film and other non-interactive media.
 In a further instance, Aarseth (1999) has, in his analysis of the play of 
the first-person shooter Doom, identified two major tropes as “prenarrative 
master-figures of experience” (p. 39): aporia and epiphany. These arise from, 
respectively, an awareness of some obstacle or problem within the digital 
game and, subsequently, the revelation of its solution. Aarseth (1997) further 
locates these tropes within digital media in general or, in his terms, within 
“hypertext discourse” wherein aporia and epiphany together constitute a 
“fundamental layer of human experience” (pp. 91–92).
 If we assign aporia the function of semiotic opposition, and if we assign 
epiphany the function of semiotic contextualization, then aporia and epiph-
any are closely analogous to similar concepts here. Yet, while Aarseth care-
fully distinguishes the aporia of hypertext from that associated with other, 
“anamorphic” forms, he clearly couches his aporia-epiphany pair within a 
literary context.
We then derive three categories: novels (in which we include Afternoon-type 
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hyperfictions), anamorphic literature (solving enigmas), and metamorphic 
literature (the texts of change and unpredictability). The tigers that can be 
observed in the latter are unplanned, unbound, and untamed. But strangely, 
in these [latter] labyrinths, our influence as literary agents is much more real 
than in the two previous ones.3
 According to an anti-aesthetic, of course, this latter claim simply cannot 
be true, since our influence as literary agents must depend on our natural 
language proclivities, which are trumped and subsumed and made inconse-
quential by the (anti-)experiential interface of repetitive and recursive com-
puter game play.
 When associating the mechanics of aesthetic response with the mechan-
ics of language and literature (rather than with the mechanics of semiosis and 
experience), computer game aesthetics becomes a variant of media deter-
minism in which the formal mechanics of interactive media (e.g., “hypertext 
discourse”) substitute for those of natural language.
 In contrast, an anti-aesthetic claims that the mechanics of aesthetic 
response are merely evoked through self-referral within the mechanics of digi-
tal media, which, in this function, precedes and transcends the more conven-
tional domains of natural and poetic language. Thus, aporia and epiphany are 
not formally constructed during computer game design but merely revealed 
during computer game play—and can only be masked and distorted during any 
subsequent analysis of computer games as language-based aesthetic forms.
 In summary, a computer game anti-aesthetic differs from conventional 
analysis of the computer game aesthetic in the former’s emphasis of recur-
sive contextualization and the psychophysical limitations of the experience 
of computer game play. Further, computer game play transcends poetic lan-
guage and literature in its reference to broader and more fundamental bodily 
mechanics associated with interpretive experiences.
 Perhaps the greatest advantage of an anti-aesthetic in this regard is that 
it more readily includes and explains those experiences associated with com-
puter game play that are considered risky, harmful, against the rules, or in 
some other way bad. Indeed, within an anti-aesthetic, “bad” play becomes 
exemplary play. This bad play includes all emotions and efforts expended 
prior to Grodal’s sense of mastery and/or prior to Aarseth’s state of epiphany: 
frustration, isolation, obsession, self-immersion, defeat. While conventional 
aesthetic analysis discounts, considers incomplete, or otherwise ignores these 
emotions and efforts, the anti-aesthetic considers them common, central, 
and generative.
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 Computer game play is an experience in which the liminal—determined 
by a particular formal relationship among computer game objects and val-
ues—is given a bodily component and cause that, in that process, viscerally 
confirms the play experience. What seems to be becomes, in the computer 
game, what is; and the psychophysical is therein asserted and confirmed as 
the physical. This confirmation is normally a temporary state, undermined 
not only by the fragile and fleeting nature of play itself but also by the dialec-
tical relationship between the experience of the computer game as simula-
tion and the experience of the computer game as self.
 Computer game designers have tended to extend the experience of the 
liminal within computer games—commonly as an endless series of goals or 
levels—wherein players oscillate between neophyte (“newbie”) and expert. 
Expert status is achieved with full and thorough knowledge of computer 
game object-value relationships and with the corresponding assimilation of 
those relationships at some habituated and visceral level. Because of this 
latter requirement, full and thorough knowledge of game mechanics is not 
alone sufficient to locate and produce the computer game aesthetic. Full 
and thorough knowledge is more equivalent to what is required during the 
aesthetic experience of reading text—and might be similarly claimed, for 
instance, from a full and thorough reading of computer game rules, from a 
full and thorough reading of other computer game players’ accounts of their 
play, or from a full and thorough knowledge of computer game interface and 
computer game code. But none of these, in isolation, is sufficient.
 Computer game players eschew rules manuals in favor of an immediate 
experience, and many game designs—MMOs among them—no longer, if 
they ever did, publish game manuals in anything close to complete form. 
Knowledge of the computer game experience is acquired only through the 
immediate and the direct, grounded only through the senses. This is not 
dissimilar from the knowledge of the warmth of the sun or the knowledge 
of riding a bike or the knowledge of some other intimate and personal kin-
esthetic joy. As such, this knowledge heralds, perhaps, a burgeoning aes-
thetic of the haptic senses, evoked not by individual sensations per se but by 
their sequential presentation within an interactive and artificial (and therein 
abstract and symbolic) environment. Play would therein be instrumental in 
forging a relationship among our senses, our environment, and the neuro-
logical systems that mediate the two.
In art, as in play, something comes into presence that has never been there 
before; the work is made present, presented, through play.4
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 Perhaps peekaboo, more than any novel or film, is the quintessential 
computer game, alternating between our expectations and realizations at 
such a visceral level that the culminate pleasure of the game lies most funda-
mentally in the realization that it is false. Furthering this analogy, peekaboo 
is also a game that can be wholly enacted by the self, with the reward of a 
familiar face provided as easily by a mechanical interface—for example, a 
video display—as by the physical presence of another human being: peeka-
boo in a mirror.
 When the psychophysical—our perception of self—is asserted and con-
firmed during computer game play, there is nothing to deny it other than 
some grotesque failure of the game mechanics (e.g., a power outage) or, 
through purposeful design, the end of the game. In the natural world, play 
provides a means to deny and therein explore the boundaries of our envi-
ronment and our selves, yet these remain unassailably physical boundaries. 
There are no analogous physical boundaries—other than, perhaps, the physi-
cal exhaustion of the computer game player—delimiting play within a virtual 
world. In the natural world in which our bodies and our play have evolved, 
experience is available to trump belief. In the virtual world of the computer 
game, belief is given its own body of experience.
 Insofar as computer game play evokes a private experiential ground, there 
is little ability to either differentiate or choose between what seems to be and 
what is. And, in fact, given the choice, computer game players much seem to 
prefer what seems to be. In granting this preference, computer games func-
tion as a means of anti-control, a conscious—or at least willful—attempt to 
lose consciousness, to disregard the sensation of other in favor of a more direct 
and immediate engagement of body and mind and the sensation of self.
 Patterned after our own sensory mechanisms (a human sensorium) and 
those cognitive adaptations that have resulted in knowing the world through 
representations (a human semiosis), computer games appear capable of 
extending human knowledge only to the extent that human experience can be 
represented. During computer game play, representations of human experi-
ence—histories, narratives, societies, and simulations—are equally hollowed 
by the habitual and repetitive nature of play and are equally transformed by a 
more fundamental, proto-representation: an anti-form. Computer game play 
then serves as a revelation of those natural and historical affordances that 
determine our behavior and, simultaneously, for better or worse, as a means 




Media cannot change our innate cognitive and emotional archi-
tecture, only invent products that may activate and enhance the 
innate specifications.
 —Torben Grodal, Stories for the Eye, Ear, and Muscles (2003)
In the late 1800s, railroads were “iron horses.” In the early 1900s, automo-
biles were “horseless carriages.” And in the late 1900s, computer games were 
“interactive fictions.”
 From a contemporary perspective, it is no doubt difficult to imagine the 
importance of the horse within pre-industrial society. And, currently, there 
is little doubt about the importance of fiction and narrative in contemporary 
society. The importance of the horse and the importance of narrative fiction, 
however, are on similar and diminishing trajectories.
 While the term fiction certainly has more generic uses, we have come to 
associate it with prose narrative. And the form and fate of fiction, as prose 
narrative, are tightly linked to the form and fate of text. Narrative, however, 
has more general functions that are neither necessarily nor inextricably 
linked to prose form. Cognitive psychologists identify narrative as a particu-
lar style of thinking/learning—sometimes explicitly,1 sometimes less so.2 In 
developmental theories of learning, a narrative mode of thinking commonly 
occurs—in children, for instance—prior to some more “advanced” mode 
(e.g., a more abstract/formal mode of thinking).
 Recent cognitive theory recognizes both the persistence and the intrac-
tability of narratives within human cognition.3 William Labov, a linguist, has 
compiled universal features of narratives;4 in brief, Labov and others5 con-
sider narrative as a folk theory of causes. That is, stories in general—and nar-
ratives in particular—function as sense-making devices by providing explicit 
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and causal relationships among otherwise unrelated observations: a temporal 
sequencing of events.
 Thus, narratives are a sort of semiotic template, recording and commu-
nicating the results of some previously completed human meaning-making 
process. In computer game play, however, the human meaning-making pro-
cess is never previously completed but always presently ongoing. Therefore, 
narratives—and particularly prose narratives—often function in conflict with 
an aesthetic of play.
anti-narrative 
Roman Jakobson was one of the youngest of the early Russian formalists and 
a member of the original group who proved most facile in applying formalist 
principles and techniques within other theoretical disciplines. Also one of 
the founders of the Moscow Linguistic Circle, Jakobson made multiple con-
tributions to linguistics and literary theory. Most pertinent here is Jakobson’s 
classification of literary genres on the basis of their characteristic tropes or, 
put more generally, characteristic relationships among signs.
 Whereas I have previously classified semiotic processes as either oppo-
sitional or contextual, Jakobson establishes a similar binary division within 
human semiosis, marked by “selection” and “combination.”6 Jakobson argues, 
in formalist fashion, that broader literary forms are derivative of these two 
most basic and fundamental forms. Jakobson associates “selection” with met-
aphor and, at the level of genre, with romanticism; he associates “combina-
tion” with metonymy and, at the level of genre, realism.
 It is easy to find parallels between Jakobson’s analysis, my own, and that 
of contemporary computer game critics such as Espen Aarseth, who identi-
fies two formal “master tropes” characterizing not only all computer game 
play but all “hypertext discourse.”7 In parallel with early formalist claims, 
Aarseth’s tropes display distinct phenomenological effects. The first is apo-
ria, a feeling of confusion or helplessness among players—a state associated 
with the initial awareness and processing of oppositional signs such as those 
confronted during initial exposure to the physical interface of action/arcade 
games or, as Aarseth notes, during encounters with difficult puzzles or major 
obstacles within any game. The second of Aarseth’s master tropes is epiph-
any, resulting from the resolution of oppositions (and, thus, the resolution of 
aporia) through a contextualization process.
 Further, Aarseth classifies his tropes as “pre-narrative,” existing apart 
from (or at least prior to) those semiotic processes associated with language 
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and literature. Similarly, Jakobson’s analysis implies that while metaphor is 
fundamentally an intra-linguistic form, metonymy is meta-lingual. From this, 
we then must assume that any formal analysis regarding such forms must also 
be meta-lingual as well.
 My own analysis concurs with this line: that there exists both a formal and 
affective distinction between poetic form and computer game form; that this 
formal and affective distinction establishes the interactive aesthetic form as 
the more fundamental form (e.g., as either supra- or meta-lingual in nature); 
and that this interactive form has, as one of its major consequences, what 
early formalists referred to as a habituation of the senses. I would, in fact, 
argue even the stronger position that, as a result of the preceding, narrative 
forms are incongruous and frequently dysfunctional when applied within 
interactive computer game designs.
 Jakobson believed we could learn more about the nature of language from 
its limitations (e.g., those observed in aphasia patients) than from its achieve-
ments; likewise, we may well learn more about the nature of digital media 
from its failed appropriations of literary forms—stories and narratives—than 
from its widespread depiction as “interactive fiction.”
play in text 
One of the better-known and more-accomplished demonstrations of play 
with narrative is found in the work of Jorge Luis Borges, who, within tradi-
tional literary forms (e.g., the short story “Funes the Memorious”), describes 
semiotic processes I have closely associated with play. One is boundless 
opposition.
Funes . . . was, let us not forget, almost incapable of general, platonic ideas. 
It was not only difficult for him to understand that the generic term dog 
embraced so many unlike specimens of differing sizes and different forms; 
he was disturbed by the fact that a dog at three-fourteen (seen in profile) 
should have the same name as the dog at three-fifteen (seen from the front) 
. . . He was the solitary and lucid spectator of a multiform world which was 
instantaneously and almost intolerably exact.
Another is limitless contextualization.
The voice of Funes, out of the darkness, continued . . . The first stimulus to 
his work, I believe, had been his discontent with the fact that “thirty-three 
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Uruguayans” required two symbols and three words, rather than a single 
word and a single symbol. Later he applied his extravagant principle to the 
other numbers. In place of seven thousand thirteen, he would say (for ex-
ample) Máximo Perez; in place of seven thousand fourteen, The Train; other 
numbers were Luis Melián Lafinur, Olimar, Brimstone, Clubs, The Whale, 
Gas, The Cauldron, Napoleon, Agustín de Vedia. In lieu of five hundred, he 
would say nine. Each word had a particular sign, a species of mark; the last 
were very complicated.
Another is paradoxical recursion.
In effect, Funes not only remembered every leaf on every tree of every 
wood, but even every one of the times he had perceived or imagined it. He 
determined to reduce all of his past experience to some seventy thousand 
recollections, which he would later define numerically. Two considerations 
dissuaded him: the thought that the task was interminable and the thought 
that it was useless.
 Yet it remains Funes the character who plays, and it remains Borges 
the author who describes and translates that play into narrative form. Like-
wise, all similar forays into the un- and anti-conventional within narrative 
are translations within that narrative form8—unless or until these become 
something else, either something untranslatable entirely or something other 
than narrative: for example, “mysticism” (Blake), “philosophy” (Nietzsche), 
“madness” (Blake, Nietzsche, Kafka), or some other.
 Indeed, “poetic” language itself can be considered an excursion into a 
sort of linguistic “madness,” in which words and meanings range—some-
times uncontrollably and unpredictably—beyond their conventional use. 
However, the inability of play in language—even poetic language—to com-
pletely escape the form of language means that the relationship between the 
computer game player and digital code is ultimately quite different from the 
relationship between the reader of literature and the “code” of language.
 Literature remains most essentially a process of communication in 
which meanings and values are transmitted (or shared, if you prefer) from 
person to person through a common language/code system that is, impor-
tantly, grounded in human experience. In contrast, during computer game 
play, meanings and values are neither definitively made nor permanently 
grounded.
 Certainly, computer game code is bound to some degree by the rules of 
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the game, but during play, computer game players both abide by and, on a 
frequent and regular basis, test, revise, and break the rules. Much computer 
game play is motivated by a sense of mastery over and movement beyond the 
rules: bad play. Any similar “movement beyond” the code of language would 
quickly render natural language—along with the poetic language that resides 
within it—meaningless.
 Within the rules of language, narratives bind, restrict, and motivate the 
experience of reading. The “rules” of digital code have no similar impact on 
the experience of play. Computer game design may well incorporate (simu-
late) literary functions, but these cannot serve the same function as literature 
insofar as these functions are rules of a game. For, once part of the rules of 
a game, the rules of language must submit to the same process of play and 
semiotic transformation as all other parts of the game: they must and will be 
breakable.
 For this reason, computer games using the rules of language as a design 
element—notably so-called interactive fiction—have found it extremely dif-
ficult to combine the distinct aesthetics of literature and play. Critics now rec-
ognize the dissonance of these respective forms but do not therein acknowl-
edge their fundamental incompatibility. Montfort,9 for instance, describes 
interactive fiction designs as only “potential” narratives (yet narratives none-
theless); similarly, the literary-inspired analysis of Ryan10 emphasizes the use 
of narrative patterns and processes within interactive digital media to gener-
ate, for instance, a variety of “possible worlds.” In such analysis, the question 
remains whether the semiotic process necessary to generate potentials and 
possibilities is not antithetic to the semiotic process necessary to construct 
and interpret narratives.
 While poetic language reveals the underlying mechanics of an embod-
ied language, computer games and other playfully interactive digital media 
forms reveal only the contents—the emptiness—of a disembodied semiosis.
hypertext
It may be useful here to compare the experience of playing a game with 
the experience of reading a peculiarly game-like text: hypertext. Aarseth 
has described the experience of hypertext reading as an “ergodic” art form 
driven by aporia and epiphany, two concepts he also closely associates with 
computer game play.
The aporia-epiphany pair is thus not a narrative structure but constitutes 
76  play redux
a more fundamental layer of human experience, from which narratives are 
spun.11
 I have described here (and elsewhere)12 a similar dialectic resulting from 
the formal opposition and subsequent contextualization of signs, involving 
Spencer-Brown’s “mark of distinction” and the dissolution of this mark dur-
ing its reapplication to itself. However, that description is a bit different from 
that implied by aporia and epiphany, even though both descriptions seem to 
refer to a similar, fundamental form.13
 Aarseth describes properties of the experience of hypertext reading from 
a reader’s perspective and as these are guided by that reader’s interpretive 
processes, often with narrative as a guide and goal. Here, I am maintain-
ing that the dialectical properties of the anti-form of play lie in the form 
of play itself—without any goals other than those goals embedded within 
and required by that form. Interactive media—most particularly computer 
games—reproduce this form most closely, but it is shared in part by the digi-
tal mechanics of hypertext as well. This peculiar form consists of a peculiar 
set of relationships between: (a) objects and values (as maintained by the 
computer game code) and (b) the local and habituated responses necessary 
to access and assimilate those object-value relationships (as maintained by 
the computer game interface).
 The resulting anti-form may be collapsed through full knowledge of 
game rules and outcomes (the culminating result of the simulation, wherein 
all object-value relationships are fully disclosed) or through lack of player 
interest or investment in game rules and outcomes (e.g., during either the 
detached reverie of the daydreamer or the purposeful misdirection of the 
cheater). In the first instance, object-value relationships are made too strict; 
in the second instance, those relationships are made too loose. In between is 
where computer game play, as a unique aesthetic form, resides.14 Hypertext, 
as an intermediary between text and game, allows the reader to manipulate 
(or play with) object-value relationships, but it does not, as computer games 
do, confirm and validate that play within a bodily mechanic.
 Over time, because of the mechanical necessities of computer game hard-
ware (and the consensual social necessity of a common set of game rules), 
computer games have tended to culminate more often in the simulative than 
in the selfish. This simulative structure often takes a recognizably narrative 
form in which computer game players do not doubt or destroy but only, on 
occasion, intervene—in a fashion similar to how readers intervene during the 
experience of hypertext reading. In such circumstances, social rules often 
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come to promote and enforce a limited set of player interventions, and play-
ing computer games becomes, like reading hypertext can become, a deriva-
tive process: a derivation and simulation of reading text.
anti-film
There is now a growing body of criticism that compares the aesthetics of 
digital games to the aesthetics of film15 and, related, to the broader category 
of visual aesthetics.16 And rightfully so—since, of all media arts, film and 
computer games seem, at least superficially, most closely related.
 Film—particularly commercial movies—is a closer aesthetic analog to 
popular computer games than is prose fiction. This is perhaps more obvious 
during computer game design than during computer game play. Both aes-
thetic forms—games and movies—follow similar designing, storyboarding, 
production, and building processes; and both share (and, in fact, require) 
similar artists, skills, and aesthetic values.17 As a result of this shared design 
process, both sets of designs as built—movies and games—display similar 
forms and structures.
 In order to consider film as a sort of anti-process like play, consider the 
typical context within which the signs and symbols of film are experienced. A 
related complex of psychoanalytical, illusion, and “dream” theories of film18 
emphatically reference the consistent placement of film audiences in a the-
ater in which the material body (the human sensorium) is isolated, deprived, 
numbed, and, in effect, desensitized.
Morin and Mitry also described the spectatorial condition as a para-oneiric 
state. For the former, this condition is produced by several factors: the dark-
ness of the auditorium; the comfort of the chair, which induces the specta-
tor to relax and fantasise; the passivity and absence of movement, inviting a 
psychic and emotive participation. In such a regressive state, according to 
Morin, the spectator increases the normal psychic mechanisms of projection 
and identification, and somehow fulfils her or his most intimate desires. For 
Mitry, the spectatorial state lies somewhere between dream and daydream. 
In fact, it is similar to dreams in that the imaginary replaces the real; and 
it resembles daydreaming because the spectator always preserves a certain 
consciousness.19
 Under such conditions, film functions somewhat analogously to natu-
ral and poetic language. That is, film images are conveyed within an anti-
experiential context emphasizing the interpretive component of represen-
78  play redux
tations while, simultaneously, damping the conventional visceral responses 
associated with the referents of those representations. The on-screen images 
then recall experience through reference rather than through reproduction. 
When we react to darkness within a film, for instance, we are reacting to the 
image or representation of darkness on the screen. The darkness in the the-
ater, meanwhile, does not affect us in a similar way; that is, the darkness in 
the theater is just as required and just as common when viewing bright and 
sunny scenes on film.
 A film audience’s “para-oneiric”20 state avoids the interruptions of—or 
mediates—more natural, immediate, and conventional perception. Within 
such a state, any willing suspension of disbelief accorded to the film’s narra-
tive is reinforced by an accompanying involuntary state of sensory depriva-
tion. With bodily senses disengaged, human semiosis becomes more focused, 
able, and likely to engage perception as an interpretive (rather than as a 
responsive or an interactive) activity—that is, as within a dream.
 In disassociating the perception of films from the experience of bodies, 
film recalls and calls into question the embedded conventions and mechanics 
of our human visual representational system, or, we might say, the film calls 
into question our habitualized perceptual “language.” In this sense, film can 
be labeled a form of anti-perception. In the context of perception, we call 
such anti-perceptions illusions. In the context of interpretations and mean-
ings, we call such representations paradoxes.
 Conventional film content is structured in a manner enhancing the aes-
thetic experience of the medium and, simultaneously, distinguishing that 
experience from a more raw and unmediated perception. Virtually all film 
editing demonstrates and relies on the disassociation of perceptual stimulus 
from experiential moment. Cuts, fades, and dissolves assume some advanced 
(and learned) level of cognitive processing beyond that of natural percep-
tion; and such artificial visual devices then become metaphors (rather than 
reproductions) of the perceptually literal.
 Following this line of thought, we might assume that any visual sign or 
symbol in film that too closely evokes the experience of its real-world refer-
ent would have a dissonant aesthetic effect—similar to that of breaking the 
fourth wall in a theatrical production. Two representative examples come to 
mind. The first is the long-imagined ideal of three-dimensional film. Due 
to technical difficulties, the 3-D film is currently discounted as an aesthetic 
medium and relegated to documentary or novelty (i.e., thrill-seeking) use. 
However, even given some future, less cumbersome implementation, 3-D 
displays may narrow the aesthetic possibilities of film for formal reasons.
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 Images within film that cause us to respond to them as experiential 
objects—that is, images that are interpreted as the thing itself rather than 
as a representation of that thing (i.e., images as icons)—limit and detract 
from the interpretation of those images within the dream-like or illusion-
ary state of the moviegoer. This is even true of realistically colored images, 
which, as the colorization controversy in the film industry has demonstrated, 
potentially interfere with director intentions, film themes, or other similar 
cognitive overlays—including narrative templates. This is certainly true of 
certain types of on-screen characters and characterizations—such as those 
employed by professional wrestling (or “rassling”) events—which blur the 
distinction between representation and reality at the cost of interpretive 
nuance and cognitive depth.
 Still another obvious example of iconic dissonance in film is pornography, 
which engages the mechanics of perception more immediately and directly 
than conventional film aesthetics allow. For this reason, pornographic images 
have predictably disruptive effects on the cognitive and interpretive processes 
associated with and enjoyed within more conventionally “serious” films.21
 In film, overly realistic and iconic images take on the accoutrements of 
spectacle and most often first masquerade as experience in the raw—as did, 
according to most popular accounts, the Lumiere brothers’ well-known scene 
of a train pulling into the Ciotat station (1895). The degree to which this 
masquerade might be subsequently penetrated is determined by the degree 
to which the film images can be disassociated from their real-world referents 
and reinterpreted within the confines of some semiotic template—a grammar 
or film “language,” for instance—distinct from that of human perception.
 In most commercial digital games, the same sort of “seriousness” we have 
come to associate with films as “works of art” is absent and, in most cases, 
detrimental to the enjoyment of play. In fact, verisimilitude—the domain of 
the iconic—is in great demand within digital games, where digital images 
and representations increasingly border on the simulative.
 While perceptual novelties within film remain largely theme-park-like 
distractions, digital games revel in such novelties and have quickly found 
ways to incorporate them into conventional game designs. Sensory feedback, 
for instance—the vibration function of game controllers—is now standard 
fare in console games; and the context in which digital games are played is 
likewise more arousing, interactive, and accepting of extraneous stimuli—for 
example, music and conversation—than the dark dream tank of the movie 
theater. In fact, it is difficult to think of any formal representation—iconic or 
not, pornographic or not—that would have a disruptive effect on game aes-
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thetics and play. For, during play, disruption—the continuous introduction of 
novelty—is, in a sense, the whole point.
play in film 
The conventional movie is much more narrowly confined than the conven-
tional computer game regarding, in particular, time.22 For instance, the aver-
age length of a commercial Hollywood movie has varied over its history but is 
decidedly under three hours. The average play of a digital game, on the other 
hand, despite a great deal of variation, is far, far beyond three hours. There-
fore, within the limited amount of time movies engage their viewers, there is 
simply less time available for play and any related anti-nesses. Nevertheless, 
some films and filmmakers display a playfully destructive intent—and the 
makeup of these displays is telling.
 Groundhog Day (Ramis, 1993), for instance, is a well-known and popular 
movie that, in a sense, “destroys” conventional time by looping its characters 
through the same twenty-four hours of a single Groundhog Day. Time travel, 
repetition, and recursion are, of course, frequent themes in otherwise con-
ventional narratives—particularly within science fiction and fantasy genres. 
These subjective distortions of “normal” time are commonly dealt with, as 
they are in Groundhog Day, through the lens of a single character who experi-
ences those distortions within a conventional chronological sequence—that is, 
within the context of a conventional narrative and its narrator. In Groundhog 
Day, Phil Conner’s (and our) point of view is quite straightforward and linear, 
despite all the fragmentation, repetition, recursion, and multiple destructions 
going on in and about the movie’s fictional version of Punxsutawney.
 More obviously game-like in form and, correspondingly, more playful in 
its destruction of the conventional is Lola Rennt, or Run Lola Run (Tykwer, 
1998). The visual context of Run Lola Run, marked as much by its style as its 
substance, is clearly anti-real. The movie is played to a virtually continuous 
techno-beat; the cast is distinguished more by their 3-D, rotating, graphic-
cardish, cartoon-inspired profiles than by their dialog; and bits of self-con-
scious animation and other digitized embellishments dot the rendering of 
Lola’s hometown. And, of course and most significantly, there is the triple 
repetition of Lola’s run through town, which substitutes for a conventional 
plot and offers the movie’s most blatant destruction of time and space.
 Run Lola Run repeats the same sequence of events—with minor altera-
tions that give these repeated scenes increasingly recursive value—until Lola 
and her boyfriend reach a happy ending. The first two sequences end, first, 
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with the death of Lola and, second, with the death of her boyfriend. Finally, 
the movie reloads a third time and, from Lola’s point of view, starts anew. 
From the audience’s point of view, of course, this third time is not truly the 
new but rather the charm; for, suddenly, we are left at movie’s end with the 
pop quiz of a narrative.
 The narrative of Run Lola Run—its folk theory of causes—would seem 
to be that persistence (or perhaps true love) alters the otherwise inevitable 
narrative of history. The movie’s keynote sequence comes during its third 
and final repetition, when Lola enters a casino and, through sheer force of 
will, overcomes chance and chaos, reasserts order, and walks out with her 
happy ending. This denouement strongly recalls a similar resolution within 
Groundhog Day: love conquers all, including destructions of play. However, 
in Run Lola Run, without the helpful overlay of Groundhog Day’s more con-
ventional narrative, the lesson learned requires a bit more effort on the part 
of the viewer.
 Run Lola Run is, in this sense, more “ergodic”23 than Groundhog Day. 
Yet Run Lola Run culminates in little more than fifty-two pickup: a game-
like form with the accoutrements but not the essence of play. The movie’s 
narrative is then a sort of inside joke about game play, a sleight of hand and 
eye that erases both the death of its protagonist and the seriousness of its 
experience. If Groundhog Day is a movie of false time, then Run Lola Run 
is likewise a movie of false play. For in both movies, the final scenes break all 
spells, dispel all magics, and end all plays.
 Memento (Nolan, 2000) is a third example of cinematic playfulness that 
stretches a bit further into the realm of anti. Memento tells the story of 
Leonard Shelby, who is afflicted with short-term memory loss. Leonard can’t 
remember anything that happens much beyond thirty seconds ago, and so 
his life is a series of continuously novel thirty-second sequences.
 Leonard manages this condition by leaving his newly regenerated thirty-
second self notes written and Polaroids taken by his previously generated 
thirty-second selves. If Leonard has something really important to say to 
his future, he tattoos it on his chest. The movie communicates Leonard’s 
state by showing Leonard’s actions in reverse order so that, like Leonard, 
the audience doesn’t know what or which came first—until the end of the 
movie, when, unlike Leonard, the audience finally gets to remember the 
whole thing.
 Memento, in comparison to our first two examples, is unique in that the 
viewer’s experience of structures—and structuring—is itself distorted. Our 
experience of Leonard’s situation is, as a result, more immediate and in par-
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allel with his own. In Groundhog Day, our knowledge of Phil Connor’s nar-
rative perspective serves as interpretive guide. In Run Lola Run, our knowl-
edge of movies and movie forms—and games and game forms—serves as an 
interpretive map. In Memento, our interpretations are thwarted. In order 
to view the movie normally, we must view it abnormally: we must inspect 
our own knowledge—our own mind, memory, and expectations—which, like 
Leonard’s, are made suspect.
 And what cinematic form, exactly, brings us to these playful moments of 
self-doubt?
Once you see “Memento” a couple of times, you figure out the devilish 
scheme Nolan has constructed . . . If we give letters to the backward 
color scenes and numbers to the monochrome scenes, then what Nolan 
presents us with is this: Credits, 1, V, 2, U, 3, T, 4, S, 5, R, 6, Q . . . all the 
way to 20, C, 21, B, and, finally, a scene I’m going to call 22/A . . . So, if 
you want to look at the story as it would actually transpire chronologically, 
rather than in the disjointed way Nolan presents it . . . you would watch 
the black-and-white scenes in the same order (1 to 21), followed by the 
black-and-white/color transition scene (22/A). You would then have to 
watch the remaining color scenes in reverse order, from B up to V, finish-
ing with the opening credit sequence, in which we see Teddy meet his 
maker at Leonard’s hands: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22/A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, 
R, S, T, U, V.24
This scheme may be “devilish,” but it is otherwise quite patterned and not, in 
fact, overly difficult to achieve or decode. And yet such a seemingly mechan-
ical presentation of events—a mere reversal of order—has a significant 
impact on our viewing experience. For Memento is designed not to create 
but to destroy. And its destruction is quite pointed at preexisting structures 
of mind, memory, cognition, and self.
 Playful art—and Memento, much more than our two previous examples, 
falls into this category—is self-reflective, in both senses of “self.” That is, play 
is self-reflective in that it refers to and represents its own form, its own play; 
our experience in viewing Memento, for instance, is as much about our own 
mental form as it is about the movie’s culminate form. Further, play is self-
reflective in that, in referring to and representing its own form, it simultane-
ously and analogously refers to and represents the cognitive processes that 
build and structure the human condition we characterize as “self.”
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 This latter sense of “self” is a difficult form to recognize because it con-
flates playful context with playful process. However, just as a simulation of 
a simulation is both a representation of that thing it represents (a simula-
tion of) and, simultaneously, the thing itself (a simulation of), those cognitive 
processes that refer to themselves are both references to play and play itself. 
Or, put more simply, play is fundamentally selfish—and so is Memento. And 
Leonard’s peculiar mental state is a formal characteristic of all similarly anti-
aesthetic (or selfishly playful) forms.
 A great many digital adventure games, for instance, are designed around 
problems associated with a Leonard-like memory deprivation. Indeed, in 
such games there always seems to be a Leonard-like character who doesn’t 
know who (or what) he is, or a robot that has had its memory wiped, or some-
thing similar. And then the whole purpose (or theme, or narrative) of these 
games is to recover missing information. This particular formal structure—
often realized as a detective/mystery story, or, more generally, as a traversing 
of the labyrinth25—appears again and again as a common narrative template 
in digital games (the Zork series, Myst, Knights of the Old Republic, etc.). 
But this template is not limited to adventure games per se. It re-appears 
during all applications of narrative within digital media that are increasingly 
interactive and increasingly susceptible to free play.
We could say that the three classic hypertexts, Michael Joyce’s Afternoon, 
Stuart Moulthrop’s Victory Garden, and Shelley Jackson’s Patchwork Girl 
all did what they could to make the reader more receptive to the marvels of 
their labyrinths: by using hidden and conditional links to highlight and paral-
lel the defences and self-denials of the protagonist in Afternoon, his general 
unwillingness to know; evoking and concretising the familiar literary tradi-
tion of forking paths of Borges, Coover and Pynchon in Victory Garden; and 
foregrounding Frankensteinian bodily metaphors to ease the postmodernist 
butchery work of connecting parts and wholes in Patchwork Girl.26
 When game play is structured by narrative (or by time), that play is forced 
to adopt a traversing-the-labyrinth path. There is something missing; the 
player has to find it, recover it, and use it to make sense of whatever the 
player is doing; and then—well, then the game ends. That is, the value of 
whatever the player is playing with has already been valued by the narrative, 
and further play does not—cannot—change that value. The player, caught 
within these other values, can only walk through a series of paint-by-number, 
dance-hall steps prepared and structured by a preexisting and forever invul-
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nerable other. Just as Lola runs through her town. Just as Leonard stumbles 
through his movie.
 Inside Memento, Leonard is living inside a digital adventure game. But 
unlike when Lola or you or I play our games, Leonard isn’t limited to recov-
ering missing information lost; he—and he alone—gets to make meanings 
new.
 The notes and Polaroids Leonard sends himself form scattered and bro-
ken narratives (some false, some true), which, as much in their absence as 
their presence, drive Leonard to solve the puzzles of his narrative-imposed 
memory loss. By the end of the movie, Leonard manages to thwart those 
non-memory-impaired folk—including all narrators and their narrations—
who are using his condition for their own ends. The will and purpose of the 
self, Leonard’s actions show us, are more fundamental than those otherwise 
arbitrary narratives that deny the will and purpose of the self.
 And how does Leonard show us this? It’s a difficult demonstration, to 
be sure—an almost self-contradictory and paradoxical demonstration in that 
Leonard finds himself irrevocably caught, as is the viewer, within the larger 
context of movie and narrative.
 Yet Leonard denies. He resists; he destroys; he murders. He kills. In 
Memento, there is a carefully plotted structure to Leonard’s predicament, 
but none to his redemption. Leonard has no denouement. He has no begin-
ning, no middle, no end. No satisfaction. No realization. No self-awareness. 
Yet Leonard is resolutely selfish in opposition to other.
 And so we, too, are selfish during our experience of Memento. We have 
only what Leonard has: the immediacy of the moment, the engagement of 
desire, and a deeply imbedded—and flawed—sense of self. Like Leonard, 
we must both endure and deny the film’s narrative. Our final pleasure in 
viewing Memento is not in finding a solution to its puzzles of logic, a solution 
that comes only belatedly, remains arbitrary, and resists scrutiny. The plea-
sures in Memento are in its denials, frustrations, and resonance with self.
 If film is an illusion27 of the sort Tan28 and Anderson29 speak, then 
Memento presents an illusion of an illusion. The movie finds its truth in self-
reflections and re-representations, which become the only available path 
through an otherwise impenetrable labyrinth of false time, false play, and 
false narrative. In the revelation of truth through denial, the destructurings 
of play—in Memento, in the drama of Ionesco, in the fiction of Borges, in 
the compositions of Schonberg, in the fragile and fleeting art of the dada-
ists—accomplish aesthetically what the early Russian formalists referred to 
as ostranenie.30
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 Similarly, Memento defamiliarizes the movie experience through a recur-
sive formal process: “film as illusion” as illusion. This same phenomenon of 
defamiliarization can be observed commonly and ubiquitously in many other 
characteristics of contemporary popular media. The car chase, the horror 
scene, the sexually explicit, the graphically obscene—each is an instance of 
some sudden and immediate spectacle31 that does not advance or contribute 
to plot or narrative so much as each takes place outside those false struc-
tures in order to appeal more directly to an otherwise inarticulate self. The 
disjointed narratives of commercial television, the capsulated and repetitive 
formulas of pop music, and the mutable and expandable genres of advertise-
ments, movie trailers, and machinima demand much more from and depend 
much more on viewer play—selfish play—than on designer structure.32
 Digital games and related media refer us to experience through the 
physical distortions of joystick, thumb pad, keyboard, and mouse. This is not 
really running and jumping, Mario’s Adventures shows us—yet it is. This is 
not really fear, Silent Hill shows us—yet it is. And this is not really narrative, 
Memento shows us—yet it is. And so, too, all running and jumping, all fear, 
and all narrative are not really such. The physical interface between our self 
and our world, so vital to the shared assumptions of conventional beliefs and 
values, is precisely the interface that digital media and play engage most 
actively and destroy most regularly.
 An anti-aesthetic of play does not build human experience so much as it 
thwarts human experience and therein reveals otherwise hidden and binding 
processes guiding the building of human experience. Because of the peculiar 
nature of these processes and their intimate relation to self, it is impossible to 
reveal them through representational form alone. All structures, narratives, 
and languages—all representational forms—are false images of human expe-
rience and, therein, its antithesis. Play, on the other hand, is the embodiment 
of representational form and, therein, its revelation.
 Often, the field of game studies attempts to contextualize play within 
games in order to serve the goals of game designers. But this contextualiza-
tion assumes that play is capable of contextualization and that, within that 
contextualization, play is capable of direction, purpose, and design. The 
most basic aesthetic properties of play—its pleasures—seem counter to 
this assumption. If play is self-motivated, if it is selfish, then, regardless of 
designer intent, games and game studies of this narrative sort lie in dialecti-




A masterpiece of fiction is an original world
and as such is not likely to fit the world of the reader.
 —Vladimir Nabokov, Lectures on Don Quixote (1983) 
Consider this rough model of the human meaning-making process (includ-
ing generation of narrative):
Sensory impressions engage mechanics of the human sensorium. •	
These mechanics are determined by long-term evolutionary pro-
cesses and, as such, are relatively intractable. This is the domain of 
instinct.
Semiotic processes emerge through recursive and, possibly, unin-•	
tended and unexpected uses of the mechanics of the sensorium. 
These uses, while they remain grounded in the neurophysiology of 
the sensorium, may exist in parallel—and, occasionally, in competi-
tion or even in conflict—with instinct. This is the domain of play.
To the extent possible and beneficial, the outcomes—the values and •	
meanings—of semiotic processes adapt and conform to sociological/
cultural norms. This is the domain of convention.
the backstory
The most obvious and common application of convention within computer 
games is the use of the ubiquitous “backstory.” Conventionally, a backstory 
consists of “a narrative providing a history or background context, esp. for a 
character or situation in a literary work, film, or dramatic series.”1
 Backstories guide actors in creating characters in drama and guide writers 
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in creating narratives in fiction. Soap operas, for instance, have extensive and 
complicated backstories used to justify character behavior. Computer game 
designers use backstories as design elements to achieve a consistent, coherent, 
and aesthetically pleasing implementation of game components. Ostensibly, 
backstories aid computer game players by delineating fundamental relation-
ships among game objects and characters. Learning the backstory of the well-
known and exemplary early adventure game Myst (1993), for instance, serves 
as both a source of clues to and the primary goal of game play.
 There are two apparent reasons backstories have become common in 
the design and distribution of computer games. First, any series of human 
events—including play events—seems to motivate a natural semiotic con-
textualization process: a folk theory of causes. During extended play, player-
characters are naturally conceived and valued as human-like entities acting 
according to a particular set of causes, that is, a narrative.
 Second, game producers and designers are increasingly motivated—pri-
marily for commercial reasons—to include backstories as a means of repro-
ducing within alternative media the values and meanings that emerge dur-
ing computer game play—through, for instance, “tie-ins.” This is, of course, 
successful insofar as computer game backstories provide easily accessible 
examples of—and subsequently motivate—play. It is largely unsuccessful, 
however, wherever backstories are expected to determine, rather than exem-
plify, that play.
 While narratives and backstories inevitably result from natural human 
semiosis, backstories neither motivate nor confine the semiotic process. 
Thus, backstories function very differently for computer game designers and 
for computer game players. For designers, backstories serve a framing func-
tion, making sure all game elements are implemented within a consistent, 
conventional, and (successfully) commercial context. For individual players, 
however, backstories inhibit the more selfish semiotic processes that occur 
during play.
 This does not mean that backstories are not useful to and enjoyed by com-
puter game players. Backstories obviously motivate individual and beginning 
play by exemplifying the (yet-to-be-experienced) outcomes of that play; and 
within some games—particularly within the genre of computer role-playing 
games—backstories may also contribute to an understanding of the context 
in which game elements are later most effectively manipulated and valued.
 Most commonly and conventionally, however, backstories engage audi-
ences simply by extending or expanding some previously experienced nar-
rative. In extreme cases, this extension/expansion can blur the distinction 
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between fiction and nonfiction—as in the detailed backstory accompanying 
the innovative release of The Blair Witch Project (1999), the conflation of fic-
tional and real-life characters in the Web-based promotion of the HBO series 
John from Cincinnati (2007), and other similar viral marketing campaigns. 
In these cases and others, the narrative’s backstory extends and broadens a 
preceding narrative form. This new and broader narrative context is then 
considered more informative and complete than the original.
 By extending/expanding a narrative context in this way, backstories recon-
textualize narratives—that is, backstories transform the meanings of signs 
and symbols within a previous narrative by subsuming that narrative context 
within some other. Sometimes these transformations are mere confirmations 
of the meanings assigned by the original narrative, resulting in an emphasis 
of context; at other times, however, these transformations are more radi-
cal—as, for instance, when Tom Stoppard recontextualized Hamlet within 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead (1967)—resulting in the extension 
and expansion of context.
 The semiotic function of backstories during computer game play might, 
then, be interpreted as either convention or play, depending on whether 
the previous narrative context is either emphasized or transformed. Most 
pertinent is the function of backstories during game design and during game 
play. Are these functions complementary? Do the conventions of designer-
determined backstories aid or inhibit the novelties and transformations of 
individual play? Let me explore these questions as regards three popular 
and separate (though non-exclusive) genres of computer games: action, role-
playing, and strategy games.
action games
In general, action games do not commonly use backstories, nor does their 
play particularly benefit from them. Young children’s play and games—for 
example, peekaboo, chase, hide-and-seek—are of much the same semiotic 
class as computer action games. These children’s games motivate the same 
fundamental semiotic processes as Tetris, the Mario game series, and virtu-
ally all first-person shooters (FPSs).
 The signs and symbols of these games are interpreted without any immedi-
ate or necessary reference to narrative. Semiotic play in this genre involves the 
recognition of oppositional (most often visual) signs in a sensory context exist-
ing prior to either stories or storytelling. Of course, extended play of any sort 
eventually motivates some sort of contextualization process, and it is interest-
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ing to note how often this contextualization is accomplished within the action 
genre without resort to conventional narrative form. For instance, one of the 
most common methods of contextualization during action game play is to use 
an arbitrary context unconnected to the game play per se—that is, to attach 
to each episode of play a “score” that is then valued within the context of all 
scores of similar episodes of play. This linear sequence of scores—hopefully 
showing progression through “improvement”—then substitutes for narrative.
 Another common technique of action game contextualization is to link iso-
lated episodes of play within very generic contexts of human behavior—con-
texts so fundamental to the human experience that they avoid the narrative’s 
conventional sequencing of events and any resulting values concerning cause, 
effect, or morality. For instance, the “backstory” in most FPSs can be reduced 
to a predator-prey relationship; if you understand this relationship (the basic 
relationship of “chase”), then you understand the context of FPS play more 
than well enough to play the FPS game, regardless of any broader narrative 
context within which that relationship might subsequently be placed.
DOOM also had no real plot. Sure, it had a backstory to set the mood, but 
that’s all it did. DOOM did not encumber you with annoying side characters 
or long, boring sections of Full Motion Video (like all those damned Wing 
Commander games, or Jedi Knight (ug, what a nightmare!)).2
 More recently, a Tom Chick review of Metal Gear 4, decries how the 
backstory of the Metal Gear series has become so obtrusive that it interferes 
with the original goal and pleasures of FPS play.
You’re watching an indulgent series finale that exhaustively reiterates details 
and piles nonsensical twist on top of nonsensical twist. Without a degree in 
Metal Gear Solidology, you will be hopelessly lost, and by the time it’s over, 
you will have long since ceased to care.3
 Indeed, computer game players familiar with multiple genres of play 
immediately recognize the absence of backstory as an inconsequential ele-
ment of play in arcade games, regardless of the length and complexity of that 
play. For instance, the Mario game series—produced/designed by Shigeru 
Miyamoto and originating with the arcade game Donkey Kong (1981)—has 
many superficial characteristics of role-playing games, but it remains rooted 
in the action genre due to, among other things, the inconsequential nature 
of its backstory.
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None of the storylines answer some HUGE backstory questions, such as how 
the games tie together exactly, not to mention the relationship of the mush-
room kingdom and other areas (Sarasaland anyone?) And what about the 
characters? What’s their deeper motivation exactly? How old are they? What 
hand does Toad write with? And what about the koopa kids? Where’d they 
come from? And all these Yoshi’s? How are they related? It’s enough to make 
a guy go crazy!4
 Miyamoto’s subsequent designs include the hugely successful Zelda 
games—beginning with The Legend of Zelda (1987)—each of which has 
increased the degree to which contextualization extends and expands game 
play. However, the Zelda series, despite an involved backstory involving Link 
and the Princess, remains very much action-oriented, and its design and play 
de-emphasize the importance of a backstory.
For every Zelda game we tell a new story . . . We actually have an enormous 
document that explains how the game relates to the others, and binds them 
together. But to be honest, they are not that important to us. We care more 
about developing the game system.5
role-playing games 
The genre of computer role-playing games (RPGs)—which includes com-
puter adventure games as an intermediary form—is most fundamentally 
distinguished from the action genre by its reliance on the expansion of val-
ues and meanings during play. Whereas goals of action/arcade games6 are 
determined by and accomplished with physical skills (and/or the hardware 
accoutrements) of game players, goals of adventure/role-playing games7 are 
determined by and accomplished with more pragmatic and social skills of 
game players. Where action game goals are obvious but difficult to achieve, 
RPG goals are relatively more obscure but relatively easier to achieve. 
Consequently, single-player RPGs can and will be, inevitably, “won” by those 
who take the time to learn and play them thoroughly—not always the case 
with action games.
 While the computer RPG genre makes much more frequent use of back-
stories than the action genre, it is interesting to note that the first design 
and publication of computer RPGs did not. Richard Garriott’s Akalabeth 
(1980) was the progenitor of the long-running Ultima series and is argu-
ably one of the more important prototypes for subsequent examples of the 
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genre—including the many Ultima games, Sir-tech’s Wizardry (1981), and, 
in a slightly later release, Might and Magic (1987). The original versions of 
these games had simple backstories that were superficial embellishments of 
generic themes, and game play in each tended to emphasize the action genre 
staple of monster bashing.
 However, over time (and after the mechanics of RPGs had become 
entrenched), specialized backstories became an increasingly common—and 
much more detailed—design element.
Might and Magic I came with a forty-page manual. The first quarter of this 
manual described how to create characters prior to play, the rest concerned 
the mechanics of play . . . The first game manual did not refer to narrative 
structures . . . unique to the M&M game world . . . The manual of the next 
Might and Magic game (II: Gates to Another World) devoted its first 2500 
words to a history of the expanding M&M game context. And each manual 
thereafter added . . . further information about preexisting characters and 
legends within the M&M fantasy universe.8
 Let me use the extended example of Ultima and its related online 
descendant, Ultima Online (UO), as an example of the characteristic ele-
ments of computer RPGs and the function (or dysfunction) of backstories 
within them.
 Ultima has one of the longer histories in the design and evolution of com-
puter RPGs. The Ultima series began with the rudimentary Akalabeth, a 
fairly simple dungeon crawl inspired by, as most early computer RPGs were, 
the paper-and-pencil game Dungeons & Dragons—which, in turn, owes 
much to the rules of miniature wargames (e.g., Chainmail) and the novels of 
Jack Vance. To the extent that computer RPGs are based on such preexisting 
sets of character relationships, scenarios, and goals, all computer RPGs can 
be said to have a similar generic backstory (e.g., the heroic quest).
 The common backstory guiding the original Ultima games was not unique 
and required no advanced training or knowledge prior to play. Richard 
Garriott was, in fact, “particularly pleased” that playing the first Ultima games 
required “no main menu, no outside the game activity of any kind.” “You 
could install it,” he said, “and then, suddenly, go directly into game play.”9
 Garriott became concerned, however, that generic adaptations of the 
Dungeons & Dragons system promoted a hack-and-slash, pillage-and-plun-
der style of play, which was, in his mind, more synonymous with villainy 
than heroism. By Ultima IV (1985), Garriott’s game designs purposefully 
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emphasized the ethical consequences of character behavior and displayed 
what would come to be known as the Ultima “virtue system.” Design ele-
ments such as the Ultima virtue system—along with recurring characters 
and a consistent game world—greatly aided the natural development of nar-
rative within the Ultima game series. That is, knowledge of these elements 
provided insight into the proper interpretation of game signs and symbols 
through an ongoing narrative associated with the hero (Avatar) player-char-
acter; therefore, it was beneficial to play the Ultima games, like a narrative, 
in the sequence they were written, published, and distributed. Or, at least, 
this was intent of the game designer.
The real advantage of playing the previous ones is that you kind of get it . . . 
There’s a lot of history to really understand the virtues and its meaningful 
backbone to the story . . . and I think you’ll find it much more meaningful.10
 However, those design elements functioning as backstory were more 
often interpreted by game players as just another part of the game rules—
not especially significant. That is, playing the Ultima game series by adhering 
strictly to the moral code of a “good-guy” Avatar—as valued by the game’s 
backstory and as intended by the game designer—was neither the quickest 
nor, for many, the most fun way to play the game. More often, the early, 
single-player Ultima games were played, by designers and players alike,11 in 
an “achiever” style of play that de-prioritized the game’s backstory and, in 
some cases, ignored it entirely.
Achievers regard points-gathering and rising in levels as their main goal, and 
all is ultimately subservient to this.12
 Realizing this, Richard Garriott more purposively incorporated Ultima’s 
backstory into the rules of the single-player game series and assessed player 
penalties for “unethical” behavior within the game. However, these player 
penalties likewise came to be valued solely within the context of the game 
rules—and therein isolated from the more conventional and restrictive func-
tions of the game’s backstory. This resulted in players seeking active means to 
transform and avoid the penalties associated with player-character unethical 
behavior (totally OK within the context of the game code) rather than seek-
ing to avoid unethical behavior itself (more appropriate within the context of 
the game narrative).
 In this way, the transformations of play “trumped” the narrative conven-
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tions of the backstory (rather than vice versa). This remained equally true of 
Ultima’s successor, Ultima Online.
 The designers of UO (Garriott was, by this time, removed from the proj-
ect) also went to great lengths to promote appropriate game values (e.g., no 
player killing) by providing voluminous backstories justifying and exemplify-
ing the Ultima virtue system.13 Many design changes implemented since the 
online game’s initial release14 likewise attempted to make the Ultima virtue 
system and its related backstory more integral to game play. However, the 
largest portion of the UO player population continued to play the game with 
no reference to or comment on the designer-generated backstory. Indeed, 
game play in Ultima Online seemed as often motivated by factors outside the 
game entirely (e.g., the economic system of eBay) than by a predetermined, 
in-game narrative.
 Herein lies a thorny issue regarding the use of backstories in the design 
of RPGs. Backstories appear to motivate game players to buy (or simply 
play) a game. And game play appears to motivate values and meanings that 
are then naturally incorporated into stories, narratives, and, if available and 
possible, backstories. Indeed, my own observations of early computer role-
playing games and gamers15 found many instances in which narratives of 
all sorts were used to value game symbols and outcomes. However, these 
narratives were always constructed by players as a result of play. Only as 
an afterthought did these narratives conform to backstories constructed by 
game designers prior to individual play.
 Most often, play within the role-playing genre remains, like play within 
the action game genre, a meaning-making process—not a process of mean-
ing confirmation or meaning validation. This makes it very difficult for any 
single and self-consistent backstory to contain the great barrage of meanings 
generated during play.
 Even so-called master or grand backstories16 provide little “story” other 
than the generic predator-prey relationship so common in the action game 
genre. Any further, more detailed explication of character relationships—
that is, explication leading to a more robust folk theory of causes, like that of 
the UO virtue system—is eventually rendered superfluous during extended 
play. Extended play in RPGs—for both designers and players—is almost 
always devoted to issues of play balance rather than play narrative. Indeed, 
insofar as narratives privilege one sort of character or one sort of meaning 
over some other, narratives pose a semiotic context antithetical to games and 
play—despite the often finely detailed backstories game designers devote so 
much time and effort to create.17
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 While backstories do not carry great weight for experienced and expert 
game players, RPG backstories do seem to engage a particular sort of player 
who is primarily interested in the peripheries of computer game play: the 
“fanboy.” The fanboy—usually a pejorative term, meant to include both males 
and females—is a relatively new phenomenon within computer gaming. In 
my early observations of computer games and gamers, I found little reference 
to fanboy types, whereas this segment of the computer gaming population is 
currently difficult to miss. Fanboys are similar in many respects to Bartle’s 
socializer type18 but do most (if not all) of their socializing outside the context 
of the game rules. In fact, long-lived games in which rules become well-known 
and widely distributed—such as Ultima and Ultima Online and other games 
with multi-year histories—seem to have relatively fewer fanboys than newer, 
less thoroughly learned and tested games. This may be because fanboys are 
more attracted to genre than game and, correspondingly, more attracted to 
narrative than play. The beta versions of many online games, for instance, are 
often frequented by fanboys without regard to the mechanics or balance of 
game play (since those are, within the beta category, still undetermined).
 With little regard for the details of game rules, fanboys can be observed 
across all genres of games. There are fanboys within the action game genre 
whose devotion is as often to a particular game platform as to a particu-
lar game. And there are fanboys within the strategy game genre, as well, in 
which detailed backstories can more actively interfere with game play.
strategy games
Early and prototypical examples of computer strategy games include 
Hammurabi, Civilization, SimCity, Master of Orion, and many other games 
in which game rules and game play transform, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the game rules. This transformation process is simultaneously critical to the 
strategy genre and contrary to the function of narrative as a theory of causes. 
Again, close examination of a single example is informative. Let me use the 
Master of Orion series as an example of the difficulties involved in attempt-
ing to frame strategy game play within the values of a backstory.
 Master of Orion (MOO), published in 1993, was a fairly typical (now 
classic) game with 4X strategy (explore, expand, exploit, exterminate).19 It 
was released with a minimal backstory. Players could choose to be one of 
several intergalactic species (the Alkari, fast but weak bird-like creatures; the 
Bulrathi, slow but strong bearlike creatures; etc.) in competition over some 
limited number of star systems.
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 Thrown into this zoological mix were the remnants of a technologically 
superior uber-race, the Orions, who were eventually replaced by the player 
winning the game. There was a bit more about the origin of the mysterious 
Orions and such, but none of the game’s early backstory had any real impact on 
game play. MOO play consisted of, as all strategy game play does, valuing the 
advantages and disadvantages of one species, weapon, and/or tactic against the 
advantages and disadvantages of some other. Most important, this balancing 
act of determining the relative value of game objects could be done most thor-
oughly and accurately with no reference to the game’s backstory whatsoever.
 During play, in fact, the MOO backstory became increasingly superflu-
ous. The competition among the intergalactic species within the game could 
have easily taken place within a fantasy world or an ancient civilization or 
beneath the surface of an isolated pond of scum. What mattered was not the 
setting or the characters or the plot but the relationships among the game’s 
signs and symbols as adjudicated by the game rules—and, of course, how 
these relationships were transformed (i.e., valued in real-time) during play.
 The original MOO was popular enough to generate a sequel, Master of 
Orion II: Battle at Antares (MOO2), in 1996. And just as in the case of the 
Ultima game series, the extension of play from MOO to MOO2 generated a 
more detailed backstory. In MOO2, the Orions were supplemented by the 
evil Antarans, another technologically advanced race, which was eventually 
replaced by the player winning the game. While the core game mechan-
ics remained the same, a variety of embellishments extended play within 
the familiar context of the original game. And while the MOO2 backstory 
implied a meaningful connection between the two games, neither game 
required knowledge of the other to play. Both games were independently 
and widely praised.
 In 2003 came Master of Orion III (MOO3), which was considered both 
by reviewers and by players to be broken. Why was MOO3 such a dismal 
failure, while MOO and MOO2 were such major successes? At least part of 
the reason can be attributed to the emphasis given to the MOO3 backstory 
during the game’s design. It is difficult to trace in detail the MOO3 design 
process because that process took so long (over three years) and involved 
so many different designers—including several who were subsequently 
removed from the project. Alan Emrich,20 one of those removed, had this to 
say early about the emphasis on narrative within MOO3:
I believe in stories so much that I want players to get output at the end of 
the game . . . It will keep track of everything they do. Every leader who was 
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raised and lost, every battle, every policy, everything. This huge text file is the 
chronicle of your civilization. And you can take that and literally write your 
own story from that outline.21
 This goal is not inconsistent with a common result of strategy game play 
and, in fact, play in general. Players commonly work singly or in groups, 
rightly or wrongly, with some effort, to shape a theory of causes—a narra-
tive—explaining and justifying game outcomes. Given this tendency, any 
game design aiding the post-play, meaning-structuring process (e.g., as the 
Civilization series did with its saved game timelines) is welcome.
 However, later MOO3 design efforts, headed most visibly by Rantz 
Hosely (art director) and Cory Nelson (producer) at Quicksilver Software, 
emphasized how narratives were to be used to tie together the three MOO 
games and, simultaneously, provide a context of design for future games. 
This emphasis is made clear within a variety of MOO3 pre-release interviews 
given by the Quicksilver design team.
We went over the basis/setting for Star Lords (pre-MOO1), MOO1, and 
MOO2. These became the keystones for the history arc . . . Master of Orion, 
with two previous incarnations, already had elements established . . . but 
no overarching story or background that tied it all together. In talking with 
Microprose at the time, we were given the license and encouraged to flesh 
the Master of Orion universe out, with an eye not only on what the current 
project was, but also looking at the possibility of sequels, prequels, [in order 
to] establish a firm base to support the franchise for future projects . . . (A 
MOO RPG for example.)22
 During the period prior to the release of MOO3, the game’s backstory was 
a source of great interest (and play) for many within online forums devoted to 
the discussion of the Master of Orion series, such as the Infogrames (subse-
quently Atari) forums and the Apolyton Web site.23 And prior to the release 
of the game, the game’s backstory received a favorable response from fanboys 
and strategy game aficionados alike. After the game’s release however, these 
two groups were polarized; fanboys continued to champion the game’s back-
story, while strategy game players much more negatively evaluated MOO3 
game elements based on game play. In fact, the pre-release interest devoted 
to MOO3 character backgrounds, appearances, and dramatic roles within 
the game’s backstory became a source of irritation for many players.
The Backstory  97
The really disappointing part is that the initial Master of Orion got the aliens 
right. Sure, they were goofy, but . . . for the purposes of playing a game, that 
works out wonderfully. These guys [the MOO3 design team] just had trouble 
determining what was important and what was trivial.24
Yet another article about the “details of their space strategy game” that man-
ages to not put in a single comment about the things that matter . . . It ain’t 
art. It ain’t animations. It ain’t whether or not there’s a backstory, if there are 
diplomatic animations, or anything else involving writing a story (i.e. author-
ing) or producing an image or animation of some type (i.e. artistry of many 
types and sorts).25
 In this regard—in their inability to benefit from detailed narratives dur-
ing play—interactive computer games appear a relatively unique form of 
popular entertainment. Unlike the common experiences associated with 
non-computer-based entertainment—Harry Potter novels, X-men comic 
books, anime of various sorts—computer game play is more often severely 
and adversely affected by a predetermined narrative frame. Or, put more 
generally perhaps, human play necessarily exists outside a theory of causes.
 The inability of computer game backstories to function in a consistent 
manner, with the same degree of success, as backstories in other aesthetic 
forms indicates that computer games are fundamentally different from those 
other forms. While semiotic values and outcomes emerging from computer 
game play are commonly combined into narratives, those narratives are an 
imposition on the values and outcomes—the transformations—of play. That 
is, the production of values and outcomes during play is neither caused nor 
determined by backstories.
 In this sense, human play can be considered a pre-narrative act, existing 
outside a theory of causes. In fact, in order to generate true novelty, play 
must exist outside all conventional theories of causes: play must be paradoxi-
cal. For this reason, no doubt, play continues to appear instinctive, intrac-
table, and, to some degree, unpredictable. Each of these characteristics is 
then also a fundamental characteristic of human semiosis, which remains 
closely intertwined with the nature and function of play.
 In order to examine this relationship between human play and human 
semiosis in greater detail, let me consider further one of the most popular, 
sophisticated, and exemplary forms in the evolution of the computer strategy 




All of my games are based on stuff I was interested in at the time.
 —Sid Meier, Gamespy (2005) 
I first found myself writing about Sid Meier’s Civilization—using it, along 
with Mark Baldwin’s Empire (Interstel, 1987), as a prototypical example of 
computer strategy games—shortly after the game’s commercial release by 
Microprose just before Christmas 1991.1
 In the succeeding decade, the game has seen several major revisions 
(Civilization II, Microprose, 1996; Civilization III, Infogrames, 2001; Civili-
zation IV, 2K Games, 2005), numerous supplements, mods, copycat designs, 
and, in the wake of widespread play and commercial success, a great variety 
of reviews, commentaries, and scholarly analyses. Over this period, my inter-
est in the game—as a player and a critic—has seldom waned (though, admit-
tedly, Civilization III tested that interest a bit). In The Nature of Computer 
Games, I devoted a chapter to the evolution of the Civilization game series, 
emphasizing components of Civ play that reflect recursive and transforma-
tive properties of cognitive play with computer games.
 Currently, the Sid Meier’s Civilization series remains one of the most 
interesting—and most fun—instances of a “builder,” a computer strategy 
game in which player goals fall into the well-known 4X categories: explore, 
expand, exploit, exterminate. But perhaps even more intriguing is that Civ 
has become, in the brief history of computer gaming, a mature game—that is, 
an illuminating example of how computer games are shaped and refined over 
time in response to the gathered experiences of their players. It is this matu-
rity of Civilization play that I wish to emphasize here: namely, the game’s 
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seemingly limitless replayability and the manner in which that replayability 
is critical to an understanding of cognitive play.
saving, reloading, and replay
Replay is an integral component of the play process and, as such, is not 
restricted to play with computer games. However, play with computer games 
displays informative manifestations of game replay—for example, save-and-
reload play.
 All computer game players are familiar with save-and-reload strate-
gies, which are applied within a great variety of games. In brief, saving and 
reloading involves initially playing some portion of a game (perhaps even 
its entirety), often less than satisfactorily; this portion of the game is then 
replayed, with some portion of that replay duplicative of the play preceding 
it. Common examples are found in first-person shooters in which the player-
character dies in confrontation with a powerful opponent; the game player 
must then reload (or reboot) in order to face the same opponent again. This 
replay process gives computer game play a spiral-like (as opposed to a linear) 
trajectory.2
 Very similar replay occurs in action games, in role-playing games, and 
in computer strategy games such as Civilization. And while there are subtle 
differences in the function of saving and reloading among computer game 
genres—at least partly justifying and verifying genre classification systems—
the fundamental nature and basic characteristics of replay are common. 
Indeed, in many cases where the “saving” component of saving-and-reloading 
is either omitted or prohibited by game design, “reloading” and replay occur 
nevertheless. For instance, unlike home computer games, arcade computer 
games traditionally provide players no opportunity to save game positions 
and continue play at a later date. Yet arcade games derive their popularity—
and their income—precisely from extensive replay.
 Replay is common not only across computer game genres but also across 
computer game histories—particularly within game histories as relatively 
long and detailed as that of Civilization. Replay in Civilization occurs both 
within the computer game proper and also within the extended process of 
play that has resulted in Civilization’s various versions, revisions, and alter-
nate designs. Incorporating ubiquitous replay, the “spiral-like” trajectory of 
computer game play is more accurately recursive, wherein replay is both 
persistent, iterative and, most significantly, transformative.
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the spiral-like history of civilization
Though I have already elsewhere detailed a history of Civilization design,3 
let me briefly recount and update the pertinent aspects of that history here.
 The first Civilization computer game—designed in tandem by Sid Meier 
and Bruce Shelley in 1991—originated as a redesign (or replay) of Frances 
Tresham’s earlier board game (Hartland Trefoil, 1980). Ostensibly a simula-
tion of the growth of ancient civilizations within the Mediterranean oval, the 
board game’s most unique and compelling feature was its use of civilization 
“advances” that transformed game play at various points during play. That is, 
these advances transformed the relative value of game units in such a way 
that game players were forced to revalue and redo their play (i.e., to replay). 
After a civilization advance had appeared, a pacifist player might be forced to 
adopt a more aggressive position; or an expansionist player might be forced 
to devote more time and attention to local city maintenance; or, more radi-
cally, a player with a previously unassailable position might realize that her 
newly transformed position was suddenly hopeless and might be forced to 
start the game anew.
 The Meier/Shelley design made much of these civilization “advances,” 
turning them into the computer game’s “World Wonders”—for example, the 
Pyramids and the Sistine Chapel. World Wonders were such an important 
part of Civilization play that expert and winning play was determined almost 
solely by predicting and controlling when and under whose ownership the 
World Wonders appeared.
 While other design elements and rules of the first Civilization com-
puter game also involved contextual transformations—for example, the 
tilling of virtual landscape by workers and the celebratory benefits of an 
array of city improvements—the peculiar transformations wrought by the 
World Wonders were neither so localized nor so limited. Indeed, the World 
Wonder transformations were, in an important way, transformations of the 
game itself; as a result, it was practically impossible to learn the rules of the 
game until you had played—and replayed—those portions of the game in 
which those rules were transformed. For this reason, replay within Civili-
zation became, over time, increasingly analytical and abstract, as the (re)
player came to be guided by goals and strategies determined by meta-rules 
(e.g., rules for the transformation of rules) that were unavailable for novice 
players.
 It is also interesting to note4 that this repetitive, recursive aspect of Civi-
lization game play was mirrored by (and perhaps even resulted from) the 
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repetitive, recursive process of its design. During the design of the original 
Civilization, Shelley tended to be the game player, and Meier tended to be 
the game coder. Over the course of approximately a year prior to the release 
of Sid Meier’s Civilization, Meier continuously varied the game code (trans-
forming the rules governing game play), and Shelley continuously valued the 
game play (determining, according to meta-rules of play, which game rules 
should and would be further transformed in subsequent variations).
 Through a similar but vastly extended process of play and replay, wherein 
the first release of the game was played, replayed, and valued within a grow-
ing community of players, Civilization spawned Civilization II and Civiliza-
tion III and, later, after a complex series of sales and transfers of publishing 
rights, Civilization IV. These later games—most particularly Civilization 
II—were each blatant redesigns of their predecessor(s). These redesigns 
attempted both to eliminate “bad” game elements and to expand and refine 
“good” game elements. And what’s most important is the degree to which 
“good” and “bad” were definitively determined only through the extended 
process of play and replay.
So we got our fun experts together and began the mammoth task of sorting 
through ideas . . . In the years since Civilization first appeared we have re-
ceived literally thousands of letters, phone calls, and e-mail messages offer-
ing suggestion for improvements, additions, and sequels . . .
 Of course, the biggest potential pitfall in working on a game like this is 
that none of us wanted to go down in history as “they guys who broke Civi-
lization”! . . . Every addition or change needed to be carefully weighted to 
make sure it wasn’t doing more harm than good.5
 Game design elements common among (and thus proved by the test of 
replay within) all games in the Civilization series included such crucial com-
ponents as the transformation capabilities of the World Wonders, the basic 
goals of the 4X genre, and the game’s (at least superficial) resemblance to the 
cultural history and characteristics of real-world civilizations. Game design 
elements unique to the first Civilization (and thus at some point revised/
removed during the redesign process) included the original game’s visual 
appearance, its operating system, and the various rules that came to be asso-
ciated with unsatisfactory—broken—play.
 “Broken” rules in Civilization included—and, in fact, were character-
ized by—rules that allowed the game to be won by avoiding the transforma-
tions of replay. During broken play, the spiral-like progression of Civilization 
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play—as envisioned by the game’s designers and enjoyed by its players—was 
short-circuited. Commonly, this resulted from some imbalance within the 
rules, favoring one portion of those rules (or rules-based strategies) over oth-
ers; this imbalance drastically curtailed replay in that the game context then 
remained static—untransformed—from one game or session of game play 
to the next. That is, the game could be won—and won very quickly—in a 
manner that made the full range of World Wonder transformations largely 
irrelevant and, in some cases, entirely superfluous. If so, then over time and 
replay, the game became increasingly less fun.
The Parallelia and Mongol strategies are game-beating strategies that exploit 
loopholes in versions 1.0 and 2.0 of Civilization. Both of them are fairly sure 
wins at any difficulty level, but they remove much of the enjoyment of play-
ing Civilization.6
 The challenge facing successive redesigns of any popular game, such as 
Civilization, is to add complexity and value without destroying the original 
game’s appeal. The successful redesign of Civilization within each subse-
quent edition exemplifies the degree to which recursive replay was funda-
mental to the original Civilization’s popularity. Throughout the Civilization 
series of games, learning the game rules remained a recursive process that, 
even once that process was well understood and widely practiced by the 
game’s most dedicated players, preceded in a recursive fashion without any 
certainty of a definitive outcome.
The spiral does not end because it cannot end—not without destroying the 
playing. Play is, in fact, never a spiral, always a spiraling.7
a theoretical interlude
Recursive replay, as observed within the behavior of computer game design-
ers and players, is often referred to obliquely by game theorists and critics as 
either an inclusive process motivated by the peculiar characteristics of digi-
tal media (e.g., Bolter’s and Grusin’s remediation) or a more exclusive pro-
cess narrowly focused on those stories, narratives, and other literary devices 
that are assumed to mediate computer game play.8 Here, however, recursive 
replay is more properly associated with basic human neurophysiology and 
universal cognitive practice, regardless of either the context in which that 
process operates (e.g., new media) or the objects on which that process oper-
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ates (e.g., either “ergodic” texts or narratives). Assuming a natural-historical 
origin of play as a biological imperative, this process stands alone.9
 Many analyses of computer games disagree. For instance, among tech-
nology-based theorists—including (with a broad brush) Manovich (2002) and 
Kittler (1997)—recursion and its manifestation as replay within computer 
games are shaped by and understood only with reference to some preexisting 
social, cultural, and/or related technological context.
 Similarly, text-based theories—including those advanced by Aarseth 
(1997), Ryan (1992), and much of the hypertext/interactive-fiction group 
(see, e.g., Montfort 2003)—most comfortably attach recursion and replay to 
a particular type of sign and symbol system, whether this system is as vague 
as language or as limited as narrative.
 Both these two theoretical positions—the tech-based and the text-
based—seem to assume that the “meaning” of play and replay is largely pre-
determined by the unique constraints (or, sometimes, freedoms) that digital 
media and/or digital texts impose on computer game players and play or, 
alternatively, that this “meaning” is determined on the fly, as a consequence 
of the immersion of game play and players within the contingencies of an 
immediate and ongoing process of social and cultural negotiation regarding 
individual values and meanings.
 In contrast, if recursive replay is indeed integral to the hard-wired 
mechanics of a biologically determined play, and if play is indeed integral 
to human cognition, then computer game play need not be constrained (or 
explained) by external factors. The constraints of play—insofar as those con-
straints would be knowable through cognition—would be wholly determined 
by the boundaries of cognition. That is, play might well appear paradoxical 
(i.e., characterized by epistemic conflicts on the boundaries of the know-
able); it might also appear instinctive (i.e., without any directly knowable 
cause). Play would, in such a scenario, appear to simply bootstrap itself into 
existence, either in ignorance or blatant disregard of rules or expectations 
contrary to its most fundamental form.
 Recursive replay within Civilization—and, in fact, replay within all com-
puter games—displays many of these characteristics of paradox and self-
determination. For instance, while computer games normally have clearly 
defined goals (the Civilization series has always had multiple winning condi-
tions: military victory, cultural domination, winning the race to Alpha Cen-
tauri, etc.), the process necessary to achieve those goals involves transform-
ing the game context in a manner that quite clearly moves those goals further 
away: the proverbial carrot on a stick. Players engage in such a paradoxical, 
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recursive process instinctively during replay, often without full realization of 
its implications. Game designers implement a cascading series of recursive 
goals more consciously and purposefully—most obviously as a series of dif-
ficulty levels that eventually recede beyond human capabilities.
It was also clear that the forty bazillion or so hours of playing time which have 
occurred between 1991 and the present have served to vastly improve the 
world’s overall Civ-playing skills . . . Without making the game more difficult 
for beginners, we needed to crank up the challenge level significantly for all 
the jaded experts out there. . . . Finally, we added the new Deity difficulty 
level for those who like their Civ really mean.10
 Certainly, over time, the Civilization redesigns have increased the num-
ber of player options—and related player challenges—far beyond the prob-
ability that any single player, during any single lifetime, will exhaustively 
complete them all. The appeal of such a multiplicity of game-related tasks 
(short of playing the game in its entirety) must then be found in the game’s 
perceived completability, regardless of how many goals or tasks are actually 
completed at the end of some interminable series of plays and replays. In 
such a context, the pleasures of play appear to result from two simultaneous 
and seemingly contradictory desires: first, the desire to conceive a clear end 
to play (e.g., in terms of designer-imposed goals); and second, a persistent 
unwillingness to reach that end. Only the first of these two might be signifi-
cantly affected by game design; and, in fact, when confronted with designer-
imposed goals that prove less than satisfactory—that is, game goals too easily 
or too quickly achieved—recursive replay bootstraps itself: players impose 
their own indeterminable goals, such as the herculean One-City Challenge11 
in Civilization II.
 The embedded “challenge” of a game is thus far less important than 
the player’s perception of the challenging; and this perception is, then, less 
clearly motivated by any objective characteristic(s) of game design than by 
those phenomenological, self-determined processes embedded in ongoing 
cognitive play. Successful game rules do not construct play; successful game 
rules conform to a preexisting set of natural-historical rules governing cogni-
tive play.
 I pause to make this point clearly regarding play and replay within Civi-
lization because implications and predictions are quite distinct among tech-
based and text-based approaches and my own “brain-based” approach—as I 
have distinguished those three here—to the study of computer game play. 
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Most particularly, there are significant differences in the predictions these 
make concerning the effects of games and game play.
 The Civilization series has the superficial trappings of a historical simula-
tion. Indeed, some of the scenarios built into the game allow players to play 
on a realistically drawn (to some rough level of approximation) map of Earth; 
the names of the civilizations included in the game are the names of real-life 
nations and peoples; and the city improvements, unit types, and political sys-
tems referred to in the game are all represented at some basic, though often 
abstract, level of verisimilitude. In general, then, the signs and symbols of the 
Civilization series are similar to those signs and symbols found in more con-
ventional accounts of human civilization and progress, such as history texts.
 Further, many have found parallels between the “lessons” learned or the 
“stories” told during Civilization game play and various political ideologies 
and/or broad-based assumptions about the nature of Earth’s peoples and 
their relationships. These lessons/stories have been, on different occasions, 
interpreted both positively12 and negatively.13 However, regardless of any 
normative issues involved, these lessons/stories are assumed to be embed-
ded in the game design and, subsequently, within the play that the design 
motivates. Based on how Civilization is actually played and replayed, I would 
like to use the remainder of this chapter to debunk this notion.
play and replay—with meaning this time
Cognitive play within the Civilization series is only marginally different from 
play within many other, similar computer games—most particularly those 
games within the 4X, builder genre. Cognitive play evokes a play and replay 
process that transforms signs and symbols just as often and just as radically 
as the World Wonders transform the game context within Civilization. This 
results in game signs and symbols having significantly different meanings 
than those meanings to which they are conventionally assigned outside the 
context of play.
Indiscriminate Bombings
The initial release of Civilization generated a (sometimes quite heated) con-
troversy concerning the game’s implementation of nuclear power.
 There are several victory conditions available within the Civilization 
games—some variable and chosen by the player before the game begins. 
Traditional and commonplace ways to win the game include (the typical war-
game fare of) destroying all your opponents and, a bit more imaginatively, 
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winning a space race to Alpha Centauri. The condition of victory in the space 
race can be chosen to guide play from the beginning of the game, or it can be 
selected as a fall-back position to be used any time a military victory proves 
unlikely. Computer-run civilizations, in fact, if sensing military defeat, devote 
their resources to the option of the space race—forcing the hand of opposing 
military commanders by changing the pace at which attacking forces must be 
mustered and deployed.
 Such a sudden transformation of game context and goals—and related 
game rules—is a dedicated feature of the World Wonders, which, in the end-
game, include the chief determinant of the space race: the Apollo Project. 
Also included in the Civilization endgame, for much the same reason—to 
move the game’s goals a little further from the player’s event horizon—are 
industrial pollution and, most particularly, pollution associated with nuclear 
power, plants, and bombs.
 In the typical Civilization endgame, with over-large cities strewn across 
a modernist landscape, pollution and accompanying global warming become 
a major problem. In fact, the steadily increasing pollution rates—along with 
the late-game World Wonders—mark the final transformation of the game’s 
early and mid-game goals to the endgame goals of either city destruction (the 
military version) or city exodus (the version of the space race).
 Some have interpreted the implementation of nuclear power within the 
game and the resulting, inevitable decay of the Civilization landscape as car-
rying political connotations beyond the context of the game. The argument 
goes something like this:
Players must . . . take care to preserve the environment. Too many large, pol-
luting cities, for example, can lead to ecological disasters, ranging from the 
destruction of local environments to global warming. Pollution also affects 
the players’ final score: players lose “civilization points” for every square of 
polluted terrain. Such features have led some to conclude that the game has 
an environmental message. Others have criticized the game for its cultural 
bias. Justin Hall, for example, remarks that the game reflects the “high tech-
nology late capitalist mindset of America.”14
 From the beginning, Sid Meier has consistently denied any intention of 
using the Civilization game designs as political statements, as indicated in 
this remark from a CGOnline interview:
It’s a gameplay factor. We very consciously avoid putting our political philoso-
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phy into the game. . . . Now, it did seem, and I think it turned out to be true, 
that building that element into Civilization, the pollution and things like that, 
gave you a new challenge as you got to the later parts of the game . . . So pol-
lution became that kind of thing.15
 Given the common and characteristically incomplete nature of replay, it 
is problematic what portion of Civilization players (and critics) have gained 
full access to the later stages of the game and experienced the effects of pol-
lution in a recursive context of play. Many obviously have and do, though it 
is also reasonable to assume that more players reach the final stages of the 
game (any game) on lower difficulty levels than they do on the highest pos-
sible difficulty level.
 In any case, it is only during initial and novice play—which is most com-
patible with a linear reading of game as text—that Civilization game signs 
and symbols (i.e., game signifiers) might be reasonably associated with those 
preexisting—often normative—values corresponding to the use (or misuse) 
of real-world factories, fossil fuels, and nuclear energies (i.e., real-world sig-
nifieds). During and after repeated play of Civilization, there are at least two 
factors that make this tentative association between game signifiers and real-
world signifieds unlikely.
 First, and most specifically as regards the Civilization series, the games 
are neither historical simulations nor historical texts, despite that fact that 
they are sometimes referred to as such—in both scholarly and popular pub-
lications.16 Technical reasons for this are embedded in the game’s semiotic 
structure,17 but let me simply note again that Civilization has been designed 
and redesigned—beginning with the original Meier and Shelley efforts—to 
quite clearly conform to an aesthetics of play rather than to construct a real-
istic model of human history. And over the succeeding years, the games have 
retained the trappings of a historical simulation only in the most superficial 
and nominative sense.18
 Second, and more important as regards computer game play in general, 
interactive game play—not game readings and not isolated game compo-
nents and structures—most definitively maps, measures, and gives mean-
ing to the signs and symbols within a game. The best test of this claim lies 
in the experiences of—and the choices made by—game players. Do these 
choices in any way reflect those cultural values commonly attributed to game 
components—for example, the nuclear-power complex of signs—outside the 
context of play?
 As an example of how and why Civilization players come to value game 
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elements, consider again the alternative (and aberrant) strategies available 
to players of the original Civilization—the same version wherein the con-
troversy concerning the use of nuclear power originated. One of the most 
aberrant of these strategies was the so-called Mongol strategy, a version of 
the well-known “rush” (or “zerg”) technique, which is often used as a first 
test of game balance and artificial intelligence capabilities by players of turn-
based and, in particular, real-time computer strategy games (e.g., the Age of 
Empires series).
 The “value” of a Mongol strategy in Civilization—positive in terms of win-
ning the game; negative in terms of curtailing replay (and fun)—was deter-
mined solely by its effect on the individual play experience. Certainly, the 
game rules allowing successful use of the Mongol strategy were not seen—by 
either players or critics of the game—as an editorial comment concerning the 
relative superiority of the Mongol civilization. These rules were simply ulti-
mately and inevitably not fun, so these rules were ultimately and inevitably 
revised in subsequent game designs, regardless of their value or meaning out-
side the context of play. At the same time, complaints about the implementa-
tion of nuclear power within Civilization have seldom referenced any negative 
impact on the immediate play experience, so the function of nuclear power 
within the game has been changed very little in the game’s many revisions.
 In general, sociocultural critics of Civilization’s ideological biases have not 
found it necessary to look at specific strategies employed by expert players 
prior to assuming widespread effects of those biases. Yet the most frequently 
discussed aspects of the game within dedicated player forums (e.g., on the 
Apolyton Web site) are the relationships among in-game signifieds—without 
reference to or really any concern about their significance (or signification) 
outside the game context. As a result, these discussions of game rules and 
related strategies have greater relevance to other computer strategy games 
than they do to the real-world referents of the game’s signs and symbols. This 
is true both of the topics of player-based game analyses and of the methods 
employed by those analyses—both are quite different from the topics and 
methods employed by sociocultural theorists.
 Here, for instance, is a typical gamer’s approach to valuing rush strategies 
as they (re-)appear within the single and multiplayer versions of Civilization 
III. (In this particular context, the aberrant Mongol strategy has evolved into 
a more efficient, virus-like form: the “Infinite City Strategy,” or ICS.)
Enter the first release of CivIII with its flog hack of pop-rushing, and for a 
while ICS was back with a vengence. Everything the Civ team had done to 
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butt **** big city strategies, and there is no other term for it—such as re-
source problems, worse corruption, harder unhappiness, more aggressive AI 
civs, less effective research for players than for AIs—made ICS ever more 
attractive . . .
 The recent patch is like a late Beta of a working game, the first release was 
like an Alpha. ICS is a good ma[r]ker of how well play tested a civ version 
was. It is an obvious, easy strategy, like “imp” from corewars, that crushes 
more elegant and complex strategies. If it works too well, then the version 
hasn’t been well thought out.19
 This particular player analysis—representative of many others—assigns 
value to new game elements (e.g., “pop-rushing”) within the context of the 
entire set of Civilization game rules (i.e., in relationship to rules determining 
“resource problems, worse corruption, harder unhappiness, more aggressive 
AI civs,” etc.). This assignation occurs without reference to either the histori-
cal accuracy or the real-world value of game elements. And, importantly, this 
assignation occurs only as a result of knowledge gained through extensive 
replay.
 If there is any most obvious bias in player analysis of this sort, it is the bias 
of the engineer in adopting a systems approach to determining values for 
game units. However, any such bias in methodology does not undermine the 
overwhelming tendency of game players to adjudicate game units, designs, 
rules, and related strategies according to their impact on subjective game 
experiences (or according to what I referred to earlier as an “aesthetic of 
play”), as in the reference in the preceding quote to “elegant and complex” 
strategies.
Barbarous Treatments 
The Civilization “barbarian” game element—appearing in the earliest por-
tions of all games in the Civilization series—has received critical attention 
similar to that of pollution in the late game. Barbarian interpretations and val-
ues differ sharply in the analysis of game players and of sociocultural critics.
 In those analyses valuing Civilization game signs as at least some part of 
a colonialist/imperialist manifesto (see the quotes that follow), the treatment 
of barbarians as distinct from the more cultured, scientifically endowed, and 
eventually successful player civilizations forces game-world barbarians into 
a subordinate relationship with the player civilizations, a relationship that 
reflects similar treatments imposed and assumptions held outside the game 
context.
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The equation that the player has to make between the Barbarian’s level of 
nomadic activity and [the] threat they pose, points to a western [sic] mental-
ity in which nomadic behavior is placed on the periphery of the culture as 
the “other.”20
The Indians exist not as a civilization in their own right, but as an obstacle 
to be surmounted by civilization; in the [Civilization] game, as in Rowland-
son’s account, the enemy Indian Other is imagined as being the mechanism 
whereby the nascent American self is tested and found to be powerful.21
 There is no doubt that recursive play as I have described it—reflecting 
basic patterns of human cognition—is universally involved in categorizing 
and, indeed, evoking oppositional relationships between self and other. 
However, there remains little evidence that the objects valued within such 
an opposition (i.e., signifiers of “other”) carry the same meanings or significa-
tions inside the game as they do outside the game. In fact, there are contrary 
indications.
 For instance, Douglas (2002) acknowledges that most players come to 
designate the barbarian villages as “goody huts,” a label more clearly reflect-
ing their role in the game than their ideological value to invading Western 
civilizations. From a gamer’s point of view, in fact, the role of barbarians dur-
ing play is more help than hindrance.
 The most obvious function of the barbarians in the original Civilization 
design was to contribute to the game’s variable difficulty levels. However, 
the impact of barbarians on game play is actually quite small, particularly 
when the game’s difficulty level is set on anything other than its lowest levels. 
Barbarians indeed pose some threat to developing civilizations and neophyte 
game units, but this threat is minimal and can be, with little effort, avoided 
entirely by saving and reloading from a point prior to all barbarian-inspired 
disasters. Rather than treating (and valuing) the barbarians as an oppositional 
force, dedicated game players are much more likely to attempt to develop 
their early civilizations with the barbarians’ aid.
 This cooperative use of barbarians is vital to gaining a foothold in Civi-
lization games played at the highest difficulty levels, where the computer-
controlled civilizations inevitably attain very large and dangerous early leads 
in city production and development. Striking a lucky goody hut or two can 
mean the difference between surviving the game’s early years or being 
quickly overrun by an aggressive adjacent civilization.
 Realizing this, the computer-controlled civilizations seek out (and 
Civilization  111
destroy) the goody huts very quickly, with races between civilizations often 
ensuing not to avoid confrontations with barbarians but to secure them for 
their own units.22 There are also other subtle benefits of having barbarians 
on the map—for example, improving the expertise of your units by sparring 
with barbarian units and allowing barbarians to fester in unexplored areas to 
serve as a temporary impedance to the growth of nearby civilizations. How-
ever, none of these functions of barbarians during game play appear to have 
any particular significance for critics of in-game barbarian representations. 
More commonly, text-based descriptions of barbarians—such as those found 
in game manuals (or game advertising)—are used as justification for assign-
ing values and meanings to play within Civilization.
 Here, for instance, is such a text-based analysis, drawn from Poblocki 
(2002):
Indeed, as an ad informs, “we can match wits with greatest leaders of the 
world in an all-out quest to build the ultimate empire” (Civ3.com 2002), and 
we do become one of such nearly divine leaders with a capacity for altering 
the course of history (hence the popular classification of Civilization in the 
“you are the god” genre). The telos, however, is well known. If in the case of 
Hegel it was the Prussian state . . . , the fetish-object of Meier’s fantasies is 
the “ultimate empire,” the state that resembles most the end product of all 
human advancement, namely the United States of America.23
 Text-based descriptions of game units, however, whether appearing in 
game-supported or supplementary publications—even when appearing as 
nominatives within the game itself—fail to reveal the manner in which those 
units are used during play and, as a result of that use, given value and mean-
ing by players. It is well known, for instance, that game players commonly 
eschew written rules and instructions in favor of more direct and immediate 
play as a means of determining game goals. And among dedicated game play-
ers, the more barbarian-like “Indians” (e.g., Iroquois) are usually considered 
more advantageously played than the (assumedly) less barbarian-like Ameri-
cans.
in the back of the backstories
Civilization game elements—such as barbarians in early game play and 
nuclear power in late game play—are obviously interpreted and valued dif-
ferently by game players than by those who find embedded in the Civiliza-
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tion games a set of values and meanings existing prior to and apart from 
game play. These embedded values and meanings can then be understood as 
a sort of ideological “backstory” to which gamers need not—and most often 
do not—adhere.
 In the previous chapter, I have made the rather contentious claim that 
game backstories generally have no real relevance to computer game play 
and, in particular, inhibit, rather than determine, play within computer strat-
egy games. This claim recognizes the degree to which (re)play deconstructs 
and revalues signs and symbols that are, in other contexts, more convention-
ally assigned value and meaning. As such, this claim is intended to apply not 
to Civilization alone but to the larger class of computer games that evoke 
repeated and recursive play. At least one well-known game designer, Raph 
Koster, in his keynote presentation to the Austin Game Conference (2003), 
applies a similar argument to concerns that play within Grand Theft Auto 
results in players learning that game’s embedded “ethical implications.”
This is why gamers are dismissive of the ethical implications of games—They 
don’t see “get a blowjob from a hooker, then run her over.” They see a power-
up.24
 However, there remains an important point unaddressed: what about 
those aspects of game play that might, with or without conscious intent, rep-
licate preexisting social and cultural values? Sociocultural criticism, after all, 
may confuse the superficialities of game labels with the underlying mech-
anisms of game structures; but those game structures might nevertheless 
still be indicative of some ideological bias originating in some other context. 
Should all civilizations in the game, for instance, function according to the 
cultural identity of a single civilization (e.g ., Poblocki’s “ultimate empire,” 
mentioned in the preceding section), then claims of ideological bias might 
well re-emerge.
The [perfidy] of Civilization’s cultural imperialism . . . sneaks into players’ 
own activities, penetrating as deep as their own reconstructed body . . .
 The history of Western civilization is to a very high extent a history of the 
camouflage of power and the means of coercion . . . It is always difficult to 
spot power in the concept of culture . . . but in strategy computer games 
such as Civilization power is almost invisible because, at least at the level of 
rhetoric, it belongs to us.25
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 I have so far claimed that patterns and rules governing an aesthetic of 
play can be observed through the design and redesign of computer games; 
and I have given examples of this process at work in the evolution of the 
Civilization game series. Let us suppose now that this aesthetic of play is not 
merely at the root of game design and play but also at the root of cultural 
bias, power, and “coercion.”
 For instance, while barbarians are not rightfully considered as a defining 
opposition to the human player in Civilization, other computer-controlled 
civilizations are placed in this sort of opposition. An undeniable theme in the 
game and its play is, then, a theme of opposition and conflict. Likewise, the 
most common manner in which the game is played, valued, and analyzed by 
its most dedicated players is through a systems-based approach that, during 
recursive play, exhibits an obvious debt to the methods and assumptions of 
positivist science.
 Within the rules and nature of human play, are there seeds of opposi-
tion and contextualization that, in their recursive application, create a “cul-
turally biased” form of abstract thought? Or is some distorted aesthetic of 
play directly imposed on an otherwise culturally neutral cognitive template? 
There is even the possibility that the vagaries of play become irrevocably 
intertwined with the backstories of prevailing cultural contexts during the 
exercise of games as “configurative practices.”26
The hacker communities and digital game scenario sites suggest that the 
awareness of game rules—and the urge to rewrite them—often subverts the 
games’ standing rules governing the way a game can be configured, but they 
also exceed the rules’ ability to configure the operator’s paths of thought. 
Such discourse includes discussion of the aesthetic qualities of the rules 
themselves . . . This is the two-way process of configuration—operator on 
game, game on operator—that digital game studies will have to address in 
the years ahead.27
Thus, regardless of how themes of power might get into our play—through 
ourselves or through others—these themes of power may yet seduce us.
 It is, in fact, tempting to see the evolution of the Civilization series—
from its earliest MS-DOS beginnings, through the feature creep and increas-
ingly sophisticated multiplayer implementations of the past decade, into the 
condensed and streamlined package of its most recent PlayStation 3 (PS3) 
edition—as a sort of microcosm of the evolution of computer games as whole: 
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from geeky spreadsheets to social media platforms to a sleekly commercial-
ized mass-produced products. Yet, it is remarkable, during that evolution, 
how little the basic form of the game itself has changed.
 Probably the single most radical difference between the PC version of 
Civ and the PS3 version (Civilization Revolution, 2008), for instance, is the 
necessity of playing the latter through a console interface. But this trans-
formation, like moving Zelda from old to new (Wii) controllers,28 has little 
impact, once mastered, on the feel and play of the game. While game play 
has been considerably shortened inside code changes for the PS3, the basic 
form of the computer game—and its play—scales down (and up) extremely 
well. The same sequences and processions of game objects are familiar in 
the PS3 version; there are simply recognizable fewer of these. The most 
affective difference is the visual presentation of the game, which benefits 
in most respects from the more sophisticated graphics of the PS3 hardware. 
But these graphic embellishments fall on the side of content rather than 
form and are eventually perceived, during repeated play, as a superficial—
even, at moments, disruptive—change; and these superficial trappings of the 
game form are largely disregarded during the inevitable saves and reloads 
and recursions and replays that mark the normal progression from novice to 
expert Civilization player.
 Noticeably, the newest version of Civilization is, if anything, more likely 
than before to be the target of cultural studies and critiques. The offending 
superficialities—barbarians, bombs, and backstories of history—are again 
omnipresent; and this time, the context of their presentation is less com-
plex and detailed and, thus, offers less depth to explore and fewer masteries 
to achieve in rebuttal of an overly quick and facile interpretation of game 
themes and narratives.
is play civilized? 
I can make no more telling argument against the assertions of cultural stud-
ies and critical theory than to observe that while games (and “fun”) exhibit 
important cultural differences, characteristics of play appear quite similar 
across cultures—and, in many respects, across species.29 And therein a line 
can be drawn in the sand of current computer game theory between those 
who would claim that the underlying mechanisms of games and game struc-
tures are determined by external factors (narratives among them) and those 
who would claim that the fundamental mechanisms of play and play struc-
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tures more accurately reflect their indelibly stamped and now internally fixed 
biological origins. This is, of course, not a new line30 (sounding, as it does, 
suspiciously like the old nature-nurture saw). However, it does allow me to 
mount some response to those who maintain that these issues are indeter-
minable.
I concur with Myers that a user’s level of experience informs the likelihood 
of his or her drawing on internal or external referents while making sense 
of Civilization. However, I would stress that the point is not that either the 
novice or the expert is more “right” about the meaning of Civ. The crucial 
issue is that the user’s level of experience (which will alter as a consequence 
of play) will constitute the interpretive frame for that user. Furthermore, this 
shows that the meaning of Civilization—whatever it might be—is neither 
universal, nor static.31
 On the contrary, expert analysis is indeed more “right” in that the expert 
analysis is more complete. Expert analysis contains and surmounts novice 
analysis. Yet the meanings and values derived by the novice are derived by 
the same meaning-making process as those derived by the expert. This formal 
meaning-making process is both universal and—at least within the bounds of 
some biologically determined evolutionary time clock—intractable.
 Simply put, experts are more capable of generating desired game objects 
than are novices: they are demonstrably and objectively better at winning the 
game. After extended and recursive play within a game, game object values 
and meanings increasingly narrow into values and meanings that are more 
functionally valid (instrumental), more completely realized, and more defini-
tively determined by the game system and code than by the culture in which 
the game play and player reside. Thus, while a cultural studies perspective 
might claim a convergence of values based on shared cultural contexts, I 
would equally claim a convergence of values based on similar game-playing 
experiences. These play experiences, channeled by game code and interface, 
eventually trump all other, non-game-related influences inside the game.
 If play serves as a deconstructive process—and if replay serves even more 
so—then frequent and dedicated players of computer strategy games will be, 
over time, increasingly less likely to interpret or be affected by games as cul-
tural statements, either consciously or unconsciously. Play and replay would 
be, in effect, a de-culturalization (or, if you prefer, de-civilization) process.
 If, on the other hand, culturalists are right, then frequent and dedicated 
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players of computer games are precisely the group mostly likely to be, over 
time, indoctrinated by the cultural values embedded in game texts, and 
they are therefore the group mostly likely to exhibit cognitive and behav-
ioral changes to that effect, regardless of the in-game consequences of these 
changes. I know of no way to adjudicate this claim other than that already 




The more you tighten your grip,
the more star systems will slip through your fingers.
 —Princess Leia, Star Wars (1977) 
The most significant development in computer game play over the past quar-
ter century has been the rapid ascension of multiplayer games and game 
designs, or MMOs. The best-known commercial success story in this genre 
is, of course, World of Warcraft (WoW). WoW and the rest of the current 
crop of MMOs remain firmly based on the fundamental mechanics of the 
paper-and-pencil role-playing game Dungeons & Dragons. And as such, 
these games reflect the same forms and processes of play outlined earlier.1 
Yet it often seems that they claim to offer something more.
 In The Nature of Computer Games, I emphasized the potential of one of 
the most popular and long-lived computer role-playing games at that time, 
Might and Magic (M&M), to expand its social context.
As of 2001, there were gathering plans to adapt the M&M games to an on-
line, multiplayer environment (Legends of Might and Magic). This would 
involve the creation of a MUD-like context, which would be a natural and 
congruous expansion of the role-playing genre’s basic semiotic form.2
 Reflecting back, however, that analysis seems naive. For while Everquest 
(1999) and Ultima Online (1997) have already been—and continue to be, in 
their own fashion—successful, the Might and Magic franchise had already 
reached its peak of popularity at the time of my analysis, and it subsequently 
faded and virtually folded. Nevertheless, the basics of the M&M role-playing 
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game design, as carried forth online by Blizzard’s World of Warcraft and (in 
planning as of 2009) Bioware’s closely analogous Knights of the Old Republic, 
demonstrate that much of the appeal of computer role-playing games remains, 
broadly put, multiplayer and social. About that, I am not surprised.
 I am surprised about some other things. Since I was then—while play-
ing M&M in 2001—and am now focused on the nature of play as a cognitive 
function, I am relatively surprised (and somewhat dismayed) to watch com-
puter game studies and analysis, buoyed by the rise of enormously profitable 
Internet-based MMOs, increasingly promote the notion that computer game 
play is most fundamentally a cooperative social activity.3 This notion is, of 
course, entirely consonant with similar notions, already discussed, promoting 
the benefits of good and “functional” play.4 And based on the analysis here, 
these paired notions are equally misleading.
The sociologically-anthropologically oriented tradition of MMORPG and its 
social aspects is usually related to themes that can be located in what Hak-
ken (1999) calls the microsocial level . . . These studies widely assume that 
MMORPGs are social spaces . . . As a corollary this tradition usually takes for 
granted the nature of the individual player as a social being.5
 WoW—as the now prototypical example of MMOs—offers numerous 
opportunities for cooperative social play (which usually simply means play-
ing “nice” with others), yet this play, like play in all similar games, might be 
best attributed either to a game design that forces social grouping in order to 
accomplish game goals or to what appears to be a common human tendency 
to establish social relationships without regard to any particular game context 
or goal or desire to play.
 In this inclination toward the social, players of online games might be 
considered similar to users of MySpace or Facebook or other more generic 
communications networks, where outside-game relationships dominate and 
motivate in-game behaviors. Yet games are a special sort of software, and 
play is a special sort of behavior; and in many instances, neither is explained 
well with reference to desires for or benefits of group play. Indeed, in WoW 
and its related clones, despite the emphasis on social play, most players play 
most often alone.6
 Nevertheless, the inclination to design computer games for social play 
has been present since very early in video game development and history,7 
although the mechanics that made these designs possible were difficult to 
achieve without the parallel development of computer-mediated commu-
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nications networks. Now, with such networks commonplace, it is clearly the 
intent of many computer game designers to include social play as a meaning-
ful component of computer game play. It is not clear, however, that social 
play contributes to the experience of computer game play as a unique aes-
thetic form.
 Because computer game play relies so fundamentally on sensory mecha-
nisms and habituated response (i.e., its interface), social play within computer 
games is commonly filtered through some previous realization of locomotor 
play. This fundamental reliance on bodily mechanics is at least somewhat 
similar to the experience of reading, insofar as all language systems reference 
visceral experiences of the human body within three-dimensional space.8 
While playing computer games (unlike reading text/hypertext) may avoid 
direct reference to language, computer game play cannot avoid reference 
to these more fundamental schemata or to the cognitive mechanisms that 
enable and empower them. The presence of other players can refine this 
reference perhaps, but that presence cannot by itself avoid the interactive 
and visceral components of computer game play.
 For this reason, it seems reasonable to construct an explanation of com-
puter game social play as an extension of computer game individual play, 
rather than to characterize that individual play as a fragmentary and incom-
plete version of social play. Indeed, individual computer game play often 
serves as an antithetical substitute for social play, with video game software 
often taking the role of (an absent) human opponent.
Play is older than culture, for culture, however inadequately defined, always 
presupposes human society, and animals have not waited for man to teach 
them their playing. We can safely assert, even, that human civilization has 
added no essential feature to the general idea of play.9
 In general, the experience of computer game play does not seem to nec-
essarily emerge from social action but, rather, becomes often located within 
social action through purposeful game design.
social play contexts
Here, in order to better understand the fundamentals of social play and 
to better understand the relationship between social and individual play, 
I would like to examine common characteristics of online social play con-
texts—particularly those distinguished by cooperative and competitive 
120  play redux
behaviors in MMOs. These contexts are widely (by players and by designers) 
represented by the categories of player versus environment (PvE) and player 
versus player (PvP). While these categories are not mutually exclusive, I will 
examine them according to the rough configuration in figure 9.1.
 PvP combat is often described and treated pejoratively within persistent 
online communities—that is, as “griefing.” Community-based analysis then 
reproduces these values by emphasizing the negative qualities of competi-
tive play and, simultaneously, the positive qualities of cooperative play—
for example, its “productiveness”—as does the following statement from a 
review of Taylor’s (2006) study of EverQuest players.
In short, MMOGs have served as avant-garde prototypes for the online social 
spaces more and more of us are electing to inhabit, and players are the first 
to understand how integrating with a computer world allows us to subject 
our social lives to the same efficiencies that govern our work time and make 
it seem rational and productive.10
 This position eventually results in a theoretical denigration of more dis-
ruptive and competitive play and distinguishes cooperative play as a more 
natural and proper extension of individual play. Yet this assumption reflects a 
disregard—or, perhaps more harmfully, a misrepresentation—of the degree 
to which competitive play tends to appear and re-appear in a variety of game 
contexts, regardless of designer intent.
Figure 9.1. Social contexts of play
 “isolated” play “productive” play
 individual play group play





pvp oppositional play 
competitive
       social (team) play
 “selfish” play “meaningful” play
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 If we position competitive play—among individuals and groups—as a sys-
tematic feature of play, then similar formal properties can be observed within 
cooperative play. And either behavior—cooperative or competitive—can be 
explained in terms of the systemic manner in which it explores, manipulates, 
and, over time, transforms the game system.
PvE
“Player versus environment” best describes the play of those single-player 
games that have been, within the past decades, transformed into today’s 
MMOs. Almost twenty years of Ultima single-player games, for instance, pre-
ceded the release of Ultima Online in 1997. By the time EverQuest appeared 
(in 1999), the computer RPG genre had solidified into a set of design char-
acteristics that could be traced back to early Dungeons & Dragons rules sets 
(1974) and the manipulation of figurines and models within fantasy wargame 
derivatives such as Warhammer (1987).
 Under these influences, the computer RPG genre remains marked by two 
basic components: (1) the creation of a character governed by pre-existing 
rules and (2) the interactions of that character within a common set of rules. 
A simplified, linguistic-based model of this process might, for instance, rep-
resent a role-playing game as a language system. Playable characters would 
then be subsets of this rules-based system: grammatically correct sentences. 
And RPG players are given templates for character structures similar to the 
basic templates governing sentence structures: a character-creation syntax.
 Within the original Advanced Dungeons &Dragons (1977) game system, 
this syntax consisted of seven “basic characteristics”: strength, intelligence, 
wisdom, dexterity, constitution, charisma, and comeliness. All properly 
constructed characters (well-formed sentences) assigned a bounded value 
to each of these characteristics. The resulting character array—similar to 
semantic values chosen during sentence construction—varied slightly from 
player to player. As a result, each properly constructed character occupied 
a unique position within the game’s multidimensional array of all possible 
characters. Game play subsequently determined the contextual value of each 
character in comparison with (or in opposition to) other game characters (or 
alternative arrays).11
 Role-playing games remained novel and engaging only to the extent that 
their play allowed exploration of these character relationships. And in com-
puter games, it is largely immaterial whether these relationships specifically 
involve other human players. More important, perhaps, is that computer 
game players assume that they do.
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 During much of the early history of computer role-playing games, players 
played in relative social isolation, reacting only to the intricacies of the game 
system and the variety of character potentials embedded in that system. This 
sort of play context is then central to the PvE theme and implies an opposi-
tional relationship between game player and game software (or code), with 
software playing the role of (an imagined) human opponent. Within current 
MMOs, PvE play now includes groups of players engaged in cooperative 
attempts to achieve the same or similar game goals.
 All PvE play, whether practiced by individuals or groups, remains a mean-
ing-making process that determines values and meanings for game objects; to 
this end, this process requires an active series of character oppositions during 
play. The collective history of these oppositions is then used to contextualize 
each perceptually unique character within an increasingly ordered set of val-
ues. These values are continuously weighed and refined with reference to the 
consequences of in-game interactions, yet they can at times—for example, 
when narratives are imposed on game play—also include values and mean-
ings imported from external sources. That is, players may assign a low value 
to a certain character based on game play but may nevertheless highly value 
that same character for its “aesthetic” value (i.e., as a “concept” character).
 In most cases, however, character values and meanings correlate closely 
with in-game performances, establishing a hierarchy of characters that does 
not differ greatly from one player to the next. Because this meaning-making 
process closely parallels the establishment of social hierarchies outside game 
play, PvE play is formally similar to what appears to be a natural human pro-
cess: exploring and valuing social relationships. In computer game PvE play, 
however, this process of assigning contextual values can take place without, 
strictly speaking, any human contact.
PvP
As technology increasingly has allowed simultaneous and participatory play, 
the oppositional relationships explored during PvE have become increas-
ingly dependent on other players’ presence and choices. Initially, and in 
parallel with board and card games and most sports, these oppositional rela-
tionships result in markedly competitive play. The inclination to design for 
this competitive tendency among players was present even in early single-
player games, where the mechanics of keeping score—or, for instance, hot-
seat implementations of turn-based formats—allowed players to value their 
characters and performances in comparison with the characters and perfor-
mances of other players.
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 MMO players distinguish strongly (and emotionally) between these two 
contexts of play: cooperative and competitive, PvE and PvP. This becomes 
most obvious in terms of how closely character values come to represent self 
values in these two different play contexts. In general, PvP’ers tend to be 
much more concerned about the relationship between their in-game charac-
ters and their out-of-game selves than are PvE’ers.
 There are two clear indications of this exaggerated identification of self 
with character among PvP players: the tone and topics of in-game commu-
nications and, related, the degree to which PvP’ers promote some form of 
inequity aversion.
PvP communications
One of the more obvious and distinguishing characteristics of PvP play—
particularly in comparison to PvE play—is the energetic conversation (smack 
talk) that takes place among players. In comparison to PvE communications, 
in-game communications among PvP players tends to occur more often as a 
direct result of the consequences of play, is more predictable as to precisely 
when during play it will occur, and more often than not concerns the rules 
of play when it does occur. In contrast, conversations among PvE players 
commonly exist only as a (often distant) back channel to a more immediate 
in-game play experience.
 When PvP players communicate with their online opponents, that com-
munication plays a significant role in assigning personal character values. 
Aside from a certain amount of nervous banter and a brief feeling-out pro-
cess, PvP players talk most often and predictably to their opponents just after 
they have been defeated in combat and “die.”
 Because virtually all MMOs determine character oppositions and their 
consequences according to rules sets that are largely hidden from players, 
the quantitative meaning of individual combat remains uncertain, leading 
to necessarily qualitative and social-based interpretations of character val-
ues. Therefore, in order to maintain a positive character value, it is vital that 
players immediately—and publicly—rationalize any indication of weakness 
or defeat. MMO combat winners occasionally assert their superiority, but 
these are ritualized and generic comments (e.g., “pwnd!”), without reference 
to specific elements of game play. MMO combat losers, on the other hand, 
are much more likely (and much quicker) to point out any inequities that 
could be attributed to their loss: computer lag, imbalanced game design, and 
such.
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 Losing players tend to isolate and criticize specific game elements; win-
ning players tend to generalize their winning performances across broader 
contexts—often extending the values and meanings derived from in-game 
play in real-world contexts (e.g., through online forums and message boards). 
For both winners and losers, these communications establish over time a 
common and shared set of values based on prioritizing inequity aversion.
PvP values
“Inequity aversion” promotes the assumption that the game is fair and that all 
PvP combatants have equal opportunities—regardless of characters played—
to “win.” Any variation in winning outcomes is then attributed to the single 
aspect of play considered to be uncontrolled and undetermined by the game 
rules: the game player. This is, of course, a more popular assumption among 
consistent PvP winners than among consistent PvP losers. However, both 
winners and losers share this common value. It is just that the winning play-
ers, with a higher status granted by their in-game winning characters, are 
normally louder, more persistent, and more persuasive in its assertion.
 With this principle of inequity aversion widely held, there are then two 
generic arguments presented at the end of any decisive PvP battle. The losers’ 
argument goes something like this: “You killed me in combat only because of 
game-related factor X.” To which the winner replies, “Game-related factor 
X has little to no significance in the outcome, since that outcome is much 
more dependent on player skill.” Neither of these positions is ever subse-
quently justified (though the attempt is often made), yet each continues to be 
supported and promoted by those whose self-valuations would most benefit 
from its adoption.
 These same values and meanings are seldom topics of discussion and 
debate during PvE play. PvE players are much more willing to allow others 
to “win” by whatever means (equitable or inequitable)—insofar as that win-
ning does not affect their own self-valuations. As a result, hierarchies of PvE 
character values are slightly different (i.e., more idiosyncratic) than those 
constructed solely with reference to PvP activities. Over the course of a long-
lived MMO, these values can diverge significantly, resulting in two separate 
cultures of play. Importantly, however, of the two, PvP value determinations 
remain more accurate and more indicative of underlying game rules and 
mechanics, due to their constant testing in game-related competitive con-
texts.
 Based on this realization and on the assumption that an important sys-
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temic function of play is to explore the mechanics of the game (or any simi-
larly complex system), PvP play—in which players are put into direct and 
immediate opposition with one another—provides a quicker, more accurate, 
and more definitive set of in-game character values and meanings than does 
PvE play. This determination process is simultaneously a source of satisfac-
tion for individual PvP’ers and a genuine boon for game designers—as an 
aid in discovering bugs, learning of unintended consequence of complicated 
rules sets, and so forth.
 If, indeed, the values determined and the meanings made during PvP 
play offer a more complete and thorough analysis of the game system than 
do the values and meanings resulting from PvE play, it would seem to follow 
that PvE play can be reasonably conceptualized as a distorted and incomplete 
version of PvP play—and, further, that much of those supposed dysfunctions 
associated with strongly individual, competitive, and “grief”-related play are, 
in fact, positive (and otherwise unachievable) functions when viewed within 
the context of the game system as a whole.
 This is perhaps the most compelling reason to assume that oppositional 
play (anti-play) is a fundamental and default condition of human play—not 
because computer game players seem to desire it more often (many of them 
do not), but because it has as an important adaptive function for larger sys-
tems. However, simply prioritizing oppositional play over cooperative play 
does not entirely clarify the relationship between the two. It remains unclear 
as to whether competition among groups or competition among individuals 
is more common and critical to an understanding of competitive play. For, 
again, just as PvE and cooperative social play are championed within their 
supportive player communities, there are similarly linked assumptions pri-
oritizing team-based PvP.
social play theory
Clearly, in most play contexts—when observing animal play, for instance—
it is relatively easy to distinguish social from individual play. And even in 
human computer game play, these two forms of play become conceptually 
intertwined only when computer games also serve as communication devices 
and, in their communication functions, allow players to share common expe-
riences during play. MMOs currently qualify both as video games and as 
social communities—though one set of functions may not require and, in 
fact, may interfere with the other.
 Ideally, perhaps, social play within computer role-playing games would 
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extend the liminal qualities of individual play.12 Turner (1969) has similarly 
extended his original concept of the liminal—into communitas.
According to Turner, communitas does not engage in active opposition 
to social structure, but merely appears as “an alternative and more ‘liber-
ated’ way of being socially human”. . . It is “a loving union of the structur-
ally damned pronouncing judgment on normative structure and providing 
alternative models for structure” . . . In its most open form, a liminal event 
reveals a “model of human society as a homogeneous, unstructured com-
munitas, whose boundaries are ideally coterminous with those of the human 
species.”13
 Communitas, as just defined, is uncommon within MMOs. Online com-
puter games promoting widespread social play generate strict social hierar-
chies with strong normative guidelines, often only peripherally related to 
game goals. These hierarchical groups—guilds, fellowships, kinships, and 
such—tend to restrict computer game object-value relationships much as 
simulations do. As a result, depending on your point of view, they either 
protect or prevent individual players from fully accessing a computer game 
(anti-)aesthetic.
 The primary function of computer game social play, then, is to control 
and deny the experience of self. That is, social play tends to require, as does 
the simulation, a common set of rules and, correspondingly, a predetermined 
and fixed set of object-value relationships. This significantly affects game play 
among members of a social group and becomes most obvious in comparing 
the consequences of PvE and PvP play.
 Social play, in order to maintain a common set of player goals, is more 
likely to impose sanctions on PvP behavior (e.g., constructing false or “fixed” 
competitions) than to pursue those competitions without bounds, thus limit-
ing the degree to which individuals can explore the game space, rules, and 
system. Avoiding the consequences of an anti-play in this fashion requires 
that social play substitutes social benefits for the more isolated pleasures of 
individual play and the liminal; accordingly, most currently successful MMO 
designs manufacture and package the pleasures of play as “loot.” In loot-
based games, social groups can offer their members information concerning 
game mechanics, quest walk-throughs, “twinking,” and various other boons 
(depending on the genre and setting of the game) that, in terms of the dis-
cussion here, solidify object-value relationships without threat to social cohe-
sion. This means that some members—the majority—of an online social play 
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group are not required to undergo the same habituation process as other 
members, and for that reason, the former may experience the computer 
game (anti-)aesthetic solely as a text aesthetic.
 This phenomenon, I daresay, also marks much current computer game 
analysis, which interprets social and cultural strictures on game play as a 
form of creativity—for example, as a source of “user-created” content.
There is no culture, there is no game, without the labor of the players. 
Whether designers want to acknowledge it fully or not, MMOGs already are 
participatory sites (if only partially realized) by their very nature as social and 
cultural spaces.14 (italics in original)
 For those who would observe and record the interpretative practices of 
players as social activities reflecting shared cultural values, user-created con-
tent is an important outcome of play that can be explained and understood 
with reference to other, similarly located social and cultural phenomena. 
For those who would locate the phenomenon of play in individual cogni-
tion rather than common society, however, user-created content is a largely 
predetermined feature of a particular game form—that is, a looseness of 
rules—that allows games to be configured and therein exploited by social 
groups and pressures. The resulting “user-created” content, like all other 
rules-based structures within the game, can then engage and empower indi-
vidual and anti-play only through its opposition and, ultimately, denial.
summary and implications 
Analysis of two well-defined contexts of online social play—PvP and PvE—
within the shared game space of MMOs offers at least three potential expla-
nations of the relationship between individual play (particularly individual 
and competitive play) and social or group play (particularly social and coop-
erative play).
 The first explanation—or hope—might be that these contexts of play 
could coexist, separate but equal; but this is immediately contradicted by 
widespread and ongoing conflicts among PvE and PvP players. There are 
clearly different goals and values associated with PvE and PvP play, despite 
these two sharing the same game space, rules, and, in many cases, players. 
One or another, it seems, needs to be assigned precedence in practice and in 
theory.
 Another explanation—the most positive and the most conventional—
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prioritizes social and cooperative play (primarily within PvE contexts) as a 
more advanced and mature form of what is initially individual, oppositional, 
and selfish play. This explanation would eventually subsume all oppositional 
and individual play within those cooperative groups and game designs that 
create and maintain social order. It would likewise promote and prioritize 
teamwork, group coordination, and individual sacrifice over self-reliance, 
independence, and self-interest.
 An immediate difficulty with this second position, however, is that the 
value and meaning determinations available through supposedly more 
“mature” and “advanced” forms of play are often less satisfying to players 
and less useful to designers than those resulting from more “primitive” forms 
of play. Further, attempting to guide and control oppositional play through 
social institutions and mechanisms simply doesn’t work very well. Self-
motivated and solo play is quite common at all levels of MMO play, among 
beginner and advanced players, in both PvE and PvP contexts. And indi-
vidual and oppositional play most often occurs without regard to any rules or 
designs that attempt to limit or channel its effects; individual play appears, 
for want of a better word, incorrigible.
 Cooperative play and tightly knit groups of players may partially distort 
and sublimate the functions of self-oriented and oppositional play, or social 
pressures or game designs may temporarily channel player self-interests and 
activities from direct and immediate oppositions (e.g., 1v1 combat) to other, 
more complex methods of determining character value (e.g., team-based 
competitions). However, neither of these factors eliminate the persistence of 
individual play in MMOs, nor does either significantly alter the self-centered 
nature of individual play whenever and wherever it occurs.
 A third explanation—the most likely—is that individual and competitive 
play is core and fundamental to an understanding of human play behavior—
much more so than cooperative and social play. In other words, human 
play, regardless of context or group, can be best explained and understood 
as originating within individual players—in and according to self. The most 
important and revealing consequences of selfish play, however, only become 
apparent when viewed in the context of larger groups and systems—and, 
somewhat paradoxically, these larger groups and systems tend to negatively 
value the motivations and behaviors associated with individual and selfish 
play. It is not inconceivable, however—or unprecedented—that individual 
self-interests might be at the core of larger group and system functions, sus-
tenance, and survivability.
 In economics, for instance, John Nash came to a similar conclusion 
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regarding the relationship between competitive and cooperative market 
behaviors. In economic game theory, the so-called Nash program assumes 
that all market-driven cooperative games can be reduced to a non-coopera-
tive (competitive) form.
The most important new contribution of Nash (1951) . . . was his argument 
that this non-cooperative equilibrium concept . . . gives us a complete meth-
odology for analyzing all games.15
 Since Nash, other economic analyses (e.g., “behavioral finance”)16 have 
emphasized the degree to which individual, self-determined, and often, as 
a result, non-rational behaviors explain market outcomes more accurately 
(and more realistically) than does an assumption of perfect rationality among 
players.17 Nevertheless, among theorists most directly concerned with the 
social outcomes of play—for example, Piaget (1932, 1954)—there is often 
the implicit assumption that any individual and selfish motives of play are 
inappropriate and should be subsequently molded into more acceptable 
social behaviors. Jose Linaza quotes Piaget to make the point that Piaget “at 
a general level upheld a continuity between all three forms of social behavior 
(motor, egocentric and cooperative)”:
. . . one must be aware of laying down the law; for things are motor, egocen-
tric, and social all at once. . . . rules of cooperation are in some respects the 
outcome of rules of coercion and of motor rules.18
 Clearly, the popularity of social software and social games has been one 
of the major success stories in the gaming industry over the past decade, and 
WoW represents an undeniable high point in that trend. Yet many charac-
teristics of WoW—and other similar online games—seem in conflict with an 
individually located and biologically determined play. In particular, the per-
sistence of online social communities—including those cultural assumptions, 
rules, and social pressures that sustain play through the indefinite extension 
of game form—seems counter to an otherwise and elsewhere fragile, frag-
mented, and fleeting human play.
 In promoting group-oriented play behavior, MMO design and analysis 
tend to denigrate the persistent and incorrigible features of individual play. 
Yet, despite all their conflicts, PvE and PvP players share the same joys and 
immediacies of individual play, before and beyond the influence of subse-
quent player groupings. These shared pleasures are found in common ele-
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ments of the game that social and cultural analyses often take for granted: 
the embedded mechanics of the game interface, the analogical sensation of 
movement through three-dimensional space, and those private and idiosyn-
cratic fantasies evoked during the game’s initial process of character cre-
ation.
 Similarly, there are strongly shared distastes among MMO PvE and PvP 
players. One of the most telling of these is their mutual desire to avoid “per-
madeath.”19 For while “death” is, of course, the most common result of a 
computer game player’s inability to achieve game goals, this pseudo-death 
is entirely representational and primarily serves as a way to limit extended 
play (e.g., in arcade games) and provide performance-related feedback (in all 
games). In action-based video games, players bounce back quickly from mul-
tiple deaths and, at the end of the game, are none the worse for wear. Within 
role-playing games, however, the creation of a character is a more involved 
and more significant portion of the game experience than it is within arcade 
and action games—and designers greatly extend this process of character 
creation so that RPG characters slowly change and “level up” over time.
 The most repulsive portion of the penalty of permadeath in MMOs is 
that the dead character, if still valuable in some way, needs to be re-created 
(“re-rolled”) from the beginning of the game. Aside from the great amount 
of time involved, this is an unacceptable consequence to most players—solo 
and social—for a common aesthetic reason: enjoyable game play is a mean-
ing-making process based on assigning values to oppositional relationships, 
including those relationships in which one game object or character is so 
highly valued over some other that the lower-value character can only “die” 
as a consequence of that opposition. But if such death-causing oppositions 
are just as likely, just as informative, and just as valuable (i.e., just as “mean-
ingful” and aesthetically pleasing) as any other, then assigning a particularly 
onerous consequence to one particular sort of relationship greatly increases 
the difficulty of determining the proper values for all possible relationships. 
Indeed, if enjoyable MMO play requires (at least the expectation of) a full 
exploration of all potential characters and character relationships, then per-
madeath is overly restrictive to this end. Permadeath therein becomes an 
incongruous MMO design feature that disrupts the normal and most enjoy-
able flow and consequences of play within the contexts of both cooperative 
and competitive play.
 Thus, even if we firmly situate PvE as cooperative play and PvP as com-
petitive play, both still involve character creation according to a fixed (and 
often identical) set of rules. Both involve assigning value and meanings to 
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game characters and game objects based on their in-game relationships and 
the consequences of interactive play. Both result in a (pseudo-)social hierar-
chy that arranges and values characters in a manner similar to those values 
and arrangements found in external social contexts. And both, for all these 
reasons, find pleasure—and displeasure—in similar game design features, 
including a mutual abhorrence of character permadeath in MMOs.
 “Productive” social play in MMOs would channel individual play into 
forms that are stable, predictable, and comfortable but also less diverse and 
less accurate in determining game values based on oppositional relation-
ships. Therefore, currently popular MMO game designs, particularly those 
promoting cooperative play, operate most fundamentally as a means of social 
control—and this function must be weighed heavily against their more pro-
ductive outcomes.
 Yet, simultaneously, an important distinction between game experiences 
and literary experiences is the degree to which the latter are essentially 
personal while the former are always potentially social. To play is to play 
with some idea, object, or person; and as computer game technologies have 
evolved, it has become not only increasingly common but also increasingly 
appropriate to incorporate multiplayer components into computer game 
designs. While computer games may function most fundamentally as private 
experiences of self-construction, they also have the potential, unrealized by 
literature during the process of reading, to function as social experiences as 
well.
 Therefore, in order to develop a comprehensive theory of play, analysis of 
MMOs must more clearly delineate the role of individual play within social 
game system design and evolution. To this end, social play will need to be re-
conceptualized to include its apparently derivative and potentially negative 
influences on the adaptive functions of individual and oppositional play.




The center cannot hold.
 —William Butler Yeats, “The Second Coming” (1920)
I am—but only sort of—Twixt. Twixt is a character I played, on and off, 
for four years (2004–8) inside the MMO City of Heroes/City of Villains 
(CoH/V).
 CoH/V was originally designed by Cryptic Studios and released in 2004 
for the PC by NCsoft. Following that release, the game went through several 
revisions (“issues”); these issues—released at least once a year—added game 
content as well as tweaking and refining game rules. The original design 
team from Cryptic Studios and the primary game designer, Jack Emmert, 
sold their interests in the game to NCsoft in 2007.
 CoH/V breaks somewhat from the traditional MMO model in not offer-
ing a conventional (swords and sorcery) fantasy setting; in all other impor-
tant respects, however, CoH/V is extremely typical of contemporary MMO 
designs. During CoH/V play, players choose and costume a superhero (or 
supervillain), who, over the course of play, improves in powers and abili-
ties. In CoH/V, as in other MMOs, character actions depend on “basic char-
acteristics” that determine a character’s interactions with other characters 
and with the game environment. Through continued play (and a continued 
monthly fee), basic characteristics increase in value and potency—characters 
“level up”—and the higher-level and more powerful characters unlock addi-
tional game content and play experiences.
 I would like, here, to use my experience playing Twixt, in some detail, 
as a basis for examining fundamental issues concerning MMO play and, in 
particular, the relationship between game rules and social and individual play 
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inside MMOs. This requires a review of the CoH/V game design and its 
game players, which I take as representative of computer games and players 
in general.
 The CoH/V game code—the rules—establishes multiple winning condi-
tions (most desired game objects)—some simple to achieve, others complex. 
In the CoH/V design, the most obvious, basic, and desirable game object—a 
high-level character—can be achieved through either group or solo play.
On the one hand, this is a MMP. I believe that some of the best features of the 
game shine when players join forces with other players. On the other hand, 
I’ve always believed that part of our game’s strength is the ability for a player 
to log on for a half hour, have fun, then log off. If a mission requires a team 
up, players spend a lot of time simply organizing. The quick fun element 
dissipates . . . Simply put: if a player wants to do something solo, it should be 
CHOICE. Teaming shouldn’t be required, but rather encouraged.1
 Because of this explicit choice by the original game designers, CoH/V 
offers one of the better opportunities among MMOs to compare group and 
individual play without the game code skewing that comparison toward either 
context. A necessary first step toward this comparison, then, is to distinguish 
between play activities characteristic of a group and those characteristic of 
individuals within CoH/V. Inside an MMO, what exactly must—and can—
players do alone?
 First, as is the case with all computer games, MMO players are required 
to master the physical interface separating them from the game code and 
subsequent conceptual play. This is not an insignificant obstacle, and it is one 
that players must negotiate largely isolated and alone, prior to more involved 
engagement with the MMO community of players. Beyond this necessity, 
however, object and conceptual play in MMOs like CoH/V is also a frequently 
solo and solitary undertaking by choice.
individual play: self construction 
As I began play in CoH/V, my first conceptual task was to figure out where I 
was and what I was doing: to distinguish my “self”—my avatar—from its sur-
roundings. Until this most basic distinction is made, there is no set of opposi-
tions to use to form a referential context within which further game objects 
can be valued. The hierarchical process of selecting a CoH/V character 
archetype (a “class”), then powers within that archetype, then enhancements 
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within those powers demands an understanding of the oppositional values of 
archetypes and powers and enhancements. Yet in the beginning, players do 
not have the experience or knowledge necessary to distinguish among these, 
and prior to such a distinction, no meaningful game play can occur.
 Therefore, the first question for all players is this one: who am I and 
who am I not? New players must answer this all-important question without 
much, if any, reference to the game code—simply because they have not yet 
gained the tools to make such reference.
 These new players make their first choices of self and self-construction in 
reference to previous experiences and other game contexts than the one in 
which they find themselves. At this beginning moment, narrative and “back-
story” exert their greatest influence on MMO game play and players. CoH/V 
players, for instance, create a self—a superhero—based on what they believe 
(or desire) a superhero, in general, to be.
 The result is that a great number of CoH/V superheroes resemble 
Spiderman, Superman, The Tick, and Mr. Incredible—among others. My 
first superhero inside the game was “Quag,” a rather bland, vaguely military 
type, whose name was borrowed from a team I had played in another game, 
a totally unrelated fantasy baseball competition. Soon after Quag, I also cre-
ated—with my young daughter, who played alongside me for a couple of 
months—a series of characters modeled after the Street Fighter game series: 
Blanca, Zangief, and the like. None of these characters proved long-lived.
 In my case and others, two important factors work against a simple and 
straightforward replication of out-of-game expectations inside a computer 
game. The first is the nature of play itself, which evokes an anti-ness result-
ing more characteristically in continuous variation than in unembellished 
duplication. The second is—in the particular case of CoH/V—a relatively 
unique design component: its detailed system for costume creation.
 Within CoH/V, the process of selecting superhero characteristics, powers, 
and enhancements is separate from that of selecting superhero sex, height, 
weight, costume, and physical appearance. These latter selections, unlike the 
former, have no real effect on instrumental game play.
 CoH/V offers players an enormous variety of costume selections—much 
more so than competing MMOs, which more often tie avatar appearance and 
gear to the relative strength or level (or value) of that avatar within the game 
context. Though CoH/V limits certain costume affectations (e.g., capes and 
auras) to specific game experiences and contexts, the game code allows even 
beginning players great latitude in costume creation and thereby makes the 
costuming process easily accessible to individual and self-motivated play. In 
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fact, the costuming process in CoH/V is necessarily individual play in that the 
game’s screen for costume selection —its user interface— precludes conver-
sations and interactions with other players.
 While Quag was clad in flak vest and combat boots, and while Blanca 
was green-skinned and monstrous, my subsequent costume creations were 
increasingly idiosyncratic. These remained influenced, in part, by my past 
experiences and expectations of superhero attire, but these creations and 
choices became more often influenced and determined by the mechan-
ics and potentials of the CoH/V game code. Certain costume choices, for 
instance, “fit” the game’s animated character images more neatly; certain 
skins and colors were more compatible with the game display, others less 
so. And whereas my goal in the initial stages of play had been to reproduce 
the superhero images of others, I eventually became interested in creating a 
superhero image of my own—as did my daughter.
 My daughter’s “main” character became “Mr. Suave,” a rather ugly and 
random (to my eyes) amalgamation of grayish-bluish costume parts—with 
tail. And my “main” became Twixt, who, for the next four years, would retain, 
with subtle variations eventually diminishing some initial garishness, the dark 
green spandex tights of his origin.
 Character costume contests are frequently held in beginning player areas 
of CoH/V. These events are neither provided for nor supported by the game 
code and are arranged solely through player initiative. During these con-
tests, beginning characters vie with one another for “best costume” prizes, 
most often awarded by more advanced characters. The decision as to which 
costume is “best” is left to the whim of the more advanced character(s), and 
participation in these contests highlights the pecking order between the high 
and the low within the social hierarchy of the game. Yet participation in these 
contests—ostensibly to please the tastes of more advanced players—does 
not imply that beginning players relinquish control over the costuming pro-
cess. Costumes designed specifically for competitions are usually used once 
or twice for this purpose only and then discarded. Just as very few players 
retain initial costume designs based on something other than their own game 
experiences and valuations, very few players retain a costume designed to 
accomplish some other player’s goal, particularly when that goal is inconsis-
tent with their own personal and aesthetic sense of self.
 Over time, the unique sense of self that players gain through character 
selection and costume design in CoH/V does not come from any single cos-
tume choice made or the appearance of any particular character created. 
Rather, players come to identify their in-game selves with their entire stable 
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of characters and costumes, not just the fixed characteristics and appearance 
of any single one.
 Player signatures, such as the following, posted on the CoH/V message 
board forums indicate this clearly.
 [NOTABLE CHARACTERS]
HEROES:  *Biostem, *Khel’Biostem, *Glacial Gauntlet, *Actuator,  
 *Unbreakable Bones, Biko, *Blue Blade Brother, Bow  
 Knows
VILLAINS:  *Sinner-man, *Humanoid Hunter, *Fridge Chick,  
 *Mind-numb, OpFor, *Slabman, *Amelia Hourglass  
 *Is level 50.
 Umbral Fist : Dm/Reg Scrap
 Umbral Lantern : Fire/Ice Tank
 Umbral Paradox : Rad/Psi Def
 Umbral Impulse : Elec/Nrg Blast
 Umbral Elemental : Earth/Kin Troller
 Umbral Astrum: Da/Nrg Tank
 Umbral Unleashed: WS
 Umbral Luminary: PB
Extended identities such as these establish a sense of self based increasingly 
less on player-character appearances and increasingly more on game-playing 
experiences. These experiences, regardless of whether or not they include 
other players, are both self-directed and self-constructive. In fact, even when 
promoting an extended self, as in the preceding forum signature examples, 
players eventually come to identify most often with a single character—a Mr. 
Suave or a Twixt.
 Individual and isolated play within MMOs and within all computer 
games—using costume creation in CoH/V as an exemplar of this play—
manipulates, arranges, and values game elements (semiotic objects) in a 
context of self. This context must necessarily preexist some parts of game 
play, yet this context is also a significant outcome of game play and, once 
established, serves as a basis for further in-game valuations.
social play: supra-contextualization 
We saw earlier2 how a group of researchers, acting in concert, recontextual-
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ized the rules of a prisoner’s dilemma tournament to more highly value their 
own play (at the expense of the play of others). I call this process supra-con-
textualization, and it is typical both of advanced individual play in all com-
puter games and, equally, of dedicated social play in MMOs.
 CoH/V—again, like all MMOs—motivates group play in several ways. 
One is by providing tasks within the game that are impossible to accomplish 
individually. Another is by giving players the freedom to set their own goals. 
Costume contests, for instance, are examples of player-initiated social play 
unconnected to any specific game-related tasks or goals.
 As a result, social play within MMOGs is frequently non-instrumental 
play, much of which takes place outside the game context entirely. For 
instance, CoH/V supergroups (similar to guilds in other MMOs) maintain 
independent Web sites, hold special events (both inside and outside the 
game), and serve as a means for exchanging personal as well as game-related 
information. In addition, many CoH/V supergroups promote role-playing 
activities that are entirely superfluous to the game code and rules.
 However, MMOs and CoH/V designs strongly motivate instrumental 
group play as well. Some missions within CoH/V cannot be attempted—
much less accomplished—by a single player. Other missions cannot be 
accomplished by certain character classes or are more easily accomplished, 
with greater rewards, by a group of characters rather than by an individual 
character. These missions include the game’s optional but very rewarding 
“task forces” (similar to raids in other MMOs) and, at one time, the crowning 
achievement of the game, reserved for its most advanced and accomplished 
characters: the defeat of the amoebic monster (the “superboss”) Hamidon.
Supergroups
Social group play within CoH/V commonly occurs in one of three contexts: 
(a) pickup groups (PUGs); (b) supergroups; and (c) supra-groups, such as 
those required to defeat the Hamidon.
 Initially, play within CoH/V—within the game’s tutorial and during initial 
character/costume creation, for instance—is predominately and purpose-
fully solo play. But soon after the tutorial is completed, PUGs are sought and 
valued by players. These first groups are randomly selected, include mostly 
strangers, and, eventually, become a notorious source of frustration and 
ridicule. Because individual play styles, expectations, and values are often 
in conflict inside PUGs, PUG game play results in many in-game failures, 
deaths, and dissatisfactions.
 Nevertheless, PUGs remain common in CoH/V because they are neces-
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sary functionally and because, despite all their problems, they are aestheti-
cally pleasing. As individual play within CoH/V—within all games—becomes 
increasingly less novel over time, group play offers a new game context and, 
therein, the potential to revalue and reinvigorate individual play. This par-
ticular recontextualization, however, comes at a cost.
 When solo play within CoH/V becomes boring, the solo player can, to 
increase novelty, either recontextualize the game within an alternative con-
text of self (e.g., create another character or “alt”—which requires, in effect, 
starting the game over) or revalue the game’s semiotic objects—including 
self—outside the game context entirely (e.g., sell their character on eBay). 
In pursuing either of these options, players must relinquish, at least in some 
part, self-constructed game values that have been the primary motivation for 
their play up to that point.
 Group play offers a third option. Groups of all kinds, including PUGs, 
revalue the individual play context and make it more novel. However, simul-
taneously, group play limits and restricts the individual play context so that 
this same novel aesthetic can be provided for all members of the group, 
rather than just one. That is, individual play can still take place in groups; it 
just then can’t be quite so selfish.
 But, of course, since play is fundamentally selfish, this makes the group 
play context, particularly the PUG context, ripe for manipulation and sub-
version by individual players. For instance, sophisticated CoH/V players use 
PUG mechanisms for their own individual goals, regardless of the effect this 
has on other members of the group. This is most evident in CoH/V power-
leveling techniques and the use and treatment of “fillers” at upper levels of 
play.
 During power leveling, a low-level character is placed within a high-level 
group solely in order for that low-level character to benefit from the strongly 
instrumental play of the high-level characters within the group. During the 
group play required by power leveling, group values and goals are clearly 
defined, with no room for individual play variation. Thus, this particular type 
of group play tends to strongly devalue individual play. This is most true of 
the character being power leveled, but it is also true of the characters doing 
the power leveling. The play of these advanced characters is so strongly 
instrumental and repetitive that the individual play experience becomes 
associated more closely with work than with play. As a consequence, anyone 
who wants to “play the game” and have “fun” either avoids power-leveling 
activities entirely or must be willing to delay that fun until some vague time 
in the future when all power leveling has been fully accomplished.
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 Because of peculiarities in the CoH/V code, it is also more efficient—
again, primarily for power-leveling purposes—to complete certain in-game 
tasks with a large PUG composed of characters whose “jobs” are simply to 
be a part of the group and do nothing whatsoever. These characters are com-
monly called “fillers.” Fillers, in fact, need serve only a brief and temporary 
function: they occupy slots in the PUG at the beginning of some in-game 
task and then quickly—and sometimes preferably—are dropped or “kicked” 
from the group.
 Beginning CoH/V players, of course, have little knowledge of such intri-
cacies of advanced play. Therefore, beginning CoH/V players often receive 
private invitations for group play from advanced players (“blind tells”), 
accept these invitations, and then are silently and unceremoniously kicked 
from their play group a short time later. From the beginning player’s point 
of view, this is no doubt rude and antisocial behavior. Seen within the larger 
context of an anti-aesthetic of play, however, this is simply the sort of thing 
that should be expected within a computer game design that imposes group 
play necessities on individual play sensibilities.
 In order to avoid these sorts of boorishly selfish play inside groups, new 
players eventually learn to avoid PUGs in favor of supergroups. Supergroups 
are collections of players known to each other, whose in-game behavior is 
therefore more predictable and trustworthy than that of members of an 
anonymous PUG.
 While task-oriented CoH/V play groups—such as PUGs—are limited to 
eight members, supergroups may have up to seventy-five members, who can 
then select among their fellows for help and participation in group-related 
in-game activities. Even with the average supergroup size being much less 
than the maximum of seventy-five, some very large supergroups flourished 
during Twixt’s four-year span inside CoH/V. But not for long.
 Supergroups tend to be unstable—and very susceptible to leader burn-
out. The more successful supergroups in CoH/V provide a predetermined 
context for group play, which, ideally, diminishes conflicts among individual 
players. Nevertheless, play within supergroups—regardless of the specifics 
of group composition—promotes different values than those associated with 
individual play. And in the case of CoH/V supergroups, there are number of 
specific obligations required of members that become increasingly restric-
tive to individual play.
 CoH/V supergroups, like all similar social groups within MMOs, establish 
a clearly marked hierarchy, with leaders, captains, lieutenants, and so forth. 
At the high end of this structure, leaders have the ability to invite members, 
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reject members, and promote members within their ranks. Leaders are also 
involved—often as a form of individual play—in establishing a set of rules 
guiding supergroup membership and play. These rules might be very rigid 
or very loose, but membership within supergroups is not given indiscrimi-
nately—and is frequently revoked if and when warranted.
 The rules of supergroups maintain a clear distinction between in-group 
and out-of-group behavior. Establishing common and (when necessary) con-
sensual group values forces supergroup members into a sometimes uneasy 
and uncomfortable compromise between strongly focused instrumental 
group play (e.g., power-leveling sessions) and a freer, less restrictive, and 
more enjoyable play outside the supergroup context entirely.
 For the majority of supergroup members, play within supergroups dis-
torts the natural inclination of play to distinguish between self and other. 
In place of this distinction, group play substitutes values determined and 
sustained outside the immediacy of individual play—for example, the values 
associated with “loot” and other in-game awards. This results in a distortion 
of the aesthetics and pleasures of individual play and, over time, a decrease 
in the enjoyment of that play—which, in turn, results in the instability and 
eventual dissolution of supergroups.
 Beyond PUGs and supergroups, there is the third type of social con-
text in CoH/V, the supra-group, which for a long time (somewhat strangely) 
proved both more fragile and more sustainable than either of the other two.
The Hamidon and the Supra-group
The culminate form of group play within CoH/V is the Hamidon raid, 
restricted to the game’s most advanced characters.
The Hamidon was once a zealous scientist named Hamidon Pasilima. Using 
hideous dark magic and his own genetic genius, he transformed himself into 
the god-like monster that would spawn the Devouring Earth and threaten 
the entire world. Time and again, hundreds of heroes from Paragon City 
have banded together to defeat the Hamidon whenever it arises.3
Defeating the Hamidon might be accomplished by a single large super-
group, but in accordance with the original game design (prior to issue 9, May 
2007), the raid was more often open to all advanced players. Defeating the 
Hamidon might require fifty or more superheroes, and on any given night, 
the raid might include as many as 200 players. This loose confederation of 
players, most of whom did not know each other and worked together only for 
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the couple of hours it took to defeat the Hamidon, was a sort of mega-PUG 
or, perhaps more descriptively, a supra-group.
 The supra-group supports group play values yet, concurrently, provides 
many opportunities for individual play. Unlike supergroups, for instance, the 
Hamidon supra-group formed solely on an ad hoc basis. And, as it turns out, 
the two fundamental and distinguishing characteristics of the supra-group—
its immediacy and its impermanence4—are much more conducive to indi-
vidual play than are the more rigid and rules-based contexts of supergroups.
 Social play within the Hamidon raid includes organizing the raid, form-
ing teams prior to the raid, and broadcasting instructions and guidelines 
during the course of the raid. A small minority of players conducts these 
activities; and this same cadre of players is likely to simultaneously hold lead-
ership positions within each server’s supergroups. For these players, then, 
the Hamidon raid is very similar to the socially based (but still individually 
motivated) play of leadership within supergroups.
 For the majority of players, however, a supra-group raid on the Hamidon 
is quite different from a supergroup mission task. Social ties and, correspond-
ingly, social rules are not so strong or so binding in the supra-group as in the 
supergroup. In fact, players are likely—as encouraged by raid leaders—to 
ignore supergroup affiliations and form more functional teams appropriate 
to the task of defeating the Hamidon. Without clearly defined social roles or 
allegiances, and with a number of different levels of participation available 
(from leader to kibitzer), many CoH/V players choose to join the Hamidon 
raid as individuals and play solo, while, in effect, playing in unison with many 
other individual players doing likewise: they play alone together.
 Of course, in this large supra-group context, as within PUGs, the ano-
nymity of its members and the looseness of social rules offer many opportu-
nities for individual players to manipulate and subvert group goals. However, 
because the Hamidon encounter is a temporary (and eternally renewable) 
in-game task with little meaningful consequences (other than the loot the 
Hamidon drops), griefing and other sorts of “bad” play are, by CoH/V stan-
dards, endured much more cheerfully during Hamidon raids than at any 
other time. One significant contributing factor to such magnanimousness, no 
doubt, is the relative inability of individual grief play to have much impact on 
the concerted efforts of such a large group of players. Indeed, the good and 
tolerating nature of the supra-group arises largely from its invulnerability to 
individual variations in play. Probably for that reason alone, the Hamidon 
raid was, for a long time, one of the more popular and widely attended group 
activities on all CoH/V servers. Then the rules—the game code—changed.
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 In May 2007, with the introduction of issue 9, the CoH/V game code 
changed the Hamidon encounter from an activity requiring the loose coop-
eration of hundreds of superheroes to a much more tightly structured activ-
ity requiring the close cooperation of many fewer superheroes. Immediately, 
the popularity of the event plummeted.
 After May 2007, although the same in-game awards (loot) were available 
after defeating the Hamidon, players no longer came together on a regular 
basis to do the deed. With a drastic drop in attendance on all CoH/V servers, 
Hamidon raids became correspondingly less central in CoH/V game discus-
sion and lore. Why, then, the change? Based on designer comments, the 
Hamidon code was changed to avoid the ease with which individual players 
could annoy (though, again, without much effect) the Hamidon supra-group 
mass—and, simultaneously, to increase the event’s “challenge.”
We wanted to address as many of the common complaints as we could, and 
also wanted Hamidon raids to be much more dynamic and require a lot more 
coordination. The Hamidon should represent the pinnacle challenge in the 
game. We’ve designed the Hamidon raid around one general strategy, but 
there should be many different ways to accomplish it. We want everyone 
involved in a Hamidon raid to be fully participating and not on auto-pilot, 
following another player around with a power on auto-cast.5
 Certainly, “challenge” is an important component of computer game 
design and play.6 But while the notion of “challenge” is rather straight-
forward in single-player computer games, it can be a trickier concept in 
MMOs. “Challenge,” like most aesthetically pleasing characteristics of play, 
originates in regards to individual play. Thus, for example, while leaders of 
CoH/V supergroups face significant challenges—as individuals—in creating 
and maintaining their groups over time, the rank-and-file members of those 
groups face significantly fewer challenges (and, in fact, commonly seek and 
enjoy supergroup play precisely for that reason: it’s easier).
 Many challenging aspects of the original CoH/V Hamidon encounter 
involved individual play: building a proper character, placing that character in 
the proper position, or simply pushing the proper buttons at the proper time. 
None of these tasks were overly difficult, but all were required to be per-
formed by a large number of players in, more or less, unison. Subsequently, 
in the issue 9 version, all these “challenges” remained identical in form but 
became much less individual in orientation. The old version of the Hamidon 
encounter allowed players to work together (and, yes, sometimes apart and 
CIty of Heroes  143
at odds) to achieve a common goal while maintaining a sense of self. The new 
version forced players to relinquish that same sense of self in order to defeat 
the Hamidon. Attendance, enjoyment, and the anti-aesthetic of play all suf-
fered as a result.
 Admittedly, however, in CoH/V—and, indeed, in all MMOs, because of 
the complexity of their code and their play—there are some doubts as to 
whether forcing CoH/V players to obey social play restrictions ruined the 
pleasures of the original CoH/V Hamidon encounter. At about the same 
time, for instance, the Hamidon loot was drastically devalued. And the 
Hamidon encounter had been around for some time by May 2007, render-
ing it increasingly less novel for advanced CoH/V players. So, although the 
ruination of the Hamidon encounter is fairly well documented, and although 
that ruination can be reasonably attributed to a failure of the game design to 
adhere to an individually oriented anti-aesthetic of play, that ruination might 
reasonably be attributed to other factors as well.
 In the next chapter, I (actually, Twixt) put these accusations of a pre-
dictable and repressive function of structured social play to more thorough 
scrutiny and analysis. What happens, for instance, when the social rules sup-
porting group play and the game code supporting individual play are in con-
flict? In such a circumstance, do game players prefer the play of the social, 
or do they prefer instead the rules of the game? Who wins and who loses 




Play and Punishment 
I do not like thee, Doctor Fell.
 —Thomas Brown, extempore (ca. 1680) 
In 1967, Harold Garfinkel published Studies in Ethnomethodology, in which 
he presented and popularized “Garfinkeling” as a means of documenting 
the methods by which individuals create and sustain social order. Professor 
Garfinkel and his students performed a series of “breaching experiments” 
in which conventional social orders were interrupted; the consequences of 
those breachings were then examined in order to investigate the mechanisms 
by which social order was reconstituted.
 The goal of the original Garfinkeling studies was to investigate assump-
tions in prevailing sociological theory—for example, functionalism1—that 
maintained social groups operated according to universal laws and norms. 
These laws were based on, by and large, individual and rational decision 
making.2
 In contrast, Garfinkel found social decision making more immediate, 
interactive, and, importantly, fragile in its constitution and adoption of social 
rules. These social rules were then “rational” only to the extent that they 
were subsequently examined in the context of scientific inquiry.
Scientific rationalities, in fact, occur as stable properties of actions and as 
sanctionable ideals only in the case of actions governed by the attitude of 
scientific theorizing. By contrast, actions governed by the attitude of daily 
life are marked by the specific absence of these rationalities either as stable 
properties or as sanctionable ideals.3
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 The branch of sociology that Garfinkel came to be associated with, eth-
nomethodology, was founded on this realization: that social law cannot be 
verified in any real or objective sense either by members of the social order 
or, equally important, by the scientists who attempt to study and confirm that 
social order. Professor Garfinkel concluded, in fact, that social order was not 
reconstituted with the aid of but, rather, in the absence of an objective social 
law. Subsequently, ethnomethodologists have found a great deal of diversity 
in social order, which is therein considered more indicative of social agency—
or “contingency”—than rationality. And this assumption is now a basic tenet 
of cultural studies of computer games—particularly online MMOs.
 Like Garfinkel some forty years ago, contemporary ethnomethodologies 
of MMOs have found a great deal of diversity in online social play. Yet in 
all the MMOs under scrutiny, there is a single and objective game code. 
And this game code, with the aid of an equally singular and objective game 
interface, establishes a common context for online play, without regard to 
subsequent intervention by either individuals or groups.
 How, then, does social order function inside a virtual MMO, where law 
and order (interface and code) are more easily—and more objectively—
verified than in the real-world settings of Garfinkel’s original studies? What 
happens when social rules of convention come into conflict with game rules 
of code? During the latter part of 2007 and early 2008, playing Twixt inside 
CoH/V, I found out.
 While Garfinkeling normally requires some sort of explicit social rules-
breaking process, a similar Garfinkeling procedure might be accomplished 
within MMOs simply by adhering to the rules and spirit of the game—or the 
letter of the law, as it were—in those circumstances where MMO PvP game 
rules are verifiably distinct from the in-game social orders and etiquettes of 
more cooperative play.
twixt: the reluctant ethnomethodologist
In the latter half of 2006, issue 7 of CoH/V introduced a dedicated PvP zone 
designed for battle among the game’s most advanced characters (levels 40 
to 50), with heroes opposing villains in attempting to capture six of seven 
“pillboxes.”
Recluse’s Victory (Levels 40–50, PvP, COV and COH)—Recluse’s Victory 
represents the villains’ assault on Paragon City™. Heroes and villains battle 
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for control points, use heavy artillery to their advantage, and watch the zone 
change dynamically as a result of their efforts . . .
 The main Goal of Recluse’s Victory is to secure the Temporal Anchors, 
aka the pillboxes. Pillboxes are cross-shaped platforms with a central open-
topped control area, with a turret on each of the 4 arms. In their neutral 
state, pillboxes boast a defense system of 4 boss ball turrets with amazing 
range, accuracy and firepower. In order to take over a pillbox all 4 turrets 
must be destroyed, which will enable the holographic control system to be 
clicked on. Once clicked on (a 5 second timer, interruptible) the temporal 
anchor will be set to your side, and the Pillbox and surroundings will change 
to either Hero or Villain under your feet. Remember that everyone knows 
what you just did, so expect company.4
 At the time Recluse’s Victory (RV) was introduced, my primary character, 
Twixt—a superhero “scrapper” in the game’s archetypal scheme—was well 
known and well situated within the CoH/V community. After RV and other 
PvP components were introduced to CoH/V, it became increasingly evident 
that these newly competitive play elements opposed and, in the opposition, 
revealed the game’s cooperative play norms. In a sense, by introducing PvP 
competition, the designers of CoH/V had Garfinkeled their game. I further 
explored this with Twixt.
 Whenever Twixt was inside the RV zone, he played to win the zone—that 
is, Twixt abided entirely by the objective rules of the PvP game, as set forth 
and confirmed by the CoH/V game developers and moderators, without ref-
erence to or concern with any social rules of conduct established by CoH/V 
players outside the PvP game context.5 At first, my interest was solely in 
adapting and perfecting Twixt’s play to accomplish the PvP game goals. I did 
not expect anything like the severity—or the ferocity—of what occurred as a 
result.
garfinkeling in CoH/V
Player populations in CoH/V are divided across eleven U.S. servers, with 
a roughly equal number of players on each. Twixt originally played on the 
Champion server, one of several U.S. West Coast servers, with a mid-range 
population of players. After observing reactions to Twixt’s behavior in RV on 
the Champion server over the course of several months, I created a simi-
lar Twixt character on the Infinity server, with similar results. Finally, after 
NCsoft instituted inter-server character transfers in late 2007, I transferred 
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Twixt to the game’s most populous U.S. East Coast server, Freedom, and 
again repeated Twixt’s single-minded, win-the-zone-at-all-costs competitive 
play inside Recluse’s Victory. On each server, reactions to Twixt’s play were 
strong, persistent over time, and, given small variations, extremely consis-
tent.
 While Twixt engaged in many activities inside RV that were deemed 
objectionable by portions of the CoH/V community, one in particular drew 
player wrath. The most notorious Twixt play involved teleport-related PvP 
tactics within RV: “droning” and, closely related, teleporting opponents into 
non-player characters (NPCs).
 Since RV is a two-faction (heroes vs. villains) implementation of the game, 
there are safe areas within the RV zone where heroes and villains can enter 
and leave the zone without fear of being attacked. Protecting these safe areas 
(“bases”) are security drones, which, without recourse, vaporize members 
of the opposing faction and transport them back to their own base on the 
opposite side of the zone map. There is no game-imposed penalty for getting 
droned, nor is any reward given to a player whose opponent gets droned.
 Twixt—and all characters in CoH/V—have access to (should they choose 
it) a “teleport-foe” power, which allows the character to transport an oppo-
nent (within some limited range) next to them. If the teleporting character 
is standing by a group of friendly non-player characters and transports an 
opponent to that spot, then the opponent is attacked by the NPCs. If the 
teleporting character is standing by a drone and transports an opponent to 
that spot, then that opponent gets “droned” and vaporized.
 According to player custom and according to a long series of discussions 
on the CoH/V public online forums, droning and teleporting into NPCs were 
forbidden. But from Twixt’s oppositional point of view, droning and other 
sorts of aggressive teleporting were quite useful to delay or otherwise thwart 
villain intentions, particularly in cases where the villain contingent outnum-
bered hero players within the zone. Therefore, Twixt used the teleport-foe 
tactic whenever necessary and available; and this single tactic, though not 
the only effective characteristic of his play, came to be considered his most 
severe breach of etiquette.
 As a result of his teleporting tactics, Twixt was often “petitioned” by oppo-
nents with the intention of having him banned from the game. The game’s 
petition process offered a useful mechanism for determining what was and 
was not an enforceable rule of the game versus merely a player-imposed rule 
of conduct. Using obscene language in the game’s broadcast channels, for 
instance, was clearly against the game’s end-user license agreement (EULA) 
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and was both a petitionable and actionable offense, regardless of any individ-
ual player’s desires or preferences. Droning, on the other hand, was equally 
clearly an acceptable tactic, as determined by the game design and as con-
firmed by the lack of moderator intervention on any petitioner’s behalf.
 Nevertheless, droning remained widely (though not unanimously) deni-
grated as a “skill-less” tactic, ruining otherwise “fun” battles. In these valua-
tions, one group of players (e.g., those without the teleport-foe power) were 
able to avoid being subject to (and thus having to defend against) the actions 
of another group of players, giving them significant competitive advantages 
within the zone. In fact, teleporting of all sorts decreased as a result of the 
negative social pressures exerted against droning. Twixt’s particular set of pow-
ers (or “basic characteristics,” in my earlier terms), which depended, in several 
different ways, on variations of the teleportation power, proved quite effective 
in RV yet remained heavily criticized and largely unused by other players.
 While rigidly competitive PvP tactics6 marked Twixt’s play from the play 
of most others within RV, there were some other players who, after observing 
Twixt’s success in the zone, copied his tactics and attitude.7 But this copycat 
play normally had the support of some larger social group that also opposed, 
for various reasons, cooperative play in a competitive game context. Twixt 
was the only character observed through a yearlong period of play within RV 
who sustained his play without any accompanying social support.
consequences of the code 
Prior to Twixt’s competitive play in RV, his character had several, multi-
year relationships with other CoH/V players; these relationships were, by 
and large, respectful, congenial, and enjoyable. Twixt had been invited and 
accepted into several supergroups during his career in the game, which waxed 
and waned with the coming and going of game players and game issues. At 
the time of Twixt’s play in RV, his closest social affiliation was with members 
of a supergroup that was one of the higher rated (i.e., more accomplished) 
supergroups on the Champion server.
 Initially, Twixt’s success in disrupting villain activity in RV was admired, 
though somewhat begrudgingly, by his online friends and acquaintances, 
who, when circumstances permitted, fought villains alongside him. A factor 
that probably helped Twixt’s early treatment in this regard was that as soon 
as his tactics became obvious, his actions became widely publicized on the 
game’s public forums and, as a result, increasingly notorious. After trying 
and failing to convince Twixt to play “properly” in the broadcast channels 
Play and Punishment  149
available within RV, disgruntled players quickly took their pleas to the game’s 
moderators (through petitions) and then, equally quickly, to the larger com-
munity of CoH/V players. As a result, Twixt became well known to friends 
and foes alike, and this minor level of celebrity was partially shared by those 
who associated with him.
 The public messages that reacted negatively to Twixt’s behavior dur-
ing his initial period of play on each server were very similar. The following 
message, one of the more articulate (and less obscene), appeared soon after 
Twixt had moved to the Freedom server.8
 Fri Jan 04 2008
ok seriously . . . where did this person come from. I know tp foe’ing into mobs 
is considered “legal” but this person is really getting out of hand. I can deal 
with his droning no problem, but now he’s resorted to tp’ing into turrets and 
letting you get killed seriously . . . is there anything you can do about this 
particular individual. i mean it’s pretty bad when his own faction hates him, 
but this guy has got to go.
 As time went on and reprimands such as these had little effect, messages 
increasingly turned to various sorts of name-calling.
 Sat Jan 05 2008
awww twixt, had a go at him teh other day in rv after i couldnt take my team 
bein tp foe’d into a drone anymore, we all agreed he is a n00b LOL
 Sat Jan 05 2008
tp into mobs is a joke, into turrets can suck if your not ready, into heavies is 
game over, and into drones is just being a poor little loser.
 Messages left in the game’s synchronous, live chat channels were more 
direct and explicit.
 01-12-2007 [Broadcast] twixt is a tool
 *
 01-12-2007 [Broadcast] twixt is a jerk, get used to it
 *
 01-12-2007 [Broadcast] twixt is a pussy lawl
 *
 04-12-2007 [Arena] FYI twist is a fucking idiot
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 These messages promoted a rationale for Twixt’s play in which he was 
either too ignorant (“retarded”), too young (a “noob”), or too mean (a 
“griefer”) to understand or obey the social norms of cooperative play. Oc-
casionally—but only occasionally—Twixt’s play elicited support from other 
players or, equally infrequently, consideration of the broader game context 
that allowed Twixt’s play to be, in the context of the PvP game inside RV, 
very successful.
 12-13-2007 [Broadcast] I like twixt
 12-13-2007 [Broadcast] lol
 12-13-2007 [Broadcast] no i do its funny how he pisses all of u off
 *
 01-09-2008 [Broadcast] . . . honestly twist is an obvi skilled player he 
just uses his skills in the wrong way lol
 Thu Aug 09 2007
People dont like the way Twixt pvp’s, some, including me thinks he is cowardly 
in his style. However, why make a big deal about someone doing something 
in a zone that is specifically designed for players to defeat other players?
 One of the more common and consistent characterizations of Twixt 
involved denigrating his success within the zone as being accomplished with-
out “skill.”
 05-06-2007 [Broadcast] YA he has to make up for the lack of skill with 
cheep tackics
 *
 05-06-2007 [Broadcast] youhavtea to be lowest skilled pvper in game
 *
 05-06-2007 [Broadcast] you have no skill
 *
 12-23-2007 [Broadcast] you have no build, just tpfoe, nem staff, and 
lazer beam eyes
 The inability of Twixt’s opponents to acknowledge his success in zone 
play was no doubt motivated in some part by having entirely different, more 
socially oriented game goals. However, the degree to which villain messages 
and in-game claims distorted and transformed Twixt’s play was drastic. For 
instance, Twixt was able to win the zone (capture six pillboxes for the heroes) 
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literally hundreds of times during his yearlong period of play on three dif-
ferent servers. Twixt’s opponents during this same period may have won the 
zone, in total, less than twenty times. Twixt was normally able to defeat, on 
average, ten to twenty villains a night, while villains seldom defeated (“killed”) 
him more than once or twice during the same period of play—or, more often, 
didn’t kill him at all.
 Rather than acknowledge these successes, Twixt’s opponents refused to 
admit them. Whenever Twixt pointed to the objective results of his play, 
he was ridiculed and ignored. At one point, for instance, toward the end of 
play on the Freedom server, Twixt posted verbatim transcripts of the game’s 
online combat log as a confirming account of what had occurred during RV 
play. This posting drew severe criticism—most harshly from those players 
listed in the log as defeated by Twixt: several denied their defeats outright; 
others attributed their defeats to more devious or pitiable causes (including a 
rather long and detailed post drawing parallels between Twixt’s behavior and 
Asperger’s syndrome).
 Much of this critical reaction to Twixt’s play can be considered a sort of 
play itself. And, indeed, most of the responses to Twixt’s play can be inter-
preted as a form of trash talk, common in competitive sports. However, there 
were several incidents that forced a re-evaluation of the context and the seri-
ousness of player reactions to Twixt. The first of these was the rather sudden 
and unexpected expulsion of Twixt from his Champion-based supergroup.
 The event that marked the beginning of Twixt’s forced isolation from the 
Champion community occurred about three months after Twixt had begun 
using competitive tactics inside RV. After droning one of the more respected 
members of his supergroup (playing as a villain), Twixt received this curt, 
private communication from the group’s leader:
 03-21-2007 22:32:25 [Tell] you’re banned you really pissed him off
 03-21-2007 22:33:05 [Tell] Twixt —> hoho, sorry
 03-21-2007 22:35:43 [Tell] yea real bad too twixt, he doens’t care about 
the mob or the debt the drones is bs
 And that was it. The subsequent lack of reconciliation from any of Twixt’s 
previous longtime acquaintances within the supergroup seemed to indicate 
a culmination of that group’s increasingly hostile and previously repressed 
feelings toward Twixt and his play.
 There were also—during Twixt’s early play in RV—some messages with 
more serious tones and emphases.
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 10-09-2006 [Broadcast] leave me alone you FUCKING CUNT
 10-09-2006 [Broadcast] i swear if i ever meet you i will physically kill you 
for real
 Throughout the duration of his competitive play inside Recluse’s Victory, 
Twixt endured threats of computer sabotage, real-life violence, and a variety 
of less speculative (and more achievable) in-game harassments and abuses. 
This pattern of escalating feelings and emotions was repeated very similarly 
on each of the three servers Twixt visited. Because of the intensity of these 
private messages and because of his opponents’ frequent supra-game tac-
tics of unmercifully spamming Twixt’s private message channels, it was often 
necessary for Twixt to turn off the game’s communications functions entirely. 
This then effectively prevented me, as a player, from re-establishing social 
communications with other players, whether or not I wished to do so.
 During the period in which Twixt moved from the Champion server to 
the Infinity server and, eventually, to the Freedom server, his notoriety as 
a player increased, and the negative reactions to his play were increasingly 
justified and reinforced through stereotypical (and false) characterizations of 
that play. These characterizations were repeated in lengthy public forum dis-
cussions in which Twixt as a game player—and as a person—was denigrated 
and marginalized.
 Surprisingly, considering Twixt’s single-minded behavior within RV, few 
of these discussions, whether in public or private, acknowledged Twixt’s 
allegiance to the rules of the PvP game. In the beginning, Twixt played by 
these rules largely in silence; as time went by, I became increasingly verbal 
in an attempt to explain Twixt’s goals and motivations. Without exception, 
however, the rules of the game, while not alien to Twixt’s opponents, were 
deemed irrelevant in judging Twixt’s play.
 05-28-2007 [Broadcast] Twixt: so why ignore the rules of the game
 05-28-2007 [Broadcast] Get your head out of your ass
 05-28-2007 [Broadcast] There are no rules Twixt
 * 
 02-24-2008 [Broadcast] Twixt: well, actually, i have been quite verbal-
here on freedom attempting to explain . . .
 02-24-2008 [Broadcast] we don’t care
 02-24-2008 [Broadcast] stfu
 One of the least confrontational and, correspondingly, most informative 
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messages summarizing the attitudes other players adopted toward Twixt’s 
play was this one, submitted late in Twixt’s career:
 Thu Mar 06 2008
. . . Twixt seems totally unable to comprehend other players as real people, 
and plays his own solipsistic game deliberately making others miserable.
. . . From his posts and RV broadcasts/actions, it’s very clear that there really 
is something wrong with him that shouldn’t be made fun of or laughed about. 
He writes in the exact same way as my paranoid schizophrenic uncle, going 
on and on about everything solely from his point of view, as if he is talking to 
himself while peppering his paragraphs with consistent typos and unecessar-
ily long words.
 His motive has remained unchanged ever since Issue 7—he plays this 
game because he believes it is his sole (and very serious) responsibility to 
maintain Hero supremacy in RV. He fights to win the zone and ruin every 
villains’ day. It’s almost like he’s an NPC, and if you consider him in that light 
everything makes a lot more sense.
 I truly believe he simply does not understand the feelings that lay behind 
people shouting and screaming at him in RV, and just continues to soldier on 
with his mission, wondering why the other Heroes aren’t helping him rid RV 
of the bad guys with a sincerity that can almost make you sympathise with 
him.
 Eventually, because of the recalcitrance of Twixt’s opponents, it became 
increasingly difficult to interpret the social rules, orders, and behaviors asso-
ciated with cooperative play—particularly cooperative play apart from and in 
opposition to any attempt to achieve PvP game goals—as anything other than 
a means of repressing individual play and players such as Twixt. From Twixt’s 
point of view, playing by the rules of the game, winning the RV zone com-
petitions, only increased the obstacles he faced and the insults he received. 
In fact, after Twixt had become sufficiently well known, the consensual goal 
within RV was, for extended periods of play, simply to “kill” Twixt.
 02-24-2007 [Broadcast] before i di ei jsut wanna kill twixt atleast once
 *
 03-21-2007 [Broadcast] Kill twixt for me please
 *
 05-26-2007 [Broadcast] Kill Twixt once for me, dudesl. I’d have helped 
you but . . . well, you know.
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 *
 11-19-2007 [Broadcast] any other heros want confuse>? to kill twixt lol
 *
 02-23-2008 [Broadcast] u guys shld kill twixt
 *
 02-03-2008 [Broadcast] kill twixt for me!
 *
 03-02-2008 [Broadcast] please do kill Twixt
 Established player groups within RV were also quick to communicate 
their opinions of Twixt to other players. These communications bordered on 
coercion, applying the same tactics against potential Twixt allies as against 
Twixt himself: ridicule and the threat (or actuality) of social ostracism.
 04-29-2007 [Broadcast] why you helping twixt for by the way ?
 *
 06-15-2007 [Broadcast] lol someone actually helping twixt
 *
 08-14-2007 [Broadcast] i hope you aren’t helping twixt
 08-14-2007 [Broadcast] nope . . . im not
 These social pressures had strong effects on competitive play within RV. 
Players who played similarly to Twixt (e.g., those who made frequent use 
of the teleportation power) became subject to the same harsh treatment 
as Twixt. As a result, these players either altered their behavior or left RV 
entirely. This diminished the number and variety of characters and strategies 
players used within RV and, correspondingly, diminished the opportunity 
and likelihood of either new toons or tactics emerging to challenge those of 
the zone’s more dominant and vocal players.
social play and repression
There is a great deal of literature on the nature and treatment of deviant 
behavior (Goode 2008). Equally relevant here, however, are those studies 
in cultural psychology noting similarities among how members of a domi-
nant culture represent non-members. These representations use precisely 
the same tactics—predominantly inferences of inferiority (immaturity, 
ignorance)—that were used in CoH/V to label and typecast Twixt. A well-
known example in this regard (as noted in Cole 1996) are those charac-
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teristics nineteenth-century Europeans attached to the native cultures of 
their foreign conquests: for example, “an inability to control the emotions, 
animistic thinking, [and an] inability to reason out cause or plan for the 
future.”9
 Lending some potential credibility to these characterizations has been 
the ambiguity of the relationship between claims of a particular culture’s 
superiority (by members of that culture) and the “evidence” used to vali-
date those claims. That is, success on the battlefield or in the marketplace 
(or, equally, in a game) might depend on a great number of variables, many 
beyond human control and understanding. Nevertheless, these isolated and 
random outcomes are then taken as indications of a particular culture’s intel-
lectual or moral superiority—without any accompanying or subsequent tests 
of verification. Admittedly, such tests would, under normal conditions, be dif-
ficult, if not impossible, to conduct, let alone replicate. However, it is largely 
for this reason—the inability to verify claims of one culture in opposition to 
those of some other culture—that social constructivists have recommended 
abandoning the more essentialist assumptions of functionalism and instead 
focusing on those methodologies by which individuals come to accept or 
reject their otherwise empirically arbitrary and objectively indeterminable 
social status (e.g., labeling theory).10
 Similarly, many studies of deviant behavior have assumed that the same 
social structures that react to and condemn deviant behaviors are those struc-
tures in which those behaviors originate and are best understood. These, too, 
are fundamentally constructivist assumptions implying a relative notion of 
deviance, in which deviant behavior is not necessarily a violation of anything 
absolute or essential.
 Within CoH/V and other similar, socially oriented role-playing games, 
however, there are embedded rules for game play and in-game behavior 
determined entirely by the game code and interface; these rules exist prior 
to and apart from the many, varied, and sometimes contradictory social rules 
that later emerge among players. Twixt’s behavior within RV, for instance, 
was purposefully governed and guided by the rules of the RV game; and 
most players’ negative and critical reactions to Twixt’s play were peripheral 
to and, in many cases, contrary to those same rules. In this sense—that is, in 
the reification of game rules as “natural” laws—Twixt’s play was non-deviant, 
conforming to an absolute and essential set of values. In a similar sense, 
negative and critical reactions to Twixt’s play can be seen as non-conforming 
and “deviant” in prioritizing a limited set of players’ interests and concerns.
 Garfinkel’s original breaching experiments—and more-recent ethno-
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methodological accounts of online societies11—have often focused on how 
individuals in unfamiliar social contexts learn, negotiate, or are taught pre-
vailing social norms; they have focused less often on what those social norms 
actually are. In the context of CoH/V, since Twixt’s competitive play refer-
enced explicit game rules as set forth by the game designers, there is a rela-
tive lack of ambiguity in making this determination.
 In real-world environments, “natural” laws governing social relationships, 
if they exist at all, are part of the same social system in which they operate 
and, for that reason, are difficult to isolate, measure, and confirm. In Twixt’s 
case, however, two unique sets of rules—one governing the game system, 
one governing the game “society”—offered an opportunity to observe how 
social rules adapt to system rules (or, more speculatively, how social laws 
might reproduce natural laws). And the clearest answer, based on Twixt’s 
experience, is that they don’t. Rather, if game rules suddenly pose some 
threat to existing social order, those game rules are simply ignored. And fur-
ther, if some player—like Twixt—decides to explore those rules fully, then 
that player is shunned, silenced, and, if at all possible, expelled.
 As a simulation of real-world society, virtual societies within online games 
suffer due to the bound and predetermined nature of their system rules. 
However, as a platform for investigating the degree to which social orders 
are capable of revealing and unraveling broader system rules, online games 
such as CoH/V indicate that socially oriented and strictly cooperative group 
play, as a whole, is much more repressive and much less capable of exploring 
system potentials than is individual, idiosyncratic, oppositional, and competi-
tive play.12
 Indeed, the strong, negative, and emotional reactions to Twixt’s play were 
almost always focused on preserving beneficent social communities and 
friendships in blatant disregard of game rules. The most important negative 
consequence of Twixt’s behavior in the eyes of other players, then, was not 
his failure to achieve game goals—Twixt’s opponents “failed” this test more 
often than he did—but his failure to garner and sustain social connections: 
the most repellant consequence of Twixt playing to win was that it made him 
disliked.
 04-12-2007 [Broadcast] Everybody hates Twixt, huh?
 *
 12-23-2007 [Broadcast] yea he is hated by a few servers . . .
 *
 01-22-2008 [Broadcast] just proves how much everyone hates twixt =D
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 *
 02-15-2008 [Broadcast] you know, the guy even the heroes hate
 *
 03-15-2008 [Broadcast] Twixt be quiet, every villain i know hates u even 
tho im a hero
 Remaining likable—socially connected—within the CoH/V community 
meant playing the game according to values other than those made explicit 
by code and interface. Players could only learn these values—much like 
those affecting social activities in the real world—by becoming (or already 
being) a member of the game’s entrenched social order.
the lessons of twixt
The most surprising result of Twixt’s play within RV was not merely the 
severity of the negative reactions to his play, but the degree to which game 
rules played such an insignificant role in those reactions. That is, a significant 
part of the social order within CoH/V seemed to operate quite independently 
of game rules and almost solely for the sake of its own preservation. It did 
not seem within the purview of social orders and ordering within CoH/V to 
recognize (much less nurture) any sort of rationality—or, for that matter, any 
other supra-social mechanism that might have adjudicated Twixt’s play on 
the basis of its ability to provide, over time, greater knowledge of the game 
system or, in a broader sense, what Sutton-Smith (2001) calls “the potentia-
tion of adaptive variability.”13
 The CoH/V online society had a decidedly chilling effect on this vari-
ability function. Given the adaptive value of individual play in exploring and 
revealing system characteristics, the social pressures against this sort of play 
in CoH/V seem drastically and overly harsh, even unnatural. If either natu-
ral or system laws governing social order in the real world are in any way 
analogous to the game rules of the CoH/V virtual world, we might conclude 
that social orders in general are more likely to deny than reveal these laws. It 
is only through so-called aberrations or “deviant” behavior—in Twixt’s case, 
through what might be regarded as “breaching” (or “bad”) play—that system 
rules, mechanics, and laws can be made most evident and applied most indis-






Computer game play employs an anti or oppositional cognitive function that, 
in its recursive application, forms contexts of values within which subsequent 
play, subsequent opposition, subsequent contextualization, and subsequent 
valuation take place. Computer game play is most fundamentally an individual 
activity. This individual activity may—and frequently does—occur in social 
contexts, but in those social contexts, individual play is typically restricted 
and repressed in order to conform to and sustain social order. Further, the 
cognitive functions of play are universal and common in form; these formal 
properties of play are then closely related to the manipulation of signs and 
symbols in other contexts: human semiosis.
 If we assume that opposition, contextualization, and recursion are, in 
their general application, common within computer game design and struc-
ture, and if we further assume that these functions are indicative of analogous 
functions in human cognition, then we can, without detailing the precise bio-
logical mechanisms of these functions, make some general comments con-
cerning the consequences of their application during computer game play.
 Computer games are meaning-making machines that, during repeated 
and recursive play, devalue real-world values of signs and symbols and, dur-
ing that process, substitute values more relevant to the structure of the game 
system and, most particularly, more relevant to the identification and con-
struction of the most desired game objects. Simulations intended to model 
the real world do so by creating game signs and symbols that have similar 
uses—and, thus, similar values—to their real-world referents. But games 
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and game play are not, in most cases, either most appealing or most success-
ful when game object values are determined, as they are in simulations, by 
something other than the process of play itself.
 Human players appear most comfortable and most proficient during play 
with game systems homologous to human cognitive architectures. These 
innate architectures are not always consistent with the real-world environ-
ments in which they have evolved. The real world, for instance, is almost cer-
tainly more complex than human cognition assumes. Correspondingly, game 
designs are, in general, more likely to reflect a level of structural complexity 
more compatible with human sensibilities than with a more objectively real-
ized natural world.
 Yet, despite game designs being practically bound by some upper limit 
of human cognition, the play process is quite capable of generating, within 
these bounds, a large variety of values and meanings. Through successive 
contextualizations—recontextualization and supra-contextualization—these 
values and meanings can extend beyond their in-game uses and, in some 
cases, challenge and replace real-world values and meanings. This poten-
tial is increasingly likely when the real-world values of signs and symbols 
are mediated by the same technological interfaces and affordances as those 
found within computer games.
 Human cognitive architectures require an embodiment of form. 
Likewise, computer games require an embodiment of play. Computer games 
are conventionally accessed through a ubiquitous controller, which requires 
the habituation of player response. This habituation process embodies the 
computer game aesthetic experience prior to player engagement with those 
semiotic properties (the values and meanings of game objects) that subse-
quently emerge during play.
 The habituation required by computer games is at least partially in paral-
lel with the tenets of a formalist model of literature in which “literariness” 
is assigned a fundamentally dehabituation function. Through the dehabitua-
tion function of poetic language, the conventions—the illusions—of natural 
language are revealed and, in that realization, reference a more immediate, 
pre-linguistic experience.
 Yet, while natural language and the mechanical necessities of computer 
game play (its interface) evoke similar habituations, computer game play has 
no parallel to the dehabituation function of poetic language. On the contrary, 
computer game play, because it is accessed solely through its own physical 
mechanic, tends to embody and affirm its own conventions and illusions. 
Therein, the aesthetic experience of the computer game becomes a self-ref-
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erencing and self-contained meaning-making process that cannot easily (if 
at all) stand in opposition, as poetic language can, to some other, preexisting 
experiential mode.
 All language, including poetic language, is ultimately grounded in 
T. S. Eliot’s notion of an “objective correlative,” which situates that language 
within an intractable external reality. Computer game play, however, func-
tions not in opposition to its real-world referents and values but in substi-
tution for them. Computer game structures reflect our natural senses and 
those cognitive properties that interpret and value the natural senses, and 
this reflection is, once engaged, trapped within its embodiment. During 
computer game play, the narcissistic reflection of self becomes our source 
of aesthetic pleasure and the root of our subsequent seduction; and therein, 
for better or worse, computer game play becomes a visceral confirmation of 
the virtual.
 In the closed system of fictional worlds, we are familiar with the will-
ing suspension of disbelief. In the closed system of virtual worlds, that sus-
pension of disbelief is replaced by active reinforcement of false experience, 
resulting in little to no distinction between what players want and what 
players believe. This is not a novel notion in new media aesthetics. Neil 
Postman (1986) calls this phenomenon “amusing ourselves to death”; Jean 
Baudrillaud (1988) describes it as an endless precession of simulacra, an age 
of the hyper-real, wherein there is no longer any necessity to reference a 
natural world; Katherine Hayles (1999) speaks of new media “disembodi-
ment” and a “cyborg ideology”; and so forth.
 The peculiar and self-aggrandizing anti-aesthetic of the computer game 
becomes very apparent in how natural laws fare when placed in opposition 
to game rules. During computer game play, virtually without exception, the 
natural laws of physics are ignored and reconstituted to better suit the laws 
of the psychophysical: the perceptions and expectations of game players.
 This is evident in the distortion of the laws of gravity and momentum in 
arcade games—including Spacewar, one of the earliest video game designs.1 
Likewise, natural laws of probability are transformed to more appealingly 
reflect individual player sensibilities. This can be observed in the imple-
mentation of “hot-hand” algorithms in sports games—including the overly 
influential variable of a football team’s “form” in Football Manager (Sports 
Interactive), Hattrick (Hattrick Ltd.), and elsewhere—and in the CoH/V 
“streak-breaker” code, which conforms to widely held but nevertheless 
incorrect human assumptions about the nature and distribution of random 
sequences.
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The streak-breaker code breaks only miss streaks, and it breaks them for 
both heroes and villains. Who wants to have their hit streak broken?2
 That is, if either a CoH/V hero or villain misses striking an NPC opponent 
more often than human perception deems feasible or proper, then that miss 
streak is broken by the CoH/V game code. The hero or villain is given an 
automatic hit, which, over time and many heroes and many villains, results 
in an improbable change in the natural laws of probability. These new and 
revised psychophysical laws of probability then affect player experiences 
with and expectations concerning the natural laws of probability. What is a 
genuine anomaly between human perception of random sequences and the 
reality of random sequences becomes a more fun and easy-to-get-along-with 
confirmation of human expectations of random sequences within the com-
puter game.
 Fortunately, in the natural world, the playful affirmation of the psy-
chophysical is both a source of self-centered pleasure and, ultimately, a 
source of abrupt self-realization. Real-world laws, even when distorted by 
game rules, remain objectively demonstrable outside the game context, just 
as game rules remain objectively demonstrable through reference to game 
code. These and similar realities firmly establish a set of boundaries for com-
puter game play and insure, upon repetitive and recursive play, that play is a 
parasitic and, ultimately, self-destructive form. That is, during play, players 
become increasingly self-aware (through reference to the formal mechanics 
of self-awareness) and increasingly less subject to the engagements, immer-
sions, and related pleasures of self-absorption. For this reason, computer 
game play commonly becomes, over time, increasingly revealed and, as a 
result, increasingly boring; and at the point of boredom, newer and more 
novel attractions—another computer game, perhaps—are required to sus-
tain any ongoing (anti-)aesthetic of play. Or, at least, this is the most normal 
consequence of play in its most common state, where it is fated by nature to 
create, to destroy, and, ultimately, to fail.
 Based on current trends in game design and game studies, however, I 
have some uncertainties and concerns regarding individual play in the rela-
tively un-natural state of virtual worlds—within MMORPGs, for instance, 
where games might be governed and ordered by a society of players rather 
than by the biological mechanics of play. These concerns are located neither 
in human play nor in interactive media but, rather, in the potency of those 
social norms that guide play behavior without need or opportunity to refer-
ence the natural environment in which human play originated. We face, in 
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other words, no danger from play—play has aided our species since time 
immemorial. We face danger only from that which might prevent play from 
breaking its own rules: the rules and regulations of social policies.
 In most social contexts, free and destructive play remains associated with 
and, assumedly, restricted to the immature, the untrained, or the criminal—
and no doubt such restrictions have well served the needs of society and 
those architects of social systems who construct and maintain that society. 
Within online virtual worlds, however, social order tends to isolate, pros-
ecute, and, if possible, eliminate all griefing and hacking and other so-called 
miscreant behaviors. This social order, when applied within virtual worlds 
similar to the current crop of MMORPGs, has significant potential to put 
natural laws and forms of play at risk.
 Prior to this point in human history and the advent of pervasive social 
media, regardless of any maverick policy or misguided law, regardless of all 
restrictions and boundaries, play has maintained the capacity to break free. 
Indeed, the value of play emphasized here—to reveal something other than 
what is already known—assumes that play provides not only a different per-
spective but a meta-perspective. This meta-perspective allows play to break 
free of what is imagined or expected or desired—even unto what is denied 
and feared and least of all desired.3
 Thus, as an embodied property of the human species, free and open play 
has remained secure from the more local and temporary effects of social 
influence, subdued from time to time, yet incorrigible. However, as virtual 
worlds evolve toward increasingly realistic interfaces and operating systems—
which they show every indication of doing—play within these worlds seems 
increasingly likely to avoid the often distasteful revelations of the natural 
world in favor of the more pleasant and uncontested confirmations of a cul-
turally situated and properly socialized self. Should social policy dictate the 
code and interface of virtual worlds for social benefit, then individual play 
within those worlds would no longer have recourse to nature. Natural law 
in such circumstances becomes the socially controlled conventions of inter-
face and code. Play might still break things within such a socially determined 
world, but it would no longer have the capacity, based on the unpredictable 
revelations of play within nature, to break free.
 A virtual world that traps, regulates, and purposefully distorts the overtly 
selfish behavior of individuals—including, prominently, play—appears to be 
a well-built bottle for one of our most destructive and most useful genies. I 
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